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SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY
This major reference collection presents in three volumes the key articles and papers on social choice theory.
More Information
Critical Acclaim
Contributors
Contents
More Information
This major reference collection presents in three volumes the key articles and papers on social choice theory.
Volume One centres attention on key aspects of the debate on Arrow’s impossibility theorem, carefully counter-poising differing viewpoints and embracing competing methodologies. In a field prone to the excessive use of mathematics and of arcane high theory, Charles Rowley skilfully presents a literature which is accessible to non-mathematicians and yet which offers full coverage of all the major debates.
Volumes two and three extend the coverage of social choice theory to review the attempts of leading scholars to resolve the ageless problems of determining social goals and reconciling apparent inconsistencies among such goals. Professor Rowley carefully guides the reader through a litany of approaches, both methodological individualist and social engineering, ends-related and process-related in nature. Volume two reprints leading contributions to the utilitarian and contractarian ethics while volume three completes this exercise with material on the social justice and contractarian ethics. Professor Rowley''s own introductory essay exposes the social choice research programme to his own Virginian critique, while integrating a large, diffuse literature into a unified whole.
Volume One centres attention on key aspects of the debate on Arrow’s impossibility theorem, carefully counter-poising differing viewpoints and embracing competing methodologies. In a field prone to the excessive use of mathematics and of arcane high theory, Charles Rowley skilfully presents a literature which is accessible to non-mathematicians and yet which offers full coverage of all the major debates.
Volumes two and three extend the coverage of social choice theory to review the attempts of leading scholars to resolve the ageless problems of determining social goals and reconciling apparent inconsistencies among such goals. Professor Rowley carefully guides the reader through a litany of approaches, both methodological individualist and social engineering, ends-related and process-related in nature. Volume two reprints leading contributions to the utilitarian and contractarian ethics while volume three completes this exercise with material on the social justice and contractarian ethics. Professor Rowley''s own introductory essay exposes the social choice research programme to his own Virginian critique, while integrating a large, diffuse literature into a unified whole.
Critical Acclaim
‘Charles Rowley has given us an excellent collection of well-chosen papers from different fields in social choice theory. The selections are informed by Professor Rowley''s broad command over the discipline. He has put social choice theorists in particular (and economists, political theorists and moral philosophers generally) much in his debt by providing this extremely useful collection.’
– Amartya Sen, Harvard University, US
‘Public choice researchers will find that the collection of articles provides a magnificent perspective on the on the breadth and scope of formal political economy.’
– Michael Cain, Public Choice
– Amartya Sen, Harvard University, US
‘Public choice researchers will find that the collection of articles provides a magnificent perspective on the on the breadth and scope of formal political economy.’
– Michael Cain, Public Choice
Contributors
Contributors include: K.J. Arrow, J.M. Buchanan, R.A. Posner, A.K. Sen, T.N. Tideman, L. Von Mises
Contents
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
VOLUME I: THE AGGREGATION OF PREFERENCE
PART I: FOUNDATIONS
A. Bergson (1938), ‘A Reformulation of Certain Aspects of Welfare Economics’
H. R. Bowen (1943), ‘A Reformulation of Voting in the Allocation of Economic Resources’
D. Black (1948), ‘On the Rationale of Group Decision-making’
K. J. Arrow (1950), ‘A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare’
PART II: COLLECTIVE RATIONALITY, VOTING AND STRATEGY-PROOFNESS
I. M. D. Little (1952), ‘Social Choice and Individual Values’
J. H. Blau (1957), ‘The Existence of Social Welfare Functions’
K. J. Arrow (1959), ‘Rational Choice Functions and Orderings’
J. de V. Graaff (1962), ‘On Making a Recommendation in a Democracy’
G. Tullock (1964), ‘The Irrationality of Intransitivity’
A. K. Sen (1964), ‘A Possibility Theorem on Majority Decisions’
G. Tullock (1967), ‘The General Irrelevance of the General Impossibility Theorem’
A. K. Sen and P. K. Pattanaik (1969), ‘Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Rational Choice under Majority Decision’
K. J. Arrow (1969), ‘Tullock and an Existence Theorem’
K. J. Arrow (1967), ‘Values and Collective Decision-making’
A. Gibbard (1973), ‘Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result’
C. R. Plott (1973), ‘Path Independence, Rationality and Social Choice’
C. R. Plott (1976), ‘Axiomatic Social Choice Theory: An Overview and Interpretation’
M. A. Satterthwaite (1975), ‘Strategy-proofness and Arrow’s Conditions: Existence and Correspondence Theorems for Voting Procedures and Social Welfare Functions’
A. K. Sen (1977), ‘Social Choice Theory” A Re-examination’
PART II: CRITIQUES OF ‘SOCIAL CHOICE AS SOCIAL ENGINEERING’
L. Von Mises (2944), ‘The Treatment of “Irrationality” in the Social Sciences’
F. A. Hayek (1945), ‘The Use of Knowledge in Society’
J. M. Buchanan (1954), ‘Social Choice, Democracy and Free Markets’
J. M. Buchanan (1954), ‘Individual Choice in Voting and the Market’
J. M. Buchanan (1964), ‘What should Economists Do?’
R. Sugden (1978), ‘Social Choice and Individual Liberty’
A. Sen (1978), ‘Liberty as Control: An Appraisal;
PART IV: ATTEMPTS TO ESCAPE FROM THE SOCIAL CHOICE DIFFICULTY
J. C. Harsanyi (1955), ‘Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility’
T. Grooves and J. Ledyard (1977), ‘Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the “Free-rider” Problem’
T. N. Tideman and G. Tullock (1976), ‘A New and Superior Process for Making Social Choices’
W. H. Riker (1979), ‘Is “A New and Superior Process” Really Superior?’
A. Sen (1977), ‘On weights and Measures: Informational Constraints in Social Welfare Analysis’
VOLUME II: SOCIAL GOALS
PART I: UTILITARIAN ETHIC
W. Vickrey (1945), ‘Measuring Marginal Utility by Reactions to Risk’
M. Fleming (1952), ‘A Cardinal Concept of Welfare’
J. C. Harsanyi (1953), ‘Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics and in the Theory of Risk-taking’
W. Vickrey (1960), ‘Utility, Strategy and Social Decision Rules’
P. A. Diamond (1967), ‘Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal comparisons of Utility: Comment’
R. A. Posner (1979), ‘Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law’
R. A. Posner (1979), ‘Utilitarianism, Economics and Legal Theory’
R. A. Posner (1979), ‘The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication’
J. L. Coleman (1980), ‘Efficiency, Utility and Wealth Maximization’
R. A. Posner (1981), ‘A Reply to Recent Criticisms of the Efficiency Theory of the Comment Law’
J. C. Harsanyi (1980), ‘Rule Utilitarianism, Rights, Obligations and the Theory of Rational Behavior’
A. K. Sen (1979), ‘Utilitarianism and Welfarism’
PART II: THE CONTRACTARIAN ETHIC
J. M. Buchanan (1975), ‘A Contractarian Paradigm for Applying Economic Theory’
S. Gordon (1976), ‘The New Contractarians’
N. P. Barry (1984), ‘Unanimity, Agreement and Liberalism: A Critique of James Buchanan’s Social Philosophy’
L. B. Yeager (1985), ‘Rights, Contract and Utility in Policy Espousal’
C. K. Rowley (1987), ‘The Economic Philosophy of James McGill Buchanan’
A. Sandmo (1990), ‘Buchanan on Political Economy: A Review Article’
T. M. Scanlon (1982), ‘Contractualism and utilitarianism’
VOLUME III
PART I: THE SOCIAL JUSTICE ETHIC
J. Rawls (1958), ‘Justice as Fairness’
J. Rawls (1974), ‘Some Reasons for the Maximum Criterion’
J. Rawls (1975), ‘A Kantian Conception of Equality’
J. Rawls (1985), ‘Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical’
J. M. Buchanan (1972), ‘Rawls on Justice as Fairness’
H. L. A. Hart (1973), ‘Rawls on Liberty and Its Priority’
S. Gordon (1973), ‘John Rawls’s Difference Principle, Utilitarianism and the Optimum Degree of Inequality’
T. Nagel (1973), ‘Rawls on Justice’
J. M. Buchanan (1976), ‘A Hobbesian Interpretation of the Rawlsian Difference Principle’
J. C. Harsanyi (1975), ‘Can the Maximum Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality? A Critique of john Rawls’s Theory’
H. R. Varian (1975), ‘Distributive Justice, Welfare Economics and the Theory of Fairness’
C. K. Rowley and A. T. Peacock (1975), ‘Justice’
A. Sen (1990), ‘Justice: Means versus Freedoms’
PART II: THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL ETHIC
A. Sen (1970), ‘The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal’
Y. K. Ng (1971), ‘The possibility of a Paretian Liberal: Impossibility Theorems and Cardinal Utility’
A. T. Peacock and C. K. Rowley (1972), ‘Pareto Optimally and the Political Economy of Liberalism’
R. Nozick (1973), ‘Distributive Justice’
A. Gibbard (1974), ‘A Pareto-Consistent Libertarian Claim’
P. Bernholz (1974), ‘Is a Paretian Liberal Really Impossible?’
J. H.Blau (1975), ‘Liberal Values and Independence’
M. J. Farrell (1976), ‘Liberalism in the Theory of Social Choice’
A. Sen (1976), ‘Liberty, Unanimity and Rights’
C. K. Rowley (1978), ‘Liberalism and Collective Choice: A Return to Reality?’
A. Sen (1979), ‘Personal Utilities and Public Judgements: Or What’s Wrong with Welfare Economics’
P. Bernholz (1980), ‘A General Social Dilemma: Profitable Exchange and Intensitive Group Preferences’
K. Suzumura (1980), ‘Liberal paradox and the Voluntary Exchange of Rights-Excerising’
A. Sen (1983), ‘Liberty and Social Choice’
K. Basu (1984), ‘The Right to Give Up Rights’
R. Sugden (1985), ‘Liberty, Preference and Choice’
J. M. Buchanan (1975), ‘Utopia, the Minimal State, and Entitlement’
K. J. Arrow (1978), ‘Nozick’s Entitlement Theory of Justice’
C. K. Rowley and R. E. Wagner (1990), ‘Choosing Freedom: Public Choice and the l
Libertarian Idea’
W. Gaertner, P. K. Pattanaik and K. Suzumura (1992), ‘Individual Rights Revisited’
A. Sen (1992), ‘Minimal Liberty’
INTRODUCTION
VOLUME I: THE AGGREGATION OF PREFERENCE
PART I: FOUNDATIONS
A. Bergson (1938), ‘A Reformulation of Certain Aspects of Welfare Economics’
H. R. Bowen (1943), ‘A Reformulation of Voting in the Allocation of Economic Resources’
D. Black (1948), ‘On the Rationale of Group Decision-making’
K. J. Arrow (1950), ‘A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare’
PART II: COLLECTIVE RATIONALITY, VOTING AND STRATEGY-PROOFNESS
I. M. D. Little (1952), ‘Social Choice and Individual Values’
J. H. Blau (1957), ‘The Existence of Social Welfare Functions’
K. J. Arrow (1959), ‘Rational Choice Functions and Orderings’
J. de V. Graaff (1962), ‘On Making a Recommendation in a Democracy’
G. Tullock (1964), ‘The Irrationality of Intransitivity’
A. K. Sen (1964), ‘A Possibility Theorem on Majority Decisions’
G. Tullock (1967), ‘The General Irrelevance of the General Impossibility Theorem’
A. K. Sen and P. K. Pattanaik (1969), ‘Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Rational Choice under Majority Decision’
K. J. Arrow (1969), ‘Tullock and an Existence Theorem’
K. J. Arrow (1967), ‘Values and Collective Decision-making’
A. Gibbard (1973), ‘Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result’
C. R. Plott (1973), ‘Path Independence, Rationality and Social Choice’
C. R. Plott (1976), ‘Axiomatic Social Choice Theory: An Overview and Interpretation’
M. A. Satterthwaite (1975), ‘Strategy-proofness and Arrow’s Conditions: Existence and Correspondence Theorems for Voting Procedures and Social Welfare Functions’
A. K. Sen (1977), ‘Social Choice Theory” A Re-examination’
PART II: CRITIQUES OF ‘SOCIAL CHOICE AS SOCIAL ENGINEERING’
L. Von Mises (2944), ‘The Treatment of “Irrationality” in the Social Sciences’
F. A. Hayek (1945), ‘The Use of Knowledge in Society’
J. M. Buchanan (1954), ‘Social Choice, Democracy and Free Markets’
J. M. Buchanan (1954), ‘Individual Choice in Voting and the Market’
J. M. Buchanan (1964), ‘What should Economists Do?’
R. Sugden (1978), ‘Social Choice and Individual Liberty’
A. Sen (1978), ‘Liberty as Control: An Appraisal;
PART IV: ATTEMPTS TO ESCAPE FROM THE SOCIAL CHOICE DIFFICULTY
J. C. Harsanyi (1955), ‘Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility’
T. Grooves and J. Ledyard (1977), ‘Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the “Free-rider” Problem’
T. N. Tideman and G. Tullock (1976), ‘A New and Superior Process for Making Social Choices’
W. H. Riker (1979), ‘Is “A New and Superior Process” Really Superior?’
A. Sen (1977), ‘On weights and Measures: Informational Constraints in Social Welfare Analysis’
VOLUME II: SOCIAL GOALS
PART I: UTILITARIAN ETHIC
W. Vickrey (1945), ‘Measuring Marginal Utility by Reactions to Risk’
M. Fleming (1952), ‘A Cardinal Concept of Welfare’
J. C. Harsanyi (1953), ‘Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics and in the Theory of Risk-taking’
W. Vickrey (1960), ‘Utility, Strategy and Social Decision Rules’
P. A. Diamond (1967), ‘Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal comparisons of Utility: Comment’
R. A. Posner (1979), ‘Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law’
R. A. Posner (1979), ‘Utilitarianism, Economics and Legal Theory’
R. A. Posner (1979), ‘The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication’
J. L. Coleman (1980), ‘Efficiency, Utility and Wealth Maximization’
R. A. Posner (1981), ‘A Reply to Recent Criticisms of the Efficiency Theory of the Comment Law’
J. C. Harsanyi (1980), ‘Rule Utilitarianism, Rights, Obligations and the Theory of Rational Behavior’
A. K. Sen (1979), ‘Utilitarianism and Welfarism’
PART II: THE CONTRACTARIAN ETHIC
J. M. Buchanan (1975), ‘A Contractarian Paradigm for Applying Economic Theory’
S. Gordon (1976), ‘The New Contractarians’
N. P. Barry (1984), ‘Unanimity, Agreement and Liberalism: A Critique of James Buchanan’s Social Philosophy’
L. B. Yeager (1985), ‘Rights, Contract and Utility in Policy Espousal’
C. K. Rowley (1987), ‘The Economic Philosophy of James McGill Buchanan’
A. Sandmo (1990), ‘Buchanan on Political Economy: A Review Article’
T. M. Scanlon (1982), ‘Contractualism and utilitarianism’
VOLUME III
PART I: THE SOCIAL JUSTICE ETHIC
J. Rawls (1958), ‘Justice as Fairness’
J. Rawls (1974), ‘Some Reasons for the Maximum Criterion’
J. Rawls (1975), ‘A Kantian Conception of Equality’
J. Rawls (1985), ‘Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical’
J. M. Buchanan (1972), ‘Rawls on Justice as Fairness’
H. L. A. Hart (1973), ‘Rawls on Liberty and Its Priority’
S. Gordon (1973), ‘John Rawls’s Difference Principle, Utilitarianism and the Optimum Degree of Inequality’
T. Nagel (1973), ‘Rawls on Justice’
J. M. Buchanan (1976), ‘A Hobbesian Interpretation of the Rawlsian Difference Principle’
J. C. Harsanyi (1975), ‘Can the Maximum Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality? A Critique of john Rawls’s Theory’
H. R. Varian (1975), ‘Distributive Justice, Welfare Economics and the Theory of Fairness’
C. K. Rowley and A. T. Peacock (1975), ‘Justice’
A. Sen (1990), ‘Justice: Means versus Freedoms’
PART II: THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL ETHIC
A. Sen (1970), ‘The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal’
Y. K. Ng (1971), ‘The possibility of a Paretian Liberal: Impossibility Theorems and Cardinal Utility’
A. T. Peacock and C. K. Rowley (1972), ‘Pareto Optimally and the Political Economy of Liberalism’
R. Nozick (1973), ‘Distributive Justice’
A. Gibbard (1974), ‘A Pareto-Consistent Libertarian Claim’
P. Bernholz (1974), ‘Is a Paretian Liberal Really Impossible?’
J. H.Blau (1975), ‘Liberal Values and Independence’
M. J. Farrell (1976), ‘Liberalism in the Theory of Social Choice’
A. Sen (1976), ‘Liberty, Unanimity and Rights’
C. K. Rowley (1978), ‘Liberalism and Collective Choice: A Return to Reality?’
A. Sen (1979), ‘Personal Utilities and Public Judgements: Or What’s Wrong with Welfare Economics’
P. Bernholz (1980), ‘A General Social Dilemma: Profitable Exchange and Intensitive Group Preferences’
K. Suzumura (1980), ‘Liberal paradox and the Voluntary Exchange of Rights-Excerising’
A. Sen (1983), ‘Liberty and Social Choice’
K. Basu (1984), ‘The Right to Give Up Rights’
R. Sugden (1985), ‘Liberty, Preference and Choice’
J. M. Buchanan (1975), ‘Utopia, the Minimal State, and Entitlement’
K. J. Arrow (1978), ‘Nozick’s Entitlement Theory of Justice’
C. K. Rowley and R. E. Wagner (1990), ‘Choosing Freedom: Public Choice and the l
Libertarian Idea’
W. Gaertner, P. K. Pattanaik and K. Suzumura (1992), ‘Individual Rights Revisited’
A. Sen (1992), ‘Minimal Liberty’
