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The International Library of the New Institutional Economics
The seven volumes in the series cover the main aspects of research in the field, beginning with an overview of its analytical foundations in Volume 1. The subsequent volumes consider issues in transaction costs and property rights, the nature and role of contracts, the alternative modes of organization, the role and nature of modern corporations, and the political economy of institutions. The series concludes with a review of some major challenges and controversies.
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Critical Acclaim
Contributors
Contents
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This authoritative series brings together the most significant papers published by leading economists and social scientists in the rapidly developing field of New Institutional Economics. The selection includes theoretical papers as well as applications and empirical studies. It represents the diversity of methodologies used for exploring the fundamental questions of the nature and status of institutions and organizations in market economies.
The seven volumes in the series cover the main aspects of research in the field, beginning with an overview of its analytical foundations in Volume 1. The subsequent volumes consider issues in transaction costs and property rights, the nature and role of contracts, the alternative modes of organization, the role and nature of modern corporations, and the political economy of institutions. The series concludes with a review of some major challenges and controversies.
This comprehensive series will be an invaluable guide for scholars in economics, social sciences, managerial sciences and law.
The seven volumes in the series cover the main aspects of research in the field, beginning with an overview of its analytical foundations in Volume 1. The subsequent volumes consider issues in transaction costs and property rights, the nature and role of contracts, the alternative modes of organization, the role and nature of modern corporations, and the political economy of institutions. The series concludes with a review of some major challenges and controversies.
This comprehensive series will be an invaluable guide for scholars in economics, social sciences, managerial sciences and law.
Critical Acclaim
‘To those wishing to learn about the New Institutional Economics, this comprehensive collection of articles will be extremely valuable, exhibiting, as it does, the New Institutional Economics in all its variety. To those wishing to contribute to the New Institutional Economics, it will be an indispensable reference source.’
– Ronald H. Coase, University of Chicago Law School, US
‘For those in economics, and the social sciences generally, who wish to broaden the horizons of their discipline to deal more effectively with the manifold problems we face, the New Institutional Economics offers a promising future. This collection of articles shows just how promising that future can be.’
– Douglass C. North, Washington University, US
‘These volumes disclose and develop the richness and importance of the New Institutional Economics – in conceptual, theoretical, empirical, and public policy respects. These timely volumes will be widely used by present students of the NIE and by social scientists and public policy analysts more generally.’
– Oliver E. Williamson, University of California, Berkeley, US
– Ronald H. Coase, University of Chicago Law School, US
‘For those in economics, and the social sciences generally, who wish to broaden the horizons of their discipline to deal more effectively with the manifold problems we face, the New Institutional Economics offers a promising future. This collection of articles shows just how promising that future can be.’
– Douglass C. North, Washington University, US
‘These volumes disclose and develop the richness and importance of the New Institutional Economics – in conceptual, theoretical, empirical, and public policy respects. These timely volumes will be widely used by present students of the NIE and by social scientists and public policy analysts more generally.’
– Oliver E. Williamson, University of California, Berkeley, US
Contributors
171 articles, dating from 1732 to 2002
Contributors include: A. Alchian, M. Aoki, K. Arrow, Y. Barzel, S. Cheung, R.H. Coase, H. Demsetz, D.C. North, H. Simon, O.E. Williamson
Contributors include: A. Alchian, M. Aoki, K. Arrow, Y. Barzel, S. Cheung, R.H. Coase, H. Demsetz, D.C. North, H. Simon, O.E. Williamson
Contents
Contents
Volume I: The Foundations of the New Institutional Economics
Acknowledgements
General Introduction Claude Ménard
Introduction Claude Ménard
PART I BACKGROUND
1. Bernard Mandeville ([1732] 1988), ‘The Grumbling Hive: or, Knaves turn’d Honest’
2. Adam Smith ([1776] 1976), ‘Of the Division of Labour’, ‘Of the Principle Which Gives Occasion to the Division of Labour’ and ‘That the Division of Labour is Limited by the Extent of the Market’
PART II CLASSIC REFERENCES
3. R.H. Coase (1937), ‘The Nature of the Firm’
4. H.B. Malmgren (1961), ‘Information, Expectations and the Theory of the Firm’
5. Herbert A. Simon (1962), ‘The Architecture of Complexity’
6. Kenneth J. Arrow (1970), ‘The Organization of Economic Activity: Issues Pertinent to the Choice of Market versus Nonmarket Allocation’
7. Lance E. Davis and Douglass C. North with the assistance of Calla Smorodin (1971), ‘A Theory of Institutional Change: Concepts and Causes’
8. Armen A. Alchian and Harold Demsetz (1972), ‘Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization’
9. Steven N.S. Cheung (1973), ‘The Fable of the Bees: An Economic Investigation’
10. Oliver E. Williamson (1979), ‘Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations’
11. Leonid Hurwicz (1987), ‘Inventing New Institutions: The Design Perspective’
PART III MODELING INSTITUTIONS AND INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
12. Andrew Schotter (1981), ‘The Nature and Function of Social Institutions’
13. Leonid Hurwicz (1996), ‘Institutions as Families of Game Forms’
14. Masahiko Aoki (2000), ‘Institutional Evolution as Punctuated Equilibria’
15. David M. Kreps (1996), ‘Markets and Hierarchies and (Mathematical) Economic Theory’
16. Michael H. Riordan and Oliver E. Williamson (1985), ‘Asset Specificity and Economic Organization’
17. Patrick Bajari and Steven Tadelis (2001), ‘Incentives versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts’
18. Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry R. Weingast (1981), ‘Structure-induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice’
PART IV SOME MAJOR ISSUES
19. Eirik G. Furubotn and Rudolf Richter (1997), ‘Introductory Observations’
20. James M. Buchanan (1975), ‘A Contractarian Paradigm for Applying Economic Theory’
21. Elinor Ostrom (1986), ‘An Agenda for the Study of Institutions’
22. Mark Granovetter (1992), ‘Economic Institutions as Social Constructions: A Framework for Analysis’
23. R.C.O. Matthews (1986), ‘The Economics of Institutions and the Sources of Growth’
24. Masahiko Aoki (1996), ‘Towards a Comparative Institutional Analysis: Motivations and Some Tentative Theorizing’
25. Claude Ménard (1995), ‘Markets as Institutions versus Organizations as Markets? Disentangling Some Fundamental Concepts’
26. Ronald Coase (1998), ‘The New Institutional Economics’
Name Index
Volume II: Transaction Costs and Property Rights
Acknowledgements
General Introduction Claude Ménard
Introduction Claude Ménard
PART I BEHAVIORAL ASSUMPTIONS
1. Douglass C. North (1990), ‘The Behavioral Assumptions in a Theory of Institutions’
2. Herbert A. Simon (1978), ‘Rationality as Process and as Product of Thought’
3. Oliver E. Williamson (1993), ‘Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization’
4. Reinhard Selten (1990), ‘Bounded Rationality’
5. Ronald A. Heiner (1983), ‘The Origin of Predictable Behavior’
6. Elinor Ostrom (1998), ‘A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action’
PART II TRANSACTION COSTS
7. Douglass C. North (1990), ‘Institutions and a Transaction-Cost Theory of Exchange’
8. Oliver E. Williamson (1993), ‘Transaction Cost Economics and Organization Theory’
9. Duncan K. Foley (1970), ‘Economic Equilibrium with Costly Marketing’
10. Carl J. Dahlman (1979), ‘The Problem of Externality’
11. Harold Demsetz (1968), ‘The Cost of Transacting’
12. Yoram Barzel (1982) ‘Measurement Cost and the Organization of Markets’
13. Keith B. Leffler, Randal R. Rucker and Ian A. Munn (2000), ‘Transaction Costs and the Collection of Information: Presale Measurement on Private Timber Sales’
14. Douglas W. Allen (2000), ‘Transaction Costs’
PART III PROPERTY RIGHTS
15. R.H. Coase (1960), ‘The Problem of Social Cost’
16. Yoram Barzel (1997), ‘The Property Rights Model’
17. Armen A. Alchian (1977), ‘Some Economics of Property Rights’
18. Harold Demsetz (1967), ‘Toward a Theory of Property Rights’
19. Lee J. Alston, Gary D. Libecap and Robert Schneider (1996), ‘The Determinants and Impact of Property Rights: Land Titles on the Brazilian Frontier’
20. Jean Ensminger (1997), ‘Changing Property Rights: Reconciling Formal and Informal Rights to Land in Africa’
21. Oliver Hart and John Moore (1990), ‘Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm’
22. Henry Hansmann (1988), ‘Ownership of the Firm’
Name Index
Volume III: Contracts in the New Institutional Economics
Acknowledgements
General Introduction Claude Ménard
Introduction Claude Ménard
PART I NATURE AND LIMITS OF CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENTS
1. Oliver E. Williamson (1985), ‘Assessing Contract’
2. Jean Tirole (1999), ‘Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?’
3. Victor P. Goldberg (1976), ‘Regulation and Administered Contracts’
4. Benjamin Klein (1980), ‘Transaction Cost Determinants of “Unfair” Contractual Arrangements’
5. Oliver E. Williamson (1983), ‘Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange’
6. Arthur L. Stinchcombe (1990), ‘Organizing Information Outside the Firm: Contracts as Hierarchical Documents’
7. Yoram Ben-Porath (1980), ‘The F-Connection: Families, Friends, and Firms and the Organization of Exchange’
8. Stewart Macaulay (1963), ‘Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study’
PART II CHARACTERISTICS OF CONTRACTS
9. Paul L. Joskow (1987), ‘Contract Duration and Relationship-Specific Investments: Empirical Evidence from Coal Markets’
10. Scott E. Masten and Keith J. Crocker (1985), ‘Efficient Adaptation in Long-Term Contracts: Take-or-Pay Provisions for Natural Gas’
11. J. Harold Mulherin (1986), ‘Complexity in Long-term Contracts: An Analysis of Natural Gas Contractual Provisions’
12. Victor P. Goldberg and John R. Erickson (1987), ‘Quantity and Price Adjustment in Long-Term Contracts: A Case Study of Petroleum Coke’
13. Thomas M. Palay (1984), ‘Comparative Institutional Economics: The Governance of Rail Freight Contracting’
14. Keith J. Crocker and Kenneth J. Reynolds (1993), ‘The Efficiency of Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Analysis of Air Force Engine Procurement’
15. Stéphane Saussier (2000), ‘Transaction Costs and Contractual Incompleteness: The Case of Électricité de France’
16. Mary M. Shirley and Lixin Colin Yu (1998), ‘Information, Incentives, and Commitment: An Empirical Analysis of Contracts Between Government and State Enterprises’
PART III ENFORCEMENT ISSUES
17. Avner Greif (1993), ‘Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders’ Coalition’
18. Benjamin Klein and Keith B. Leffler (1981), ‘The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance’
19. Thomas M. Palay (1985), ‘Avoiding Regulatory Constraints: Contracting Safeguards and the Role of Informal Agreements’
20. Avner Greif, Paul Milgrom and Barry R. Weingast (1994), ‘Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild’
21. Alan Schwartz (1992), ‘Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies’
22. Gary D. Libecap and Steven N. Wiggins (1985), ‘The Influence of Private Contractual Failure on Regulation: The Case of Oil Field Unitization’
23. Benjamin Klein (1996), ‘Why Hold-Ups Occur: The Self-Enforcing Range of Contractual Relationships’
Name Index
Volume IV: Modes of Organization in the New Institutional Economics
Acknowledgements
General Introduction Claude Ménard
Introduction Claude Ménard
PART I MARKETS, HIERARCHIES, HYBRID FORMS
1. R.H. Coase (1992), ‘The Institutional Structure of Production’
2. Oliver E. Williamson (1991), ‘Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives’
3. Steven N.S. Cheung (1983), ‘The Contractual Nature of the Firm’
4. Bengt Holmstrom (1999), ‘The Firm as a Subeconomy’
5. James G. March (1962), ‘The Business Firm as a Political Coalition’
6. Claude Ménard (1997), ‘The Governance of Hybrid Organizational Forms’
7. George Baker, Robert Gibbons and Kevin J. Murphy (2002), ‘Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm’
PART II VERTICAL INTEGRATION
8. Oliver E. Williamson (1971), ‘The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations’
9. Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford and Armen A. Alchian (1978), ‘Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process’
10. Kirk Monteverde and David J. Teece (1982), ‘Supplier Switching Costs and Vertical Integration in the Automobile Industry’
11. Scott E. Masten (1984), ‘The Organization of Production: Evidence from the Aerospace Industry’
12. Paul L. Joskow (1985), ‘Vertical Integration and Long-term Contracts: The Case of Coal-burning Electric Generating Plants’
13. Bruce R. Lyons (1995), ‘Specific Investment, Economies of Scale, and the Make-or-Buy Decision: A Test of Transaction Cost Theory’
14. Erin Anderson and David C. Schmittlein (1984), ‘Integration of the Sales Force: An Empirical Examination’
15. George John and Barton A. Weitz (1988), ‘Forward Integration into Distribution: An Empirical Test of Transaction Cost Analysis’
16. Paul L. Joskow (1988), ‘Asset Specificity and the Structure of Vertical Relationships: Empirical Evidence’
PART III NON-STANDARD AGREEMENTS
17. William G. Ouchi (1980), ‘Markets, Bureaucracies, and Clans’
18. Robert G. Eccles (1981), ‘The Quasifirm in the Construction Industry’
19. Walter W. Powell (1990), ‘Neither Market nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization’
20. Claude Ménard (1996), ‘On Clusters, Hybrids, and Other Strange Forms: The Case of the French Poultry Industry’
21. Joanne E. Oxley (1997), ‘Appropriability Hazards and Governance in Strategic Alliances: A Transaction Cost Approach’
22. Francine Lafontaine and Kathryn L. Shaw (1999), ‘The Dynamics of Franchise Contracting: Evidence from Panel Data’
23. Bengt Holmström and John Roberts (1998), ‘The Boundaries of the Firm Revisited’
Name Index
Volume V: Institutional Dimensions of the Modern Corporation
Acknowledgements
General Introduction Claude Ménard
Introduction Claude Ménard
PART I STRUCTURES
1. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. (1980), ‘The United States: Seedbed of Managerial Capitalism’
2. Oliver E. Williamson (1981), ‘The Modern Corporation: Origins, Evolution, Attributes’
3. Masahiko Aoki (1990), ‘Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm’
4. Henry Ogden Armour and David J. Teece (1978), ‘Organizational Structure and Economic Performance: A Test of the Multidivisional Hypothesis’
5. Scott E. Masten, James W. Meehan, Jr. and Edward A. Snyder (1991), ‘The Costs of Organization’
PART II CONTROL WITHIN ORGANIZATIONS 6. Roy Radner (1986), ‘The Internal Economy of Large Firms’
7. Kenneth J. Arrow (1964), ‘Control in Large Organizations’
8. Oliver E. Williamson (1967), ‘Hierarchical Control and Optimum Firm Size’,
9. Masahiko Aoki (1986), ‘Horizontal vs. Vertical Information Structure of the Firm’
10. Jean Tirole (1986), ‘Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations’
11. Gary J. Miller (1990), ‘Managerial Dilemmas: Political Leadership in Hierarchies’
12. Philippe Aghion and Jean Tirole (1997), ‘Formal and Real Authority in Organizations’
13. Gregory K. Dow (1987), ‘The Function of Authority in Transaction Cost Economics’
14. Claude Ménard (1994), ‘Organizations as Coordinating Devices’
PART III MOTIVATIONS AND VALUES
15. Jeffrey Pfeffer (1990), ‘Incentives in Organizations: The Importance of Social Relations’
16. Sherwin Rosen (1988), ‘Transactions Costs and Internal Labor Markets’
17. Bengt Holmstrom and Paul Milgrom (1991), ‘Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design’
18. David M. Kreps (1990), ‘Corporate Culture and Economic Theory’
19. Gareth R. Jones (1983), ‘Transaction Costs, Property Rights, and Organizational Culture: An Exchange Perspective’
20. Mats Alvesson and Lars Lindkvist (1993), ‘Transaction Costs, Clans and Corporate Culture’
PART IV PUBLIC POLICIES AND ORGANIZATION CHOICES
21. Mark J. Roe (2002), ‘Can Culture Constrain the Economic Model of Corporate Law?’
22. Paul M. Hirsch (1975), ‘Organizational Effectiveness and the Institutional Environment’
23. Oliver E. Williamson (1976), ‘Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies – in General and with Respect to CATV’
24. Paul L. Joskow (1991), ‘The Role of Transaction Cost Economics in Antitrust and Public Utility Regulatory Policies’
25. Brian Levy and Pablo T. Spiller (1994), ‘The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation’
Name Index
Volume VI: The Political Economy of Institutions
Acknowledgements
General Introduction Claude Ménard
Introduction Claude Ménard
PART I POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIAL NORMS
1. Douglass C. North (1990), ‘A Transaction Cost Theory of Politics’
2. Randall L. Calvert (1998), ‘Rational Actors, Equilibrium, and Social Institutions’
3. Terry M. Moe (1990), ‘Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story’
4. Barry R. Weingast (1995), ‘The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development’
5. Barry R. Weingast and William J. Marshall (1988), ‘The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets’
6. Arthur T. Denzau and Michael C. Munger (1986), ‘Legislators and Interest Groups: How Unorganized Interests Get Represented’
7. Avner Greif (1994), ‘Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies’
8. Stanley L. Engerman (1997), ‘Cultural Values, Ideological Beliefs, and Changing Labor Institutions: Notes on Their Interactions’
9. Jon Elster (1989), ‘Social Norms and Economic Theory’
PART II THE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT OF A MARKET ECONOMY
10. Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast (1989), ‘Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England’
11. Barry R. Weingast (1993), ‘Constitutions as Governance Structures: The Political Foundations of Secure Markets’
12. Peter Murrell and Mancur Olson (1991), ‘The Devolution of Centrally Planned Economies’
13. Michael McFaul (1999), ‘Lessons from Russia’s Protracted Transition from Communist Rule’
14. Pranab K. Bardhan (2000), ‘Understanding Underdevelopment: Challenges for Institutional Economics From the Point of View of Poor Countries’
15. Ross Levine (1997), ‘Financial Development and Economic Growth: Views and Agenda’
16. Philip Keefer and Stephen Knack (1997), ‘Why Don’t Poor Countries Catch Up? A Cross-National Test of an Institutional Explanation’
PART III LONG RUN PERSPECTIVES
17. Avner Greif (1998), ‘Historical and Comparative Institutional Analysis’
18. Paul R. Milgrom, Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast (1990), ‘The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs’
19. Lee J. Alston and Joseph P. Ferrie (1993), ‘Paternalism in Agricultural Labor Contracts in the U.S. South: Implications for the Growth of the Welfare State’
20. Stanley L. Engerman, Stephen H. Haber and Kenneth L. Sokoloff (2000), ‘Inequality, Institutions and Differential Paths of Growth among New World Economies’
21. Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson (2001), ‘The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation’
22. Douglass C. North (1997), ‘Transaction Costs Through Time’
Name Index
Volume VII: Controversies and Challenges in the New Institutional Economics
Acknowledgements
General Introduction Claude Ménard
Introduction Claude Ménard
PART I ON ASSUMPTIONS
1. Oliver Hart (1990), ‘Is “Bounded Rationality” an Important Element of a Theory of Institutions?’
2. Richard N. Langlois (1990), ‘Bounded Rationality and Behavioralism: A Clarification and Critique’
3. Margaret Levi (2000), ‘When Good Defenses Make Good Neighbors: A Transaction Cost Approach to Trust, the Absence of Trust and Distrust’
4. Arthur T. Denzau and Douglass C. North (1994), ‘Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions’
PART II ON THE NATURE OF THE FIRM
5. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. (1992), ‘What is a Firm? A Historical Perspective’
6. Harold Demsetz (1988), ‘The Theory of the Firm Revisited’
7. Armen A. Alchian and Susan Woodward (1988), ‘The Firm is Dead; Long Live the Firm: A Review of Oliver E. Williamson’s The Economic Institutions of Capitalism’
8. John Moore (1992), ‘The Firm as a Collection of Assets’
9. Herbert A. Simon (1991), ‘Organizations and Markets’
PART III ON VERTICAL INTEGRATION
10. Benjamin Klein (1988), ‘Vertical Integration as Organizational Ownership: The Fisher Body-General Motors Relationship Revisited’
11. R.H. Coase (2000), ‘The Acquisition of Fisher Body by General Motors’
12. Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart (1986), ‘The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration’
13. Michael D. Whinston (2001), ‘Assessing the Property Rights and Transaction-Cost Theories of Firm Scope’
PART IV ON TRANSACTION COSTS
14. William M. Dugger (1983), ‘The Transaction Cost Analysis of Oliver E. Williamson: A New Synthesis?’
15. Gregory K. Dow (1993), ‘The Appropriability Critique of Transaction Cost Economics’
16. Paul Milgrom and John Roberts (1990), ‘Bargaining Costs, Influence Costs, and the Organization of Economic Activity’
17. Yoram Barzel (1985), ‘Transaction Costs: Are They Just Costs?’
18. Oliver E. Williamson (1990), ‘A Comparison of Alternative Approaches to Economic Organization’
PART V OLD WINE IN NEW BOTTLES?
19. Ernest J. Englander (1988), ‘Technology and Oliver Williamson’s Transaction Cost Economics’
20. Oliver E. Williamson (1988), ‘Technology and Transaction Cost Economics: A Reply’
21. Geoffrey M. Hodgson (1993), ‘Institutional Economics: Surveying the “Old” and the “New”’
22. Terence W. Hutchison (1984), ‘Institutionalist Economics Old and New’
23. Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell (1991), ‘Introduction’
24. Douglass C. North (1995), ‘Five Propositions about Institutional Change’
PART VI WRAPPING IT UP: ON THE RESEARCH AGENDA [121 pp]
25. Douglass C. North (1981), ‘A Theory of Institutional Change and the Economic History of the Western World’
26. Jack Knight and Douglass North (1997), ‘Explaining Economic Change: The Interplay Between Cognition and Institutions’
27. Mark Granovetter (1985), ‘Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness’
28. Paul L. Joskow (2002), ‘Transaction Cost Economics, Antitrust Rules, and Remedies’
29. Aric Rindfleisch and Jan B. Heide (1997), ‘Transaction Cost Analysis: Past, Present, and Future Applications’
30. Oliver E. Williamson (2000), ‘The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead’
Name Index
Volume I: The Foundations of the New Institutional Economics
Acknowledgements
General Introduction Claude Ménard
Introduction Claude Ménard
PART I BACKGROUND
1. Bernard Mandeville ([1732] 1988), ‘The Grumbling Hive: or, Knaves turn’d Honest’
2. Adam Smith ([1776] 1976), ‘Of the Division of Labour’, ‘Of the Principle Which Gives Occasion to the Division of Labour’ and ‘That the Division of Labour is Limited by the Extent of the Market’
PART II CLASSIC REFERENCES
3. R.H. Coase (1937), ‘The Nature of the Firm’
4. H.B. Malmgren (1961), ‘Information, Expectations and the Theory of the Firm’
5. Herbert A. Simon (1962), ‘The Architecture of Complexity’
6. Kenneth J. Arrow (1970), ‘The Organization of Economic Activity: Issues Pertinent to the Choice of Market versus Nonmarket Allocation’
7. Lance E. Davis and Douglass C. North with the assistance of Calla Smorodin (1971), ‘A Theory of Institutional Change: Concepts and Causes’
8. Armen A. Alchian and Harold Demsetz (1972), ‘Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization’
9. Steven N.S. Cheung (1973), ‘The Fable of the Bees: An Economic Investigation’
10. Oliver E. Williamson (1979), ‘Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations’
11. Leonid Hurwicz (1987), ‘Inventing New Institutions: The Design Perspective’
PART III MODELING INSTITUTIONS AND INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
12. Andrew Schotter (1981), ‘The Nature and Function of Social Institutions’
13. Leonid Hurwicz (1996), ‘Institutions as Families of Game Forms’
14. Masahiko Aoki (2000), ‘Institutional Evolution as Punctuated Equilibria’
15. David M. Kreps (1996), ‘Markets and Hierarchies and (Mathematical) Economic Theory’
16. Michael H. Riordan and Oliver E. Williamson (1985), ‘Asset Specificity and Economic Organization’
17. Patrick Bajari and Steven Tadelis (2001), ‘Incentives versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts’
18. Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry R. Weingast (1981), ‘Structure-induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice’
PART IV SOME MAJOR ISSUES
19. Eirik G. Furubotn and Rudolf Richter (1997), ‘Introductory Observations’
20. James M. Buchanan (1975), ‘A Contractarian Paradigm for Applying Economic Theory’
21. Elinor Ostrom (1986), ‘An Agenda for the Study of Institutions’
22. Mark Granovetter (1992), ‘Economic Institutions as Social Constructions: A Framework for Analysis’
23. R.C.O. Matthews (1986), ‘The Economics of Institutions and the Sources of Growth’
24. Masahiko Aoki (1996), ‘Towards a Comparative Institutional Analysis: Motivations and Some Tentative Theorizing’
25. Claude Ménard (1995), ‘Markets as Institutions versus Organizations as Markets? Disentangling Some Fundamental Concepts’
26. Ronald Coase (1998), ‘The New Institutional Economics’
Name Index
Volume II: Transaction Costs and Property Rights
Acknowledgements
General Introduction Claude Ménard
Introduction Claude Ménard
PART I BEHAVIORAL ASSUMPTIONS
1. Douglass C. North (1990), ‘The Behavioral Assumptions in a Theory of Institutions’
2. Herbert A. Simon (1978), ‘Rationality as Process and as Product of Thought’
3. Oliver E. Williamson (1993), ‘Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization’
4. Reinhard Selten (1990), ‘Bounded Rationality’
5. Ronald A. Heiner (1983), ‘The Origin of Predictable Behavior’
6. Elinor Ostrom (1998), ‘A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action’
PART II TRANSACTION COSTS
7. Douglass C. North (1990), ‘Institutions and a Transaction-Cost Theory of Exchange’
8. Oliver E. Williamson (1993), ‘Transaction Cost Economics and Organization Theory’
9. Duncan K. Foley (1970), ‘Economic Equilibrium with Costly Marketing’
10. Carl J. Dahlman (1979), ‘The Problem of Externality’
11. Harold Demsetz (1968), ‘The Cost of Transacting’
12. Yoram Barzel (1982) ‘Measurement Cost and the Organization of Markets’
13. Keith B. Leffler, Randal R. Rucker and Ian A. Munn (2000), ‘Transaction Costs and the Collection of Information: Presale Measurement on Private Timber Sales’
14. Douglas W. Allen (2000), ‘Transaction Costs’
PART III PROPERTY RIGHTS
15. R.H. Coase (1960), ‘The Problem of Social Cost’
16. Yoram Barzel (1997), ‘The Property Rights Model’
17. Armen A. Alchian (1977), ‘Some Economics of Property Rights’
18. Harold Demsetz (1967), ‘Toward a Theory of Property Rights’
19. Lee J. Alston, Gary D. Libecap and Robert Schneider (1996), ‘The Determinants and Impact of Property Rights: Land Titles on the Brazilian Frontier’
20. Jean Ensminger (1997), ‘Changing Property Rights: Reconciling Formal and Informal Rights to Land in Africa’
21. Oliver Hart and John Moore (1990), ‘Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm’
22. Henry Hansmann (1988), ‘Ownership of the Firm’
Name Index
Volume III: Contracts in the New Institutional Economics
Acknowledgements
General Introduction Claude Ménard
Introduction Claude Ménard
PART I NATURE AND LIMITS OF CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENTS
1. Oliver E. Williamson (1985), ‘Assessing Contract’
2. Jean Tirole (1999), ‘Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?’
3. Victor P. Goldberg (1976), ‘Regulation and Administered Contracts’
4. Benjamin Klein (1980), ‘Transaction Cost Determinants of “Unfair” Contractual Arrangements’
5. Oliver E. Williamson (1983), ‘Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange’
6. Arthur L. Stinchcombe (1990), ‘Organizing Information Outside the Firm: Contracts as Hierarchical Documents’
7. Yoram Ben-Porath (1980), ‘The F-Connection: Families, Friends, and Firms and the Organization of Exchange’
8. Stewart Macaulay (1963), ‘Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study’
PART II CHARACTERISTICS OF CONTRACTS
9. Paul L. Joskow (1987), ‘Contract Duration and Relationship-Specific Investments: Empirical Evidence from Coal Markets’
10. Scott E. Masten and Keith J. Crocker (1985), ‘Efficient Adaptation in Long-Term Contracts: Take-or-Pay Provisions for Natural Gas’
11. J. Harold Mulherin (1986), ‘Complexity in Long-term Contracts: An Analysis of Natural Gas Contractual Provisions’
12. Victor P. Goldberg and John R. Erickson (1987), ‘Quantity and Price Adjustment in Long-Term Contracts: A Case Study of Petroleum Coke’
13. Thomas M. Palay (1984), ‘Comparative Institutional Economics: The Governance of Rail Freight Contracting’
14. Keith J. Crocker and Kenneth J. Reynolds (1993), ‘The Efficiency of Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Analysis of Air Force Engine Procurement’
15. Stéphane Saussier (2000), ‘Transaction Costs and Contractual Incompleteness: The Case of Électricité de France’
16. Mary M. Shirley and Lixin Colin Yu (1998), ‘Information, Incentives, and Commitment: An Empirical Analysis of Contracts Between Government and State Enterprises’
PART III ENFORCEMENT ISSUES
17. Avner Greif (1993), ‘Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders’ Coalition’
18. Benjamin Klein and Keith B. Leffler (1981), ‘The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance’
19. Thomas M. Palay (1985), ‘Avoiding Regulatory Constraints: Contracting Safeguards and the Role of Informal Agreements’
20. Avner Greif, Paul Milgrom and Barry R. Weingast (1994), ‘Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild’
21. Alan Schwartz (1992), ‘Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies’
22. Gary D. Libecap and Steven N. Wiggins (1985), ‘The Influence of Private Contractual Failure on Regulation: The Case of Oil Field Unitization’
23. Benjamin Klein (1996), ‘Why Hold-Ups Occur: The Self-Enforcing Range of Contractual Relationships’
Name Index
Volume IV: Modes of Organization in the New Institutional Economics
Acknowledgements
General Introduction Claude Ménard
Introduction Claude Ménard
PART I MARKETS, HIERARCHIES, HYBRID FORMS
1. R.H. Coase (1992), ‘The Institutional Structure of Production’
2. Oliver E. Williamson (1991), ‘Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives’
3. Steven N.S. Cheung (1983), ‘The Contractual Nature of the Firm’
4. Bengt Holmstrom (1999), ‘The Firm as a Subeconomy’
5. James G. March (1962), ‘The Business Firm as a Political Coalition’
6. Claude Ménard (1997), ‘The Governance of Hybrid Organizational Forms’
7. George Baker, Robert Gibbons and Kevin J. Murphy (2002), ‘Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm’
PART II VERTICAL INTEGRATION
8. Oliver E. Williamson (1971), ‘The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations’
9. Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford and Armen A. Alchian (1978), ‘Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process’
10. Kirk Monteverde and David J. Teece (1982), ‘Supplier Switching Costs and Vertical Integration in the Automobile Industry’
11. Scott E. Masten (1984), ‘The Organization of Production: Evidence from the Aerospace Industry’
12. Paul L. Joskow (1985), ‘Vertical Integration and Long-term Contracts: The Case of Coal-burning Electric Generating Plants’
13. Bruce R. Lyons (1995), ‘Specific Investment, Economies of Scale, and the Make-or-Buy Decision: A Test of Transaction Cost Theory’
14. Erin Anderson and David C. Schmittlein (1984), ‘Integration of the Sales Force: An Empirical Examination’
15. George John and Barton A. Weitz (1988), ‘Forward Integration into Distribution: An Empirical Test of Transaction Cost Analysis’
16. Paul L. Joskow (1988), ‘Asset Specificity and the Structure of Vertical Relationships: Empirical Evidence’
PART III NON-STANDARD AGREEMENTS
17. William G. Ouchi (1980), ‘Markets, Bureaucracies, and Clans’
18. Robert G. Eccles (1981), ‘The Quasifirm in the Construction Industry’
19. Walter W. Powell (1990), ‘Neither Market nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization’
20. Claude Ménard (1996), ‘On Clusters, Hybrids, and Other Strange Forms: The Case of the French Poultry Industry’
21. Joanne E. Oxley (1997), ‘Appropriability Hazards and Governance in Strategic Alliances: A Transaction Cost Approach’
22. Francine Lafontaine and Kathryn L. Shaw (1999), ‘The Dynamics of Franchise Contracting: Evidence from Panel Data’
23. Bengt Holmström and John Roberts (1998), ‘The Boundaries of the Firm Revisited’
Name Index
Volume V: Institutional Dimensions of the Modern Corporation
Acknowledgements
General Introduction Claude Ménard
Introduction Claude Ménard
PART I STRUCTURES
1. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. (1980), ‘The United States: Seedbed of Managerial Capitalism’
2. Oliver E. Williamson (1981), ‘The Modern Corporation: Origins, Evolution, Attributes’
3. Masahiko Aoki (1990), ‘Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm’
4. Henry Ogden Armour and David J. Teece (1978), ‘Organizational Structure and Economic Performance: A Test of the Multidivisional Hypothesis’
5. Scott E. Masten, James W. Meehan, Jr. and Edward A. Snyder (1991), ‘The Costs of Organization’
PART II CONTROL WITHIN ORGANIZATIONS 6. Roy Radner (1986), ‘The Internal Economy of Large Firms’
7. Kenneth J. Arrow (1964), ‘Control in Large Organizations’
8. Oliver E. Williamson (1967), ‘Hierarchical Control and Optimum Firm Size’,
9. Masahiko Aoki (1986), ‘Horizontal vs. Vertical Information Structure of the Firm’
10. Jean Tirole (1986), ‘Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations’
11. Gary J. Miller (1990), ‘Managerial Dilemmas: Political Leadership in Hierarchies’
12. Philippe Aghion and Jean Tirole (1997), ‘Formal and Real Authority in Organizations’
13. Gregory K. Dow (1987), ‘The Function of Authority in Transaction Cost Economics’
14. Claude Ménard (1994), ‘Organizations as Coordinating Devices’
PART III MOTIVATIONS AND VALUES
15. Jeffrey Pfeffer (1990), ‘Incentives in Organizations: The Importance of Social Relations’
16. Sherwin Rosen (1988), ‘Transactions Costs and Internal Labor Markets’
17. Bengt Holmstrom and Paul Milgrom (1991), ‘Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design’
18. David M. Kreps (1990), ‘Corporate Culture and Economic Theory’
19. Gareth R. Jones (1983), ‘Transaction Costs, Property Rights, and Organizational Culture: An Exchange Perspective’
20. Mats Alvesson and Lars Lindkvist (1993), ‘Transaction Costs, Clans and Corporate Culture’
PART IV PUBLIC POLICIES AND ORGANIZATION CHOICES
21. Mark J. Roe (2002), ‘Can Culture Constrain the Economic Model of Corporate Law?’
22. Paul M. Hirsch (1975), ‘Organizational Effectiveness and the Institutional Environment’
23. Oliver E. Williamson (1976), ‘Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies – in General and with Respect to CATV’
24. Paul L. Joskow (1991), ‘The Role of Transaction Cost Economics in Antitrust and Public Utility Regulatory Policies’
25. Brian Levy and Pablo T. Spiller (1994), ‘The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation’
Name Index
Volume VI: The Political Economy of Institutions
Acknowledgements
General Introduction Claude Ménard
Introduction Claude Ménard
PART I POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIAL NORMS
1. Douglass C. North (1990), ‘A Transaction Cost Theory of Politics’
2. Randall L. Calvert (1998), ‘Rational Actors, Equilibrium, and Social Institutions’
3. Terry M. Moe (1990), ‘Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story’
4. Barry R. Weingast (1995), ‘The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development’
5. Barry R. Weingast and William J. Marshall (1988), ‘The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets’
6. Arthur T. Denzau and Michael C. Munger (1986), ‘Legislators and Interest Groups: How Unorganized Interests Get Represented’
7. Avner Greif (1994), ‘Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies’
8. Stanley L. Engerman (1997), ‘Cultural Values, Ideological Beliefs, and Changing Labor Institutions: Notes on Their Interactions’
9. Jon Elster (1989), ‘Social Norms and Economic Theory’
PART II THE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT OF A MARKET ECONOMY
10. Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast (1989), ‘Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England’
11. Barry R. Weingast (1993), ‘Constitutions as Governance Structures: The Political Foundations of Secure Markets’
12. Peter Murrell and Mancur Olson (1991), ‘The Devolution of Centrally Planned Economies’
13. Michael McFaul (1999), ‘Lessons from Russia’s Protracted Transition from Communist Rule’
14. Pranab K. Bardhan (2000), ‘Understanding Underdevelopment: Challenges for Institutional Economics From the Point of View of Poor Countries’
15. Ross Levine (1997), ‘Financial Development and Economic Growth: Views and Agenda’
16. Philip Keefer and Stephen Knack (1997), ‘Why Don’t Poor Countries Catch Up? A Cross-National Test of an Institutional Explanation’
PART III LONG RUN PERSPECTIVES
17. Avner Greif (1998), ‘Historical and Comparative Institutional Analysis’
18. Paul R. Milgrom, Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast (1990), ‘The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs’
19. Lee J. Alston and Joseph P. Ferrie (1993), ‘Paternalism in Agricultural Labor Contracts in the U.S. South: Implications for the Growth of the Welfare State’
20. Stanley L. Engerman, Stephen H. Haber and Kenneth L. Sokoloff (2000), ‘Inequality, Institutions and Differential Paths of Growth among New World Economies’
21. Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson (2001), ‘The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation’
22. Douglass C. North (1997), ‘Transaction Costs Through Time’
Name Index
Volume VII: Controversies and Challenges in the New Institutional Economics
Acknowledgements
General Introduction Claude Ménard
Introduction Claude Ménard
PART I ON ASSUMPTIONS
1. Oliver Hart (1990), ‘Is “Bounded Rationality” an Important Element of a Theory of Institutions?’
2. Richard N. Langlois (1990), ‘Bounded Rationality and Behavioralism: A Clarification and Critique’
3. Margaret Levi (2000), ‘When Good Defenses Make Good Neighbors: A Transaction Cost Approach to Trust, the Absence of Trust and Distrust’
4. Arthur T. Denzau and Douglass C. North (1994), ‘Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions’
PART II ON THE NATURE OF THE FIRM
5. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. (1992), ‘What is a Firm? A Historical Perspective’
6. Harold Demsetz (1988), ‘The Theory of the Firm Revisited’
7. Armen A. Alchian and Susan Woodward (1988), ‘The Firm is Dead; Long Live the Firm: A Review of Oliver E. Williamson’s The Economic Institutions of Capitalism’
8. John Moore (1992), ‘The Firm as a Collection of Assets’
9. Herbert A. Simon (1991), ‘Organizations and Markets’
PART III ON VERTICAL INTEGRATION
10. Benjamin Klein (1988), ‘Vertical Integration as Organizational Ownership: The Fisher Body-General Motors Relationship Revisited’
11. R.H. Coase (2000), ‘The Acquisition of Fisher Body by General Motors’
12. Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart (1986), ‘The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration’
13. Michael D. Whinston (2001), ‘Assessing the Property Rights and Transaction-Cost Theories of Firm Scope’
PART IV ON TRANSACTION COSTS
14. William M. Dugger (1983), ‘The Transaction Cost Analysis of Oliver E. Williamson: A New Synthesis?’
15. Gregory K. Dow (1993), ‘The Appropriability Critique of Transaction Cost Economics’
16. Paul Milgrom and John Roberts (1990), ‘Bargaining Costs, Influence Costs, and the Organization of Economic Activity’
17. Yoram Barzel (1985), ‘Transaction Costs: Are They Just Costs?’
18. Oliver E. Williamson (1990), ‘A Comparison of Alternative Approaches to Economic Organization’
PART V OLD WINE IN NEW BOTTLES?
19. Ernest J. Englander (1988), ‘Technology and Oliver Williamson’s Transaction Cost Economics’
20. Oliver E. Williamson (1988), ‘Technology and Transaction Cost Economics: A Reply’
21. Geoffrey M. Hodgson (1993), ‘Institutional Economics: Surveying the “Old” and the “New”’
22. Terence W. Hutchison (1984), ‘Institutionalist Economics Old and New’
23. Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell (1991), ‘Introduction’
24. Douglass C. North (1995), ‘Five Propositions about Institutional Change’
PART VI WRAPPING IT UP: ON THE RESEARCH AGENDA [121 pp]
25. Douglass C. North (1981), ‘A Theory of Institutional Change and the Economic History of the Western World’
26. Jack Knight and Douglass North (1997), ‘Explaining Economic Change: The Interplay Between Cognition and Institutions’
27. Mark Granovetter (1985), ‘Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness’
28. Paul L. Joskow (2002), ‘Transaction Cost Economics, Antitrust Rules, and Remedies’
29. Aric Rindfleisch and Jan B. Heide (1997), ‘Transaction Cost Analysis: Past, Present, and Future Applications’
30. Oliver E. Williamson (2000), ‘The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead’
Name Index
