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Legal Institutions and Economic Development
This insightful collection of classic papers explores the effects of various legal institutions and policies on economic development. The editors include analysis of the historical, current, and future conditions of numerous legal traditions and strategies, both nationally and globally. The volume will enhance understanding of how legal policies influence economic growth. It will also contribute to the selection and advancement of those legal policies most likely to improve overall economic development and social welfare.
More Information
Critical Acclaim
Contributors
Contents
More Information
This insightful collection of classic papers explores the effects of various legal institutions and policies on economic development. The editors include analysis of the historical, current, and future conditions of numerous legal traditions and strategies, both nationally and globally. The volume will enhance understanding of how legal policies influence economic growth. It will also contribute to the selection and advancement of those legal policies most likely to improve overall economic development and social welfare.
This volume is an invaluable reference source for both scholars and practitioners interested or involved in the development of legal policy.
This volume is an invaluable reference source for both scholars and practitioners interested or involved in the development of legal policy.
Critical Acclaim
‘The study of the interaction between legal institutions and economic development is one of the most important research areas in economics and law. Professors Cooter and Parisi have produced a remarkable anthology. Their selection of articles and the way they have structured the literature form an original contribution in themselves. Even those who are already familiar with the literature will enjoy the refreshing perspective that is being offered by two of the leading scholars in the field.’
– Gerrit De Geest, Washington University, St. Louis, US
– Gerrit De Geest, Washington University, St. Louis, US
Contributors
20 articles, dating from 1983 to 2007
Contributors include: Y. Barzel, L.A. Bebchuk, F.H. Easterbrook, T. Ginsburg, A.T. Guzman, K.N. Hylton, P.G. Mahoney, M.J. Roe, R. Romano, M.J. Trebilcock
Contributors include: Y. Barzel, L.A. Bebchuk, F.H. Easterbrook, T. Ginsburg, A.T. Guzman, K.N. Hylton, P.G. Mahoney, M.J. Roe, R. Romano, M.J. Trebilcock
Contents
Contents:
Acknowledgements
Introduction Robert D. Cooter and Francesco Parisi
PART I LAW, FINANCE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
1. Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny (1998), ‘Law and Finance’
2. Paul G. Mahoney (2001), ‘The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might be Right’
3. Frank B. Cross (2002), ‘Law and Economic Growth’
4. Edward L. Glaeser and Andrei Shleifer (2002), ‘Legal Origins’
5. Bernard S. Black and Vikramaditya S. Khanna (2007), ‘Can Corporate Governance Reforms Increase Firm Market Values? Event Study Evidence from India’
PART II COMMON LAW AND LEGAL EVOLUTION
6. Mark J. Roe (1996), ‘Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics’
7. Y. Barzel (2000), ‘Dispute and its Resolution: Delineating the Economic Role of the Common Law
8. Vincy Fon and Francesco Parisi (2003), ‘Litigation and the Evolution of Legal Remedies: A Dynamic Model’
9. Keith N. Hylton (2006), ‘Information, Litigation, and Common Law Evolution’
PART III PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW
10. Frank H. Easterbrook (1983), ‘Statutes’ Domains’
11. McNollgast (1994), ‘Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation’
12. Robert Cooter (2002), ‘Constitutional Consequentialism: Bargain Democracy versus Median Democracy’
13. Francesco Parisi (2003), ‘Political Coase Theorem’
14. Alan Schwartz and Robert E. Scott (1995), ‘The Political Economy of Private Legislatures’
15. Tom Ginsberg (2002), ‘Ways of Criticizing Public Choice: The Uses of Empiricism and Theory in Legal Scholarship’
PART IV FEDERALISM AND CHOICE OF LAW
16. Andrew T. Guzman (2002), ‘Choice of Law: New Foundations’
17. Robert P. Inman and Daniel L. Rubinfeld (1997), ‘Rethinking Federalism’
18. Lucian Arye Bebchuk (1992), ‘Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law’
19. Roberta Romano (2006), ‘The States as a Laboratory: Legal Innovation and State Competition for Corporate Charters’
20. Michael J. Trebilcock (2003), ‘The Law and Economics of Immigration Policy’
Name Index
Acknowledgements
Introduction Robert D. Cooter and Francesco Parisi
PART I LAW, FINANCE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
1. Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny (1998), ‘Law and Finance’
2. Paul G. Mahoney (2001), ‘The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might be Right’
3. Frank B. Cross (2002), ‘Law and Economic Growth’
4. Edward L. Glaeser and Andrei Shleifer (2002), ‘Legal Origins’
5. Bernard S. Black and Vikramaditya S. Khanna (2007), ‘Can Corporate Governance Reforms Increase Firm Market Values? Event Study Evidence from India’
PART II COMMON LAW AND LEGAL EVOLUTION
6. Mark J. Roe (1996), ‘Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics’
7. Y. Barzel (2000), ‘Dispute and its Resolution: Delineating the Economic Role of the Common Law
8. Vincy Fon and Francesco Parisi (2003), ‘Litigation and the Evolution of Legal Remedies: A Dynamic Model’
9. Keith N. Hylton (2006), ‘Information, Litigation, and Common Law Evolution’
PART III PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW
10. Frank H. Easterbrook (1983), ‘Statutes’ Domains’
11. McNollgast (1994), ‘Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation’
12. Robert Cooter (2002), ‘Constitutional Consequentialism: Bargain Democracy versus Median Democracy’
13. Francesco Parisi (2003), ‘Political Coase Theorem’
14. Alan Schwartz and Robert E. Scott (1995), ‘The Political Economy of Private Legislatures’
15. Tom Ginsberg (2002), ‘Ways of Criticizing Public Choice: The Uses of Empiricism and Theory in Legal Scholarship’
PART IV FEDERALISM AND CHOICE OF LAW
16. Andrew T. Guzman (2002), ‘Choice of Law: New Foundations’
17. Robert P. Inman and Daniel L. Rubinfeld (1997), ‘Rethinking Federalism’
18. Lucian Arye Bebchuk (1992), ‘Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law’
19. Roberta Romano (2006), ‘The States as a Laboratory: Legal Innovation and State Competition for Corporate Charters’
20. Michael J. Trebilcock (2003), ‘The Law and Economics of Immigration Policy’
Name Index
