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Social Norms, Nonlegal Sanctions, and the Law
This authoritative collection brings together a careful selection of previously published articles that use economics to analyze the interaction of law, on the one hand, and social norms and nonlegal sanctions on the other. The articles cover a range of foundational questions. What are social norms and nonlegal sanctions? Do strong laws undermine social norms, thus weakening other valuable forms of social cooperation? Can laws be used to exploit existing social norms, so that the laws are more effective than they would be otherwise? The contributing authors use a variety of economic models and concepts to address these questions.
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Contributors
Contents
More Information
This authoritative collection brings together a careful selection of previously published articles that use economics to analyze the interaction of law, on the one hand, and social norms and nonlegal sanctions on the other. The articles cover a range of foundational questions. What are social norms and nonlegal sanctions? Do strong laws undermine social norms, thus weakening other valuable forms of social cooperation? Can laws be used to exploit existing social norms, so that the laws are more effective than they would be otherwise? The contributing authors use a variety of economic models and concepts to address these questions.
Contributors
16 articles, dating from 1980 to 2001
Contributors include: G.A. Akerlof, R.D Cooter, R.C. Ellickson, R.A. Epstein, U. Gneezy, P.G. Mahoney, A. Greif, P.R. Milgrom, R.C. Picker, R.A. Posner
Contributors include: G.A. Akerlof, R.D Cooter, R.C. Ellickson, R.A. Epstein, U. Gneezy, P.G. Mahoney, A. Greif, P.R. Milgrom, R.C. Picker, R.A. Posner
Contents
Contents:
Acknowledgements
Introduction Eric A. Posner
PART I GENERAL THEORIES
1. Robert Cooter (1997), ‘Normative Failure Theory of Law’
2. Robert C. Ellickson (1986), ‘Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta County’
3. Richard H. McAdams (1997), ‘The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms’
4. Randal C. Picker (1997), ‘Simple Games in a Complex World: A Generative Approach to the Adoption of Norms’
5. Eric A. Posner (1998), ‘Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms in Politics and the Law’
PART II NORMS AND EFFICIENCY
6. Paul G. Mahoney and Chris W. Sanchirico (2001), ‘Competing Norms and Social Evolution: Is the Fittest Norm Efficient?’
7. Eric A. Posner (1996), ‘Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms’
PART III BUSINESS CUSTOM
8. Lisa Bernstein (1992), ‘Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry’
9. Richard A. Epstein (1992), ‘The Path to The T.J. Hooper: The Theory and History of Custom in the Law of Tort’
PART IV APPLICATIONS
10. George A. Akerlof (1980), ‘A Theory of Social Custom, of Which Unemployment May Be One Consequence’
11. Robert Cooter and Ariel Porat (2001), ‘Should Courts Deduct Nonlegal Sanctions From Damages?’
12. Dan M. Kahan and Eric A. Posner (1999), ‘Shaming White-collar Criminals: A Proposal for Reform of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines’
13. Gertrud M. Fremling and Richard A. Posner (1999), ‘Status Signaling and the Law, With Particular Application to Sexual Harassment’
PART V EMPIRICAL AND HISTORICAL WORK
14. Uri Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini (2000), ‘A Fine is a Price’
15. Avner Greif, Paul Milgrom and Barry R. Weingast (1994), ‘Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild’
16. Paul R. Milgrom, Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast (1990), ‘The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs’
Name Index
Acknowledgements
Introduction Eric A. Posner
PART I GENERAL THEORIES
1. Robert Cooter (1997), ‘Normative Failure Theory of Law’
2. Robert C. Ellickson (1986), ‘Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta County’
3. Richard H. McAdams (1997), ‘The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms’
4. Randal C. Picker (1997), ‘Simple Games in a Complex World: A Generative Approach to the Adoption of Norms’
5. Eric A. Posner (1998), ‘Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms in Politics and the Law’
PART II NORMS AND EFFICIENCY
6. Paul G. Mahoney and Chris W. Sanchirico (2001), ‘Competing Norms and Social Evolution: Is the Fittest Norm Efficient?’
7. Eric A. Posner (1996), ‘Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms’
PART III BUSINESS CUSTOM
8. Lisa Bernstein (1992), ‘Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry’
9. Richard A. Epstein (1992), ‘The Path to The T.J. Hooper: The Theory and History of Custom in the Law of Tort’
PART IV APPLICATIONS
10. George A. Akerlof (1980), ‘A Theory of Social Custom, of Which Unemployment May Be One Consequence’
11. Robert Cooter and Ariel Porat (2001), ‘Should Courts Deduct Nonlegal Sanctions From Damages?’
12. Dan M. Kahan and Eric A. Posner (1999), ‘Shaming White-collar Criminals: A Proposal for Reform of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines’
13. Gertrud M. Fremling and Richard A. Posner (1999), ‘Status Signaling and the Law, With Particular Application to Sexual Harassment’
PART V EMPIRICAL AND HISTORICAL WORK
14. Uri Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini (2000), ‘A Fine is a Price’
15. Avner Greif, Paul Milgrom and Barry R. Weingast (1994), ‘Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild’
16. Paul R. Milgrom, Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast (1990), ‘The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs’
Name Index
