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The Economics of Organisation and Bureaucracy
This authoritative and in-depth collection presents seminal papers from leading academics in the field of organisation and bureaucracy. It encompasses sections on organisational boundaries, neo-Schumpeterian theories, hierarchy and international organisation, organisational culture and behaviour, power politics and authority, as well as organisational institutions and practices.
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Contributors
Contents
More Information
This authoritative and in-depth collection presents seminal papers from leading academics in the field of organisation and bureaucracy. It encompasses sections on organisational boundaries, neo-Schumpeterian theories, hierarchy and international organisation, organisational culture and behaviour, power politics and authority, as well as organisational institutions and practices. Professor Jackson has chosen works which have shaped the views of how the economics of organisation and bureaucracy are viewed today and has included papers from conflicting ends of the spectrum to illustrate the fluid and evolving nature of the subject. This indispensable volume, with an original introduction by the editor, will be of immense value to students, scholars and practitioners interested in this topical and relevant field.
Contributors
87 articles, dating from 1776 to 2008
Contributors include: K. Arrow, R. Coase, O. Hart, B. Klein, J. Mirrlees, H. Simon, A. Smith, J. Stiglitz, D. Teece, O. Williamson
Contributors include: K. Arrow, R. Coase, O. Hart, B. Klein, J. Mirrlees, H. Simon, A. Smith, J. Stiglitz, D. Teece, O. Williamson
Contents
Contents:
Volume I
Acknowledgements
Introduction Peter M. Jackson
PART I CLASSICAL FOUNDATIONS
1. Adam Smith ([1776] 1976), ‘Of the Division of Labour’ and ‘Of the Principle Which Gives Occasion to the Division of Labour’
2. Philip Selznick (1948), ‘Foundations of the Theory of Organization’
3. Luther Gulick (1937), ‘Notes on the Theory of Organization’
4. Ronald Coase (1937), ‘The Nature of the Firm’
5. Herbert A. Simon (1951), ‘A Formal Theory of the Employment Relationship’
6. Robert Gibbons (2005), ‘Four Formal(izable) Theories of the Firm?’
PART II ORGANISATIONAL BOUNDARIES
7. Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart (1986), ‘The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration’
8. Oliver Hart and John Moore (1990), ‘Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm’
9. Oliver E. Williamson (1979), ‘Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations’
10. Bengt Holmström and John Roberts (1998), ‘The Boundaries of the Firm Revisited’
11. Benjamin Klein (2007), ‘The Economic Lessons of Fisher Body – General Motors’
12. Herbert A. Simon (1991), ‘Organizations and Markets’
13. Filipe M. Santos and Kathleen M. Eisenhardt (2005), ‘Organizational Boundaries and Theories of Organization’
PART III PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS
14. Armen A. Alchian and Harold Demsetz (1972), ‘Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization’
15. Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling (1976), ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure’
16. Eugene F. Fama (1980), ‘Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm’
17. Stephen A. Ross (1973), ‘The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal’s Problem’
18. James A. Mirrlees (1976), ‘The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority within an Organization’
19. Bengt Holmström (1979), ‘Moral Hazard and Observability’
PART IV AGENCY AND PERFORMANCE
20. Bengt Holmström (1982), ‘Moral Hazard in Teams’
21. Robert Gibbons (2005), ‘Incentives Between Firms (and Within)’
22. George P. Baker (1992), ‘Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement’
23. Hideshi Itoh (1991), ‘Incentives to Help in Multi-Agent Situations’
24. W. Bentley MacLeod (1997), ‘Reputations, Relationships, and Contract Enforcement’
25. Margaret A. Meyer and John Vickers (1997), ‘Performance Comparisons and Dynamic Incentives’
PART V NEO-SCHUMPETERIAN THEORIES
26. Sidney G. Winter (2006), ‘Toward a Neo-Schumpeterian Theory of the Firm’
27. F.A. von Hayek (1937), ‘Economics and Knowledge’
28. Nicolai J. Foss (2002), ‘”Coase vs Hayek”: Economic Organization and the Knowledge Economy’
29. Kenneth J. Arrow (1975), ‘Vertical Integration and Communication’
30. Richard P. Rumelt (1984), ‘Towards a Strategic Theory of the Firm’
31. D. Teece and G. Pisano (1994), ‘The Dynamic Capabilities of Firms: An Introduction’
32. Anna Grandori (2001), ‘Neither Hierarchy nor Identity: Knowledge-Governance Mechanisms and the Theory of the Firm’
Volume II
Acknowledgements
An introduction by the editor to all three volumes appears in Volume I
PART I MANAGEMENT AND GOVERNANCE
1. Oliver E. Williamson (2005), ‘The Economics of Governance’
2. Jean Tirole (2001), ‘Corporate Governance’
3. Marianne Bertrand and Antoinette Schoar (2003), ‘Managing with Style: The Effect of Managers on Firm Policies’
4. Raaj K. Sah and Joseph E. Stiglitz (1991), ‘The Quality of Managers in Centralized Versus Decentralized Organizations’
PART II CO-ORDINATION MECHANISMS
5. Jacques Crémer (1995), ‘Arm’s Length Relationships’
6. Claude Ménard (2004), ‘The Economics of Hybrid Organizations’
7. Walter W. Powell (1990), ‘Neither Market Nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization’
8. George P. Baker, Robert Gibbons and Kevin J. Murphy (2008), ‘Strategic Alliances: Bridges Between “Islands of Conscious Power”’
PART III HIERARCHY AND INTERNAL ORGANISATION
9. Joseph E. Stiglitz (1975), ‘Incentives, Risk, and Information: Notes Towards a Theory of Hierarchy’
10. Jean Geanakoplos and Paul Milgrom (1991), ‘A Theory of Hierarchies Based on Limited Managerial Attention’
11. Roy Radner (1992), ‘Hierarchy: The Economics of Managing’
12. Mark Casson (1994), ‘Why Are Firms Hierarchical?’
13. Oliver Hart and John Moore (2005), ‘On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination versus Specialization’
14. Dilip Mookherjee (2006), ‘Decentralization, Hierarchies, and Incentives: A Mechanism Design Perspective’
15. Yingyi Qian, Gérard Roland and Chenggang Xu (2006), ‘Coordination and Experimentation in M-Form and U-Form Organizations’
PART IV ORGANISATIONAL DESIGN
16. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. (1962), ‘Introduction- Strategy and Structure’
17. Henry Ogden Armour and David J. Teece (1978), ‘Organizational Structure and Economic Performance: A Test of the Multidivisional Hypothesis’
18. Neil Fligstein (1985), ‘The Spread of the Multidivisional Form Among Large Firms, 1919–1979’
19. David Thesmar and Mathias Thoenig (2000), ‘Creative Destruction and Firm Organization Choice’
20. Masahiko Aoki (1990), ‘Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm’
21. Raaj Kumar Sah and Joseph E. Stiglitz (1986), ‘The Architecture of Economic Systems: Hierarchies and Polyarchies’
PART V POWER POLITICS AND AUTHORITY
22. James G. March (1962), ‘The Business Firm as a Political Coalition’
23. Philippe Aghion and Jean Tirole (1997), ‘Formal and Real Authority in Organizations’
24. George Baker, Robert Gibbons and Kevin J. Murphy (1999), ‘Informal Authority in Organizations’
25. Raghuram G. Rajan and Luigi Zingales (1998), ‘Power in a Theory of the Firm’
26. Wouter Dessein (2002), ‘Authority and Communication in Organizations’
Volume III
Acknowledgements
An introduction by the editor to all three volumes appears in Volume I
PART I CULTURE AND LEADERSHIP
1. Jacques Crémer (1993), ‘Corporate Culture and Shared Knowledge’
2. Julio J. Rotemberg and Garth Saloner (1993), ‘Leadership Style and Incentives’
3. Benjamin E. Hermalin (1998), ‘Toward an Economic Theory of Leadership: Leading by Example’
4. Eric Van den Steen (2005), ‘Organizational Beliefs and Managerial Vision’
PART II ORGANISATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND PRACTICES
5. James N. Baron (1988), ‘The Employment Relation as a Social Relation’
6. Donald W. Griesinger (1990), ‘The Human Side of Economic Organization’
7. Edward P. Lazear (1991), ‘Labor Economics and the Psychology of Organizations’
8. Julio J. Rotemberg (1994), ‘Human Relations in the Workplace’
9. Paul Osterman (1994), ‘Supervision, Discretion, and Work Organization’
10. George Baker, Michael Gibbs and Bengt Holmström (1994), ‘The Internal Economics of the Firm: Evidence from Personnel Data’
11. Casey Ichniowski, Kathryn Shaw and Giovanna Prennushi (1997), ‘The Effects of Human Resource Management Practices on Productivity: A Study of Steel Fishing Lines’
12. Canice J. Prendergast (1996), ‘A Theory of Responsibility in Organizations’
13. Mathias Dewatripont and Jean Tirole (1999), ‘Advocates’
PART III CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES
14. Edwin G. Dolan (1971), ‘Alienation, Freedom, and Economic Organization’
15. Samuel Bowles (1985), ‘The Production Process in a Competitive Economy: Walrasian, Neo-Hobbesian, and Marxian Models’
16. Charles Perrow (1986), ‘Economic Theories of Organization’
17. William Lazonick (1991), ‘Business Organization and Economic Theory’
PART IV ECONOMICS OF BUREAUCRACY
18. William A. Niskanen (2001), ‘''Bureaucracy’
19. Julius Margolis (1975), ‘Comment’
20. Albert Breton and Ronald Wintrobe (1975), ‘The Equilibrium Size of a Budget–maximizing Bureau: A Note on Niskanen’s Theory of Bureaucracy’
21. Thomas McGuire, Michael Coiner and Larry Spancake (1979), ‘Budget-Maximizing Agencies and Efficiency in Government’
22. William A. Niskanen, Jr. (1994), ‘A Reassessment’
23. Brian Levy (1987), ‘A Theory of Public Enterprise Behavior’
PART V COMPLEXITY AND ORGANIZATION
24. Ilya Prigogine (1987), ‘Exploring Complexity’
25. Philip Anderson (1999), ‘Complexity Theory and Organization Science’
26. Peter Howitt and Robert Clower (2000), ‘The Emergence of Economic Organization’
27. Haridimos Tsoukas (1998), ‘Introduction: Chaos, Complexity and Organizational Theory’
28. Bill McKelvey (1997), ‘Quasi-natural Organization Science’
29. Daniel A. Levinthal (1997), ‘Adaptation on Rugged Landscapes’
Volume I
Acknowledgements
Introduction Peter M. Jackson
PART I CLASSICAL FOUNDATIONS
1. Adam Smith ([1776] 1976), ‘Of the Division of Labour’ and ‘Of the Principle Which Gives Occasion to the Division of Labour’
2. Philip Selznick (1948), ‘Foundations of the Theory of Organization’
3. Luther Gulick (1937), ‘Notes on the Theory of Organization’
4. Ronald Coase (1937), ‘The Nature of the Firm’
5. Herbert A. Simon (1951), ‘A Formal Theory of the Employment Relationship’
6. Robert Gibbons (2005), ‘Four Formal(izable) Theories of the Firm?’
PART II ORGANISATIONAL BOUNDARIES
7. Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart (1986), ‘The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration’
8. Oliver Hart and John Moore (1990), ‘Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm’
9. Oliver E. Williamson (1979), ‘Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations’
10. Bengt Holmström and John Roberts (1998), ‘The Boundaries of the Firm Revisited’
11. Benjamin Klein (2007), ‘The Economic Lessons of Fisher Body – General Motors’
12. Herbert A. Simon (1991), ‘Organizations and Markets’
13. Filipe M. Santos and Kathleen M. Eisenhardt (2005), ‘Organizational Boundaries and Theories of Organization’
PART III PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS
14. Armen A. Alchian and Harold Demsetz (1972), ‘Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization’
15. Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling (1976), ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure’
16. Eugene F. Fama (1980), ‘Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm’
17. Stephen A. Ross (1973), ‘The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal’s Problem’
18. James A. Mirrlees (1976), ‘The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority within an Organization’
19. Bengt Holmström (1979), ‘Moral Hazard and Observability’
PART IV AGENCY AND PERFORMANCE
20. Bengt Holmström (1982), ‘Moral Hazard in Teams’
21. Robert Gibbons (2005), ‘Incentives Between Firms (and Within)’
22. George P. Baker (1992), ‘Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement’
23. Hideshi Itoh (1991), ‘Incentives to Help in Multi-Agent Situations’
24. W. Bentley MacLeod (1997), ‘Reputations, Relationships, and Contract Enforcement’
25. Margaret A. Meyer and John Vickers (1997), ‘Performance Comparisons and Dynamic Incentives’
PART V NEO-SCHUMPETERIAN THEORIES
26. Sidney G. Winter (2006), ‘Toward a Neo-Schumpeterian Theory of the Firm’
27. F.A. von Hayek (1937), ‘Economics and Knowledge’
28. Nicolai J. Foss (2002), ‘”Coase vs Hayek”: Economic Organization and the Knowledge Economy’
29. Kenneth J. Arrow (1975), ‘Vertical Integration and Communication’
30. Richard P. Rumelt (1984), ‘Towards a Strategic Theory of the Firm’
31. D. Teece and G. Pisano (1994), ‘The Dynamic Capabilities of Firms: An Introduction’
32. Anna Grandori (2001), ‘Neither Hierarchy nor Identity: Knowledge-Governance Mechanisms and the Theory of the Firm’
Volume II
Acknowledgements
An introduction by the editor to all three volumes appears in Volume I
PART I MANAGEMENT AND GOVERNANCE
1. Oliver E. Williamson (2005), ‘The Economics of Governance’
2. Jean Tirole (2001), ‘Corporate Governance’
3. Marianne Bertrand and Antoinette Schoar (2003), ‘Managing with Style: The Effect of Managers on Firm Policies’
4. Raaj K. Sah and Joseph E. Stiglitz (1991), ‘The Quality of Managers in Centralized Versus Decentralized Organizations’
PART II CO-ORDINATION MECHANISMS
5. Jacques Crémer (1995), ‘Arm’s Length Relationships’
6. Claude Ménard (2004), ‘The Economics of Hybrid Organizations’
7. Walter W. Powell (1990), ‘Neither Market Nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization’
8. George P. Baker, Robert Gibbons and Kevin J. Murphy (2008), ‘Strategic Alliances: Bridges Between “Islands of Conscious Power”’
PART III HIERARCHY AND INTERNAL ORGANISATION
9. Joseph E. Stiglitz (1975), ‘Incentives, Risk, and Information: Notes Towards a Theory of Hierarchy’
10. Jean Geanakoplos and Paul Milgrom (1991), ‘A Theory of Hierarchies Based on Limited Managerial Attention’
11. Roy Radner (1992), ‘Hierarchy: The Economics of Managing’
12. Mark Casson (1994), ‘Why Are Firms Hierarchical?’
13. Oliver Hart and John Moore (2005), ‘On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination versus Specialization’
14. Dilip Mookherjee (2006), ‘Decentralization, Hierarchies, and Incentives: A Mechanism Design Perspective’
15. Yingyi Qian, Gérard Roland and Chenggang Xu (2006), ‘Coordination and Experimentation in M-Form and U-Form Organizations’
PART IV ORGANISATIONAL DESIGN
16. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. (1962), ‘Introduction- Strategy and Structure’
17. Henry Ogden Armour and David J. Teece (1978), ‘Organizational Structure and Economic Performance: A Test of the Multidivisional Hypothesis’
18. Neil Fligstein (1985), ‘The Spread of the Multidivisional Form Among Large Firms, 1919–1979’
19. David Thesmar and Mathias Thoenig (2000), ‘Creative Destruction and Firm Organization Choice’
20. Masahiko Aoki (1990), ‘Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm’
21. Raaj Kumar Sah and Joseph E. Stiglitz (1986), ‘The Architecture of Economic Systems: Hierarchies and Polyarchies’
PART V POWER POLITICS AND AUTHORITY
22. James G. March (1962), ‘The Business Firm as a Political Coalition’
23. Philippe Aghion and Jean Tirole (1997), ‘Formal and Real Authority in Organizations’
24. George Baker, Robert Gibbons and Kevin J. Murphy (1999), ‘Informal Authority in Organizations’
25. Raghuram G. Rajan and Luigi Zingales (1998), ‘Power in a Theory of the Firm’
26. Wouter Dessein (2002), ‘Authority and Communication in Organizations’
Volume III
Acknowledgements
An introduction by the editor to all three volumes appears in Volume I
PART I CULTURE AND LEADERSHIP
1. Jacques Crémer (1993), ‘Corporate Culture and Shared Knowledge’
2. Julio J. Rotemberg and Garth Saloner (1993), ‘Leadership Style and Incentives’
3. Benjamin E. Hermalin (1998), ‘Toward an Economic Theory of Leadership: Leading by Example’
4. Eric Van den Steen (2005), ‘Organizational Beliefs and Managerial Vision’
PART II ORGANISATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND PRACTICES
5. James N. Baron (1988), ‘The Employment Relation as a Social Relation’
6. Donald W. Griesinger (1990), ‘The Human Side of Economic Organization’
7. Edward P. Lazear (1991), ‘Labor Economics and the Psychology of Organizations’
8. Julio J. Rotemberg (1994), ‘Human Relations in the Workplace’
9. Paul Osterman (1994), ‘Supervision, Discretion, and Work Organization’
10. George Baker, Michael Gibbs and Bengt Holmström (1994), ‘The Internal Economics of the Firm: Evidence from Personnel Data’
11. Casey Ichniowski, Kathryn Shaw and Giovanna Prennushi (1997), ‘The Effects of Human Resource Management Practices on Productivity: A Study of Steel Fishing Lines’
12. Canice J. Prendergast (1996), ‘A Theory of Responsibility in Organizations’
13. Mathias Dewatripont and Jean Tirole (1999), ‘Advocates’
PART III CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES
14. Edwin G. Dolan (1971), ‘Alienation, Freedom, and Economic Organization’
15. Samuel Bowles (1985), ‘The Production Process in a Competitive Economy: Walrasian, Neo-Hobbesian, and Marxian Models’
16. Charles Perrow (1986), ‘Economic Theories of Organization’
17. William Lazonick (1991), ‘Business Organization and Economic Theory’
PART IV ECONOMICS OF BUREAUCRACY
18. William A. Niskanen (2001), ‘''Bureaucracy’
19. Julius Margolis (1975), ‘Comment’
20. Albert Breton and Ronald Wintrobe (1975), ‘The Equilibrium Size of a Budget–maximizing Bureau: A Note on Niskanen’s Theory of Bureaucracy’
21. Thomas McGuire, Michael Coiner and Larry Spancake (1979), ‘Budget-Maximizing Agencies and Efficiency in Government’
22. William A. Niskanen, Jr. (1994), ‘A Reassessment’
23. Brian Levy (1987), ‘A Theory of Public Enterprise Behavior’
PART V COMPLEXITY AND ORGANIZATION
24. Ilya Prigogine (1987), ‘Exploring Complexity’
25. Philip Anderson (1999), ‘Complexity Theory and Organization Science’
26. Peter Howitt and Robert Clower (2000), ‘The Emergence of Economic Organization’
27. Haridimos Tsoukas (1998), ‘Introduction: Chaos, Complexity and Organizational Theory’
28. Bill McKelvey (1997), ‘Quasi-natural Organization Science’
29. Daniel A. Levinthal (1997), ‘Adaptation on Rugged Landscapes’
