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Regulation, Economics and the Law
Regulation, Economics and the Law presents a selection of the most important published articles on key issues arising in the design of social regulation. It focuses in particular on interventionist measures used to protect primarily the environment, health and safety and consumers. Professor Ogus uses both public interest and private interest theory to investigate and evaluate the legal forms and procedures.
The volume covers, on the one hand, traditional ‘command-and-control’ techniques, such as licensing and standards, and on the other, newer techniques, such as economic incentives and emissions trading. Rulemaking procedures, institutional structures and the impact of international competition are also considered.
The volume covers, on the one hand, traditional ‘command-and-control’ techniques, such as licensing and standards, and on the other, newer techniques, such as economic incentives and emissions trading. Rulemaking procedures, institutional structures and the impact of international competition are also considered.
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Contributors
Contents
More Information
Regulation, Economics and the Law presents a selection of the most important published articles on key issues arising in the design of social regulation. It focuses in particular on interventionist measures used to protect primarily the environment, health and safety and consumers. Professor Ogus uses both public interest and private interest theory to investigate and evaluate the legal forms and procedures.
The volume covers, on the one hand, traditional ‘command-and-control’ techniques, such as licensing and standards, and on the other, newer techniques, such as economic incentives and emissions trading. Rulemaking procedures, institutional structures and the impact of international competition are also considered.
Regulation, Economics and the Law will be an invaluable source of reference for economists, lawyers and policymakers working in these fields.
The volume covers, on the one hand, traditional ‘command-and-control’ techniques, such as licensing and standards, and on the other, newer techniques, such as economic incentives and emissions trading. Rulemaking procedures, institutional structures and the impact of international competition are also considered.
Regulation, Economics and the Law will be an invaluable source of reference for economists, lawyers and policymakers working in these fields.
Contributors
17 articles, dating from 1961 to 1998
Contributors include: H. Beales, F.H. Easterbrook, D.R. Fischel, L.B. Lave, J.R. Macey, R.G. Noll, R.A. Posner, S. Shavell, C.R. Sunstein, T.H. Tietenberg
Contributors include: H. Beales, F.H. Easterbrook, D.R. Fischel, L.B. Lave, J.R. Macey, R.G. Noll, R.A. Posner, S. Shavell, C.R. Sunstein, T.H. Tietenberg
Contents
Contents:
Acknowledgements
Introduction Anthony I. Ogus
PART I THEORIES AND FUNCTIONS OF REGULATION
1. Cass R. Sunstein (1990), ‘The Functions of Regulatory Statutes’
2. Roger G. Noll (1989), ‘Economic Perspectives on the Politics of Regulation’
PART II TRADITIONAL LEGAL FORMS
3. Steven Shavell (1984), ‘Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety’
4. Steven Shavell (1993), ‘The Optimal Structure of Law Enforcement’
5. Anthony Ogus (1994), ‘Standard Setting for Environmental Protection: Principles and Processes’
6. Thomas G. Moore (1961), ‘The Purpose of Licensing’
7. Howard Beales, Richard Craswell and Steven C. Salop (1981), ‘The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information’
8. Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel (1984), ‘Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors’
PART III ECONOMIC INCENTIVES AND OTHER REGULATORY TECHNIQUES
9. Robert Howse (1993), ‘Retrenchment, Reform or Revolution? The Shift to Incentives and the Future of the Regulatory State’
10. Anthony Ogus (1998), ‘Corrective Taxes and Financial Impositions as Regulatory Instruments’
11. Thomas H. Tietenberg (1980), ‘Transferable Discharge Permits and the Control of Stationary Source Air Pollution: A Survey and Synthesis’
12. Anthony Ogus (1995), ‘Rethinking Self-regulation’
PART IV INSTITUTIONS AND PROCESSES
13. Jonathan R. Macey (1992), ‘Organizational Design and the Political Control of Administrative Agencies’
14. Stephen Woolcock (1996), ‘Competition Among Rules in the Single European Market’
15. Isaac Ehrlich and Richard A. Posner (1974), ‘An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking’
16. Lester B. Lave (1996), ‘Benefit-cost Analysis: Do the Benefits Exceed the Costs?’
17. P. Fenn and C.G. Veljanovski (1988), ‘A Positive Economic Theory of Regulatory Enforcement’
Name Index
Acknowledgements
Introduction Anthony I. Ogus
PART I THEORIES AND FUNCTIONS OF REGULATION
1. Cass R. Sunstein (1990), ‘The Functions of Regulatory Statutes’
2. Roger G. Noll (1989), ‘Economic Perspectives on the Politics of Regulation’
PART II TRADITIONAL LEGAL FORMS
3. Steven Shavell (1984), ‘Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety’
4. Steven Shavell (1993), ‘The Optimal Structure of Law Enforcement’
5. Anthony Ogus (1994), ‘Standard Setting for Environmental Protection: Principles and Processes’
6. Thomas G. Moore (1961), ‘The Purpose of Licensing’
7. Howard Beales, Richard Craswell and Steven C. Salop (1981), ‘The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information’
8. Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel (1984), ‘Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors’
PART III ECONOMIC INCENTIVES AND OTHER REGULATORY TECHNIQUES
9. Robert Howse (1993), ‘Retrenchment, Reform or Revolution? The Shift to Incentives and the Future of the Regulatory State’
10. Anthony Ogus (1998), ‘Corrective Taxes and Financial Impositions as Regulatory Instruments’
11. Thomas H. Tietenberg (1980), ‘Transferable Discharge Permits and the Control of Stationary Source Air Pollution: A Survey and Synthesis’
12. Anthony Ogus (1995), ‘Rethinking Self-regulation’
PART IV INSTITUTIONS AND PROCESSES
13. Jonathan R. Macey (1992), ‘Organizational Design and the Political Control of Administrative Agencies’
14. Stephen Woolcock (1996), ‘Competition Among Rules in the Single European Market’
15. Isaac Ehrlich and Richard A. Posner (1974), ‘An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking’
16. Lester B. Lave (1996), ‘Benefit-cost Analysis: Do the Benefits Exceed the Costs?’
17. P. Fenn and C.G. Veljanovski (1988), ‘A Positive Economic Theory of Regulatory Enforcement’
Name Index
