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The Evolution of Efficient Common Law
This volume contains a selection of the most important articles on the issue of the evolution of the common law. The notion that evolutionary forces would lead to common law efficiency has been very influential in the study of the economics of law. Even those scholars who do not believe that the law is efficient will find it useful to consider the evolutionary forces identified in this volume.
More Information
Contributors
Contents
More Information
This volume contains a selection of the most important articles on the issue of the evolution of the common law. The notion that evolutionary forces would lead to common law efficiency has been very influential in the study of the economics of law. Even those scholars who do not believe that the law is efficient will find it useful to consider the evolutionary forces identified in this volume.
In an even-handed approach, Professor Rubin has selected not only articles which advance the hypothesis of efficient evolution, but also those which claim that the evolutionary process is not efficient. Further articles show that the process is indeed sometimes efficient and sometimes not, and identify those conditions which bring about more of less efficiency in the evolution of law. This authoritative collection will be useful to anyone who is concerned with the sources of efficiency and inefficiency in the law, as well as to scholars pursuing research in this area.
In an even-handed approach, Professor Rubin has selected not only articles which advance the hypothesis of efficient evolution, but also those which claim that the evolutionary process is not efficient. Further articles show that the process is indeed sometimes efficient and sometimes not, and identify those conditions which bring about more of less efficiency in the evolution of law. This authoritative collection will be useful to anyone who is concerned with the sources of efficiency and inefficiency in the law, as well as to scholars pursuing research in this area.
Contributors
22 articles, dating from 1977 to 2006
Contributors include: Y. Barzel, J. Hirshleifer, L. Kornhauser, W.M. Landes, F. Parisi, R.A. Posner, G.L. Priest, M.J. Roe, A. Shleifer, T.J. Zywicki
Contributors include: Y. Barzel, J. Hirshleifer, L. Kornhauser, W.M. Landes, F. Parisi, R.A. Posner, G.L. Priest, M.J. Roe, A. Shleifer, T.J. Zywicki
Contents
Contents:
Acknowledgements
Introduction Paul H. Rubin
PART I THE BEGINNINGS
1. Paul H. Rubin (1977), ‘Why is the Common Law Efficient?’
2. George L. Priest (1977), ‘The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules’
3. John C. Goodman (1978), ‘An Economic Theory of the Evolution of Common Law’
4. R. Peter Terrebonne (1981), ‘A Strictly Evolutionary Model of Common Law’
PART II THE FIRST CRITICS
5. William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner (1979), ‘Adjudication as a Private Good’
6. Robert Cooter and Lewis Kornhauser (1980), ‘Can Litigation Improve the Law Without the Help of Judges?’
7. Paul H. Rubin (1982), ‘Common Law and Statute Law’
8. Peter H. Aranson (1992), ‘The Common Law as Central Economic Planning’
PART III EVOLUTIONARY CRITICS
9. Jack Hirshleifer (1982), ‘Evolutionary Models in Economics and Law: Cooperation Versus Conflict Strategy’
10. Gillian K. Hadfield (1992), ‘Bias in the Evolution of Legal Rules’
11. Mark J. Roe (1996), ‘Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics’
12. Oona A. Hathaway (2001), ‘Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System’
PART IV BIASED EVOLUTION
13. Paul H. Rubin and Martin J. Bailey (1994), ‘The Role of Lawyers in Changing the Law’
14. Vincy Fon and Francesco Parisi (2003), ‘Litigation and the Evolution of Legal Remedies: A Dynamic Model’
PART V SPECIFIC APPLICATIONS
15. Bruce L. Benson (1989), ‘The Spontaneous Evolution of Commercial Law’
16. Yoram Barzel (2000), ‘Dispute and Its Resolution: Delineating the Economic Role of the Common Law’
17. Jeffrey Evans Stake (2005), ‘Evolution of Rules in a Common Law System: Differential Litigation of the Fee Tail and Other Perpetuities’
18. Keith N. Hylton (2006), ‘Information, Litigation, and Common Law Evolution’
19. Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny (1998), ‘Law and Finance’
PART VI HAYEKIAN (MACRO) EFFICIENCY
20. Paul G. Mahoney (2001), ‘The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might be Right’
21. Todd J. Zywicki (2003), ‘The Rise and Fall of Efficiency in the Common Law: A Supply-Side Analysis’
PART VII SUMMING UP
22. Paul H. Rubin (2005), ‘Micro and Macro Legal Efficiency: Supply and Demand’
Name Index
Acknowledgements
Introduction Paul H. Rubin
PART I THE BEGINNINGS
1. Paul H. Rubin (1977), ‘Why is the Common Law Efficient?’
2. George L. Priest (1977), ‘The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules’
3. John C. Goodman (1978), ‘An Economic Theory of the Evolution of Common Law’
4. R. Peter Terrebonne (1981), ‘A Strictly Evolutionary Model of Common Law’
PART II THE FIRST CRITICS
5. William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner (1979), ‘Adjudication as a Private Good’
6. Robert Cooter and Lewis Kornhauser (1980), ‘Can Litigation Improve the Law Without the Help of Judges?’
7. Paul H. Rubin (1982), ‘Common Law and Statute Law’
8. Peter H. Aranson (1992), ‘The Common Law as Central Economic Planning’
PART III EVOLUTIONARY CRITICS
9. Jack Hirshleifer (1982), ‘Evolutionary Models in Economics and Law: Cooperation Versus Conflict Strategy’
10. Gillian K. Hadfield (1992), ‘Bias in the Evolution of Legal Rules’
11. Mark J. Roe (1996), ‘Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics’
12. Oona A. Hathaway (2001), ‘Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System’
PART IV BIASED EVOLUTION
13. Paul H. Rubin and Martin J. Bailey (1994), ‘The Role of Lawyers in Changing the Law’
14. Vincy Fon and Francesco Parisi (2003), ‘Litigation and the Evolution of Legal Remedies: A Dynamic Model’
PART V SPECIFIC APPLICATIONS
15. Bruce L. Benson (1989), ‘The Spontaneous Evolution of Commercial Law’
16. Yoram Barzel (2000), ‘Dispute and Its Resolution: Delineating the Economic Role of the Common Law’
17. Jeffrey Evans Stake (2005), ‘Evolution of Rules in a Common Law System: Differential Litigation of the Fee Tail and Other Perpetuities’
18. Keith N. Hylton (2006), ‘Information, Litigation, and Common Law Evolution’
19. Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny (1998), ‘Law and Finance’
PART VI HAYEKIAN (MACRO) EFFICIENCY
20. Paul G. Mahoney (2001), ‘The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might be Right’
21. Todd J. Zywicki (2003), ‘The Rise and Fall of Efficiency in the Common Law: A Supply-Side Analysis’
PART VII SUMMING UP
22. Paul H. Rubin (2005), ‘Micro and Macro Legal Efficiency: Supply and Demand’
Name Index
