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The Political Economy of Monetary Union
The Political Economy of Monetary Union presents an important collection of the most influential articles covering different areas in this expanding field.
More Information
Critical Acclaim
Contributors
Contents
More Information
The Political Economy of Monetary Union presents an important collection of the most influential articles covering different areas in this expanding field.
The volume brings together both the classical articles which have laid the foundations for the theory of optimum currency and the resulting empirical literature. Further papers focus on the issues of fiscal policy, the design and operation of the central bank in a monetary union and the problems of transition to monetary union.
This authoritative volume is essential reading for all scholars, students and practitioners interested in the issues relating to economic and monetary unification.
The volume brings together both the classical articles which have laid the foundations for the theory of optimum currency and the resulting empirical literature. Further papers focus on the issues of fiscal policy, the design and operation of the central bank in a monetary union and the problems of transition to monetary union.
This authoritative volume is essential reading for all scholars, students and practitioners interested in the issues relating to economic and monetary unification.
Critical Acclaim
‘The selection of readings prepared by Paul De Grauwe – himself an important contributor to the theory of monetary union – is a most timely and useful tool for teachers and students.’
– Giorgio Basevi, University of Bologna, Italy
– Giorgio Basevi, University of Bologna, Italy
Contributors
24 articles, dating from 1961 to 1999
Contributors include: R. Dornbusch, B. Eichengreen, J. Frankel, F. Giavazzi, P. Kenen, P. Krugman, R. McKinnon, R. Mundell, J. Von Hagen, C. Wyplosz
Contributors include: R. Dornbusch, B. Eichengreen, J. Frankel, F. Giavazzi, P. Kenen, P. Krugman, R. McKinnon, R. Mundell, J. Von Hagen, C. Wyplosz
Contents
Contents
Acknowledgements
Introduction Paul De Grauwe
PART I THE THEORY OF OPTIMUM CURRENCY AREAS
1. Robert A. Mundell (1961), ‘A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas’
2. Ronald I. McKinnon (1963), ‘Optimum Currency Areas’
3. Peter B. Kenen (1969), ‘The Theory of Optimum Currency Areas: An Eclectic View’
4. Paul Krugman (1993), ‘Lessons of Massachusetts for EMU’
5. George S. Tavlas (1993) ‘The "New" Theory of Optimum Currency Areas’
6. Tamim Bayoumi (1994), ‘A Formal Model of Optimum Currency Areas’
PART II EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF OPTIMUM CURRENCY AREAS
7. Tamim Bayoumi and Barry Eichengreen (1993), ‘Shocking Aspects of European Monetary Integration’
8. Tamim Bayoumi and Barry Eichengreen (1997), ‘Ever Closer to Heaven? An Optimum-Currency-Area Index for European Countries’
9. M.J. Artis and W. Zhang (1997), ‘International Business Cycles and the ERM: Is there a European Business Cycle?’
10. Paul De Grauwe and Wim Vanhaverbeke (1993), ‘Is Europe an Optimum Currency Area?: Evidence from Regional Data’
11. Jörg Decressin and Antonio Fatás (1995), ‘Regional Labour Market Dynamics in Europe’
12. Charles Engel and John H. Rogers (1996), ‘How Wide is the Border?’
13. Jeffrey A. Frankel and Andrew K. Rose (1998), ‘The Endogeneity of the Optimum Currency Area Criteria’
PART III FISCAL POLICIES IN A MONETARY UNION
14. Xavier Sala-i-Martín and Jeffrey Sachs (1992), ‘Fiscal Federalism and Optimum Currency Areas: Evidence for Europe from the United States’
15. Jürgen von Hagen (1992), ‘Fiscal Arrangements in a Monetary Union. Evidence from the US’
16. Willem Buiter, Giancarlo Corsetti and Nouriel Roubini (1993), ‘Excessive Deficits: Sense and Nonsense in the Treaty of Maastricht’
17. Charles Wyplosz (1991), ‘Monetary Union and Fiscal Policy Discipline’
18. Pierfederico Asdrubali, Bent E. Sørensen and Oved Yosha (1996), ‘Channels of Interstate Risk Sharing: United States 1963–1990’
PART IV THE CENTRAL BANK IN A MONETARY UNION
19. Jakob de Haan (1997), ‘The European Central Bank: Independence, Accountability and Strategy: A Review’
20. Stephen G. Cecchetti (1999), ‘Legal Structure, Financial Structure, and the Monetary Policy Transmission Mechanism’
21. Rudi Dornbusch, Carlo Favero and Francesco Giavazzi (1998), ‘Immediate Challenges for the European Central Bank’
PART V ISSUES OF TRANSITION TO MONETARY UNION
22. David Begg, Francesco Giavazzi, Jürgen von Hagen and Charles Wyplosz (1997), EMU: Getting the End-game Right
23. Roland Vaubel (1990), ‘Currency Competition and European Monetary Integration’
24. Friedrich A. Hayek (1984), ‘The Theory of Currency Competition. I.1 The Future Unit of Value’
Name Index
Acknowledgements
Introduction Paul De Grauwe
PART I THE THEORY OF OPTIMUM CURRENCY AREAS
1. Robert A. Mundell (1961), ‘A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas’
2. Ronald I. McKinnon (1963), ‘Optimum Currency Areas’
3. Peter B. Kenen (1969), ‘The Theory of Optimum Currency Areas: An Eclectic View’
4. Paul Krugman (1993), ‘Lessons of Massachusetts for EMU’
5. George S. Tavlas (1993) ‘The "New" Theory of Optimum Currency Areas’
6. Tamim Bayoumi (1994), ‘A Formal Model of Optimum Currency Areas’
PART II EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF OPTIMUM CURRENCY AREAS
7. Tamim Bayoumi and Barry Eichengreen (1993), ‘Shocking Aspects of European Monetary Integration’
8. Tamim Bayoumi and Barry Eichengreen (1997), ‘Ever Closer to Heaven? An Optimum-Currency-Area Index for European Countries’
9. M.J. Artis and W. Zhang (1997), ‘International Business Cycles and the ERM: Is there a European Business Cycle?’
10. Paul De Grauwe and Wim Vanhaverbeke (1993), ‘Is Europe an Optimum Currency Area?: Evidence from Regional Data’
11. Jörg Decressin and Antonio Fatás (1995), ‘Regional Labour Market Dynamics in Europe’
12. Charles Engel and John H. Rogers (1996), ‘How Wide is the Border?’
13. Jeffrey A. Frankel and Andrew K. Rose (1998), ‘The Endogeneity of the Optimum Currency Area Criteria’
PART III FISCAL POLICIES IN A MONETARY UNION
14. Xavier Sala-i-Martín and Jeffrey Sachs (1992), ‘Fiscal Federalism and Optimum Currency Areas: Evidence for Europe from the United States’
15. Jürgen von Hagen (1992), ‘Fiscal Arrangements in a Monetary Union. Evidence from the US’
16. Willem Buiter, Giancarlo Corsetti and Nouriel Roubini (1993), ‘Excessive Deficits: Sense and Nonsense in the Treaty of Maastricht’
17. Charles Wyplosz (1991), ‘Monetary Union and Fiscal Policy Discipline’
18. Pierfederico Asdrubali, Bent E. Sørensen and Oved Yosha (1996), ‘Channels of Interstate Risk Sharing: United States 1963–1990’
PART IV THE CENTRAL BANK IN A MONETARY UNION
19. Jakob de Haan (1997), ‘The European Central Bank: Independence, Accountability and Strategy: A Review’
20. Stephen G. Cecchetti (1999), ‘Legal Structure, Financial Structure, and the Monetary Policy Transmission Mechanism’
21. Rudi Dornbusch, Carlo Favero and Francesco Giavazzi (1998), ‘Immediate Challenges for the European Central Bank’
PART V ISSUES OF TRANSITION TO MONETARY UNION
22. David Begg, Francesco Giavazzi, Jürgen von Hagen and Charles Wyplosz (1997), EMU: Getting the End-game Right
23. Roland Vaubel (1990), ‘Currency Competition and European Monetary Integration’
24. Friedrich A. Hayek (1984), ‘The Theory of Currency Competition. I.1 The Future Unit of Value’
Name Index
