Hardback
Political Business Cycles
This is a collection of articles on how the government influences the economy in order to secure re-election. The economy is steered such that unemployment and inflation are as low as possible, and the growth of real income as high as possible during the election period. The collection contains forerunners to the analysis of this phenomenon, surveys emphasizing different aspects, empirical and the major theoretical approaches (vote maximization, partisan, and vote-cum-partisan models and rational political business cycles. The collection provides extensions including the role of the central bank, of direct democracy and the particular cycles in East European communist countries. Finally, the policy relevance is discussed.
More Information
Critical Acclaim
Contributors
Contents
More Information
This is a collection of articles on how the government influences the economy in order to secure re-election. The economy is steered such that unemployment and inflation are as low as possible, and the growth of real income as high as possible during the election period. The collection contains forerunners to the analysis of this phenomenon, surveys emphasizing different aspects, empirical and the major theoretical approaches (vote maximization, partisan, and vote-cum-partisan models and rational political business cycles. The collection provides extensions including the role of the central bank, of direct democracy and the particular cycles in East European communist countries. Finally, the policy relevance is discussed.
Critical Acclaim
‘This is an excellent collection of articles. . . . This collection is an important addition to the growing field of public choice demonstrating the inter-relationship between politics and economics and how these fields cannot be kept apart. . . . it is one more in a valuable series of reprints from Edward Elgar.’
– Keith Dowding, Political Studies
– Keith Dowding, Political Studies
Contributors
23 articles, dating from 1943 to 1994
Contributors include: A. Alesina, B.S. Frey, D.A. Hibbs, G. Kirchgässner, A. Lindbeck, W. Nordhaus, M. Paldam, K. Rogoff, F. Schneider
Contributors include: A. Alesina, B.S. Frey, D.A. Hibbs, G. Kirchgässner, A. Lindbeck, W. Nordhaus, M. Paldam, K. Rogoff, F. Schneider
Contents
Contents: Introduction Part I: Surveys Part II: Forerunners Part III: Empirical Accounts Part IV: Vote Maximizing Models Part V: Partisan Models Part VI: Vote-Cum-Partisan Part VII: Rational Political Business Cycles Part VIII: Some Extensions Part IX: Policy Relevance Index
