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The International Monetary Fund and the World Economy
A large and growing academic literature seeks to analyse the key aspects of the International Monetary Fund’s operations from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. This two-volume set draws together what are generally acknowledged to be the most important contributions. In the main it focuses on the economics of the IMF but also reflects the fact that a full understanding of the Fund will only be achieved if its political dimensions are also addressed. The collected articles demonstrate the way in which research on the IMF has evolved over time. They cover the role of the IMF, the determinants of IMF lending, conditionality and the implementation and effects of IMF programs, the prolonged use of IMF resources as well as the IMF’s own reserve asset, the Special Drawing Right. No serious student of the IMF will want to be without this up-to-date and comprehensive collection.
More Information
Critical Acclaim
Contributors
Contents
More Information
A large and growing academic literature seeks to analyse the key aspects of the International Monetary Fund’s operations from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. This two-volume set draws together what are generally acknowledged to be the most important contributions. In the main it focuses on the economics of the IMF but also reflects the fact that a full understanding of the Fund will only be achieved if its political dimensions are also addressed. The collected articles demonstrate the way in which research on the IMF has evolved over time. They cover the role of the IMF, the determinants of IMF lending, conditionality and the implementation and effects of IMF programs, the prolonged use of IMF resources as well as the IMF’s own reserve asset, the Special Drawing Right. No serious student of the IMF will want to be without this up-to-date and comprehensive collection.
Critical Acclaim
‘Bird and Rowlands have accomplished a remarkable milestone in providing the world this invaluable collection of top-notch articles and papers published at different times in the 20th and 21st centuries. . . This is an ambitious work that was well executed. I highly recommend it.’
– Chika B. Onwuekwe, Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation
– Chika B. Onwuekwe, Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation
Contributors
38 articles, dating from 1981 to 2004
Contributors include: S. Dell, A. Dreher, M. Feldstein, M. Goldstein, M.S. Khan, T. Killick, J.J. Polak, J. Spraos, R. Stone, R. Vaubel
Contributors include: S. Dell, A. Dreher, M. Feldstein, M. Goldstein, M.S. Khan, T. Killick, J.J. Polak, J. Spraos, R. Stone, R. Vaubel
Contents
Contents:
Volume I
Acknowledgements
Introduction Graham Bird and Dane Rowlands
PART I THE DETERMINANTS OF IMF PROGRAMMES
1. Graham Bird and Timothy Orme (1981), ‘An Analysis of Drawings on the International Monetary Fund by Developing Countries’
2. Joseph P. Joyce (1992), ‘The Economic Characteristics of IMF Program Countries’
3. Patrick Conway (1994), ‘IMF Lending Programs: Participation and Impact’
4. Julio A. Santaella (1996), ‘Stylized Facts Before IMF-Supported Macroeconomic Adjustment’
5. Strom C. Thacker (1999), ‘The High Politics of IMF Lending’
6. Graham Bird and Dane Rowlands (2001), ‘IMF Lending: How Is It Affected by Economic, Political and Institutional Factors?’
7. Randall W. Stone (2004), ‘The Political Economy of IMF Lending in Africa’
PART II THE DESIGN OF IMF CONDITIONALITY
8. Sidney Dell (1981), ‘On Being Grandmotherly: The Evolution of IMF Conditionality’
9. Mohsin S. Khan and Malcolm D. Knight (1981), ‘Stabilization Programs in Developing Countries: A Formal Framework’
10. John Spraos (1986), ‘IMF Conditionality: Ineffectual, Inefficient, Mistargeted’
11. Jacques J. Polak (1991), ‘The Changing Nature of IMF Conditionality’
12. Manuel Guitián (1995), ‘Conditionality: Past, Present, Future’
13. Paul Collier, Patrick Guillaumont, Sylviane Guillaumont and Jan Willem Gunning (1997), ‘Redesigning Conditionality’
14. Martin Feldstein (1998), ‘Refocusing the IMF’
15. Michael Mussa and Miguel Savastano (2000), ‘The IMF Approach to Economic Stabilization’
16. William Easterly (2006), ‘An Identity Crisis? Examining the IMF Financial Programming’
17. Morris Goldstein (2003), ‘IMF Structural Programs’
Name Index
Volume II
Acknowledgements
An introduction by the editors to both volumes appears in Volume I
PART I THE EFFECTS OF IMF PROGRAMMES
1. Morris Goldstein and Peter Montiel (1986), ‘Evaluating Fund Stabilization Programs with Multicountry Data: Some Methodological Pitfalls’
2. Mohsin S. Khan (1990), ‘The Macroeconomic Effects of Fund-Supported Adjustment Programs’
3. Tony Killick, Moazzam Malik and Marcus Manuel (1992), ‘What Can We Know About the Effects of IMF Programmes?’
4. Khosrow Doroodian (1993), ‘Macroeconomic Performance and Adjustment Under Policies Commonly Supported by the International Monetary Fund’
5. Graham Bird and Dane Rowlands (1997), ‘The Catalytic Effect of Lending by the International Financial Institutions’
6. Louis Dicks-Mireaux, Mauro Mecagni and Susan Schadler (2000), ‘Evaluating the Effects of IMF Lending to Low-Income Countries’
7. Gopal Garuda (2000), ‘The Distributional Effects of IMF Programs: A Cross-Country Analysis’
8. Adam Przeworski and James Raymond Vreeland (2000), ‘The Effect of IMF Programs on Economic Growth’
9. Ayse Evrensel (2002), ‘Effectiveness of IMF-Supported Stabilization Programs in Developing Countries’
10. Michael M. Hutchison (2003), ‘A Cure Worse Than the Disease? Currency Crises and the Output Costs of IMF-Supported Stabilization Programs’
11. Axel Dreher and Roland Vaubel (2004), ‘The Causes and Consequences of IMF Conditionality’
PART II THE IMPLEMENTATION OF IMF PROGRAMMES
12. Tony Killick (1996), ‘Principals, Agents and the Limitations of BWI Conditionality’
13. Graham Bird (1998), ‘The Effectiveness of Conditionality and the Political Economy of Policy Reform: Is It Simply a Matter of Political Will?’
14. Allan Drazen (2002), ‘Conditionality and Ownership in IMF Lending: A Political Economy Approach’
15. Axel Dreher (2003), ‘The Influence of Elections on IMF Programme Interruptions’
16. Anna Ivanova, Wolfgang Mayer, Alex Mourmouras and George Anayiotos (2006), ‘What Determines the Implementation of IMF-Supported Programs?’
PART III MORAL HAZARD, LENDER OF LAST RESORT, AND SPECIAL DRAWING RIGHTS
17. G.K. Helleiner (1983), ‘Lender of Early Resort: The IMF and the Poorest’
18. Roland Vaubel (1983), ‘The Moral Hazard of IMF Lending’
19. Graham Bird (1998), ‘The Political Economy of the SDR: The Rise and Fall of an International Reserve Asset’
20. Stanley Fischer (1999), ‘On the Need for an International Lender of Last Resort’
21. Axel Dreher and Roland Vaubel (2004), ‘Do IMF and IBRD Cause Moral Hazard and Political Business Cycles? Evidence from Panel Data’
Name Index
Volume I
Acknowledgements
Introduction Graham Bird and Dane Rowlands
PART I THE DETERMINANTS OF IMF PROGRAMMES
1. Graham Bird and Timothy Orme (1981), ‘An Analysis of Drawings on the International Monetary Fund by Developing Countries’
2. Joseph P. Joyce (1992), ‘The Economic Characteristics of IMF Program Countries’
3. Patrick Conway (1994), ‘IMF Lending Programs: Participation and Impact’
4. Julio A. Santaella (1996), ‘Stylized Facts Before IMF-Supported Macroeconomic Adjustment’
5. Strom C. Thacker (1999), ‘The High Politics of IMF Lending’
6. Graham Bird and Dane Rowlands (2001), ‘IMF Lending: How Is It Affected by Economic, Political and Institutional Factors?’
7. Randall W. Stone (2004), ‘The Political Economy of IMF Lending in Africa’
PART II THE DESIGN OF IMF CONDITIONALITY
8. Sidney Dell (1981), ‘On Being Grandmotherly: The Evolution of IMF Conditionality’
9. Mohsin S. Khan and Malcolm D. Knight (1981), ‘Stabilization Programs in Developing Countries: A Formal Framework’
10. John Spraos (1986), ‘IMF Conditionality: Ineffectual, Inefficient, Mistargeted’
11. Jacques J. Polak (1991), ‘The Changing Nature of IMF Conditionality’
12. Manuel Guitián (1995), ‘Conditionality: Past, Present, Future’
13. Paul Collier, Patrick Guillaumont, Sylviane Guillaumont and Jan Willem Gunning (1997), ‘Redesigning Conditionality’
14. Martin Feldstein (1998), ‘Refocusing the IMF’
15. Michael Mussa and Miguel Savastano (2000), ‘The IMF Approach to Economic Stabilization’
16. William Easterly (2006), ‘An Identity Crisis? Examining the IMF Financial Programming’
17. Morris Goldstein (2003), ‘IMF Structural Programs’
Name Index
Volume II
Acknowledgements
An introduction by the editors to both volumes appears in Volume I
PART I THE EFFECTS OF IMF PROGRAMMES
1. Morris Goldstein and Peter Montiel (1986), ‘Evaluating Fund Stabilization Programs with Multicountry Data: Some Methodological Pitfalls’
2. Mohsin S. Khan (1990), ‘The Macroeconomic Effects of Fund-Supported Adjustment Programs’
3. Tony Killick, Moazzam Malik and Marcus Manuel (1992), ‘What Can We Know About the Effects of IMF Programmes?’
4. Khosrow Doroodian (1993), ‘Macroeconomic Performance and Adjustment Under Policies Commonly Supported by the International Monetary Fund’
5. Graham Bird and Dane Rowlands (1997), ‘The Catalytic Effect of Lending by the International Financial Institutions’
6. Louis Dicks-Mireaux, Mauro Mecagni and Susan Schadler (2000), ‘Evaluating the Effects of IMF Lending to Low-Income Countries’
7. Gopal Garuda (2000), ‘The Distributional Effects of IMF Programs: A Cross-Country Analysis’
8. Adam Przeworski and James Raymond Vreeland (2000), ‘The Effect of IMF Programs on Economic Growth’
9. Ayse Evrensel (2002), ‘Effectiveness of IMF-Supported Stabilization Programs in Developing Countries’
10. Michael M. Hutchison (2003), ‘A Cure Worse Than the Disease? Currency Crises and the Output Costs of IMF-Supported Stabilization Programs’
11. Axel Dreher and Roland Vaubel (2004), ‘The Causes and Consequences of IMF Conditionality’
PART II THE IMPLEMENTATION OF IMF PROGRAMMES
12. Tony Killick (1996), ‘Principals, Agents and the Limitations of BWI Conditionality’
13. Graham Bird (1998), ‘The Effectiveness of Conditionality and the Political Economy of Policy Reform: Is It Simply a Matter of Political Will?’
14. Allan Drazen (2002), ‘Conditionality and Ownership in IMF Lending: A Political Economy Approach’
15. Axel Dreher (2003), ‘The Influence of Elections on IMF Programme Interruptions’
16. Anna Ivanova, Wolfgang Mayer, Alex Mourmouras and George Anayiotos (2006), ‘What Determines the Implementation of IMF-Supported Programs?’
PART III MORAL HAZARD, LENDER OF LAST RESORT, AND SPECIAL DRAWING RIGHTS
17. G.K. Helleiner (1983), ‘Lender of Early Resort: The IMF and the Poorest’
18. Roland Vaubel (1983), ‘The Moral Hazard of IMF Lending’
19. Graham Bird (1998), ‘The Political Economy of the SDR: The Rise and Fall of an International Reserve Asset’
20. Stanley Fischer (1999), ‘On the Need for an International Lender of Last Resort’
21. Axel Dreher and Roland Vaubel (2004), ‘Do IMF and IBRD Cause Moral Hazard and Political Business Cycles? Evidence from Panel Data’
Name Index
