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Economics of Securities Law
Bringing together the most important articles from leading authors in the field, Professor Geoffrey P. Miller’s new collection, Economics of Securities Law, is an essential resource for students, policy-makers, and those interested in the history and current status of the subject.
The papers included represent fundamental contributions that shaped later thinking, illustrate approaches that have proven durably influential, or represent important challenges to conventional views. The collection also explores new approaches, such as behavioral economics, alongside ‘Chicago School’ papers, comparative analyses, and influential works by people involved in the creation of laws governing modern securities markets.
The papers included represent fundamental contributions that shaped later thinking, illustrate approaches that have proven durably influential, or represent important challenges to conventional views. The collection also explores new approaches, such as behavioral economics, alongside ‘Chicago School’ papers, comparative analyses, and influential works by people involved in the creation of laws governing modern securities markets.
More Information
Contributors
Contents
More Information
Bringing together the most important articles from leading authors in the field, Professor Geoffrey P. Miller’s new collection, Economics of Securities Law, is an essential resource for students, policy-makers, and those interested in the history and current status of the subject.
The papers included represent fundamental contributions that shaped later thinking, illustrate approaches that have proven durably influential, or represent important challenges to conventional views. The collection also explores new approaches, such as behavioral economics, alongside ‘Chicago School’ papers, comparative analyses, and influential works by people involved in the creation of laws governing modern securities markets.
The papers included represent fundamental contributions that shaped later thinking, illustrate approaches that have proven durably influential, or represent important challenges to conventional views. The collection also explores new approaches, such as behavioral economics, alongside ‘Chicago School’ papers, comparative analyses, and influential works by people involved in the creation of laws governing modern securities markets.
Contributors
38 articles, dating from 1933 to 2014
Contributors include: L.A. Bebchuk, J.C. Coffee, Jr., D.W. Diamond, F.H. Easterbrook, E.F. Fama, D.R. Fischel, M.C. Jensen, W.F. Sharpe, R.J. Shiller, G.J. Stigler, J.L. Stiglitz
Contributors include: L.A. Bebchuk, J.C. Coffee, Jr., D.W. Diamond, F.H. Easterbrook, E.F. Fama, D.R. Fischel, M.C. Jensen, W.F. Sharpe, R.J. Shiller, G.J. Stigler, J.L. Stiglitz
Contents
Contents:
Introduction Geoffrey P. Miller
PART I ORIGINS
1. Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller (1991), ‘Origin of the Blue Sky Laws’, Texas Law Review, 70 (2), December, 347–97
2. William O. Douglas and George E. Bates (1933), ‘The Federal Securities Act of 1933’, Yale Law Journal, 43 (2), December, 171–217
PART II DISCLOSURE
3. George J. Stigler (1964), ‘Public Regulation of the Securities Markets’, Journal of Business, 37 (2), April, 117–42
4. George J. Benston (1973), ‘Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934’, American Economic Review, 63 (1), March, 132–55
5. Gregg A. Jarrell (1981), ‘The Economic Effects of Federal Regulation of the Market for New Security Issues’, Journal of Law and Economics, 24 (3), December, 613–75
6. Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel (1984), ‘Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors’, Virginia Law Review, 70 (4), May, 669–715
7. John C. Coffee, Jr. (1984), ‘Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System’, Virginia Law Review, 70 (4), May, 717–53
8. Paul G. Mahoney (1995), ‘Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems’, University of Chicago Law Review, 62 (3), Summer, 1047–112
9. Douglas W. Diamond (1985), ‘Optimal Release of Information by Firms’, Journal of Finance, 40 (4), September, 1071–94
PART III EFFICIENT MARKETS
10. Eugene F. Fama (1970), ‘Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work’, Journal of Finance, Papers and Proceedings, 25 (2), May, 383–417
11. Michael C. Jensen (1978), ‘Some Anomalous Evidence Regarding Market Efficiency’, Journal of Financial Economics, 6 (2–3), June–September, 95–101
12. Charles M.C. Lee, Andrei Shleifer and Richard H. Thaler (1991), ‘Investor Sentiment and the Closed-End Fund Puzzle’, Journal of Finance, 46 (1), March, 75–109
13. Sanford J. Grossman and Joseph E. Stiglitz (1980), ‘On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets’, American Economic Review, 70 (3), June, 393–408
14. Ronald J. Gilson and Reinier Kraakman (2014), ‘Market Efficiency After the Financial Crisis: It''s Still a Matter of Information Costs’, Virginia Law Review, 100 (2), April, 313–75
PART IV ASSET PRICING AND DIVERSIFICATION
15. Harry Markowitz (1952), ‘Portfolio Selection’, Journal of Finance, 7 (1), March, 77–91
16. William F. Sharpe (1964), ‘Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk’, Journal of Finance, 19 (3), September, 425–42
PART V SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS
17. Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller (1990), ‘Good Finance, Bad Economics: An Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory’, Stanford Law Review, 42, April, 1059–92
18. John C. Coffee, Jr. (2006), ‘Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its Implementation’, Columbia Law Review, 106 (7), November, 1534–86
19. Donald C. Langevoort (2009), ‘Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market’, Wisconsin Law Review, 2009 (2), April, 151–98
Index
Volume II
An introduction to both volumes by the editor appears in Volume I
PART I TAKEOVERS
1. Henry G. Manne (1965), ‘Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control’, Journal of Political Economy, 73 (2), April, 110–20
2. Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel (1981), ‘The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer’, Harvard Law Review, 94 (6), April, 1161–204
3. Lucian A. Bebchuk (1982), ‘The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers’, Harvard Law Review, 95, 1028–56
4. Michael C. Jensen and Richard S. Ruback (1983), ‘The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence’, Journal of Financial Economics, 11 (1–4), April, 5–50
PART II INSIDER TRADING
5. Henry G. Manne (1966), ‘In Defense of Insider Trading’, Harvard Business Review, 44, November–December, 113–22
6. Dennis W. Carlton and Daniel R. Fischel (1982), ‘The Regulation of Insider Trading’, Stanford Law Review, 35, May, 857–95
7. David D. Haddock and Jonathan R. Macey (1986), ‘A Coasian Model of Insider Trading’, Northwestern University Law Review, 80 (6), 1449–72
8. James D. Cox (1986), ‘Insider Trading and Contracting: A Critical Response to the “Chicago School”’, Duke Law Journal, 35 (4), September, 628–59
9. Lawrence R. Glosten and Paul R. Milgrom (1985), ‘Bid, Ask and Transaction Prices in a Specialist Market with Heterogeneously Informed Traders’, Journal of Financial Economics, 14 (1), March, 71–100
PART III BEHAVIOURAL FINANCE
10. Malcolm Baker, Jeffrey Wurgler and Yu Yuan (2012), ‘Global, Local, and Contagious Investor Sentiment’, Journal of Financial Economics, 104 (2), May, 272–87
11. David Hirshleifer (2001), ‘Investor Psychology and Asset Pricing’, Journal of Finance, 56 (4), August, 1533–97
12. Robert J. Shiller (2003), ‘From Efficient Markets Theory to Behavioral Finance’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17 (1), Winter, 83–104
13. Stephen J. Choi and A.C. Pritchard (2003), ‘Behavioral Economics and the SEC’, Stanford Law Review, 56 (1), October, 1–73
PART IV REGULATORY DESIGN
14. Roberta Romano (1998), ‘Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation’, Yale Law Journal, 107, 2359–430
15. Jennifer H. Arlen and William J. Carney (1992), ‘Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities Markets: Theory and Evidence’, University of Illinois Law Review, 1992, 691–740
PART V THE ROLE OF SHAREHOLDERS
16. John C. Coffee, Jr. (1991), ‘Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor’, Columbia Law Review, 91 (6), October, 1277–368
17. Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock (2011), ‘The Insignificance of Proxy Access’, Virginia Law Review, 97, 1347–434
18. Henry T.C. Hu and Bernard Black (2006), ‘Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership: Taxonomy, Implications, and Reforms’, Business Lawyer, 61 (3), May, 1011–70
PART VI COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
19. Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer (2006), ‘What Works in Securities Laws?’, Journal of Finance, 61 (1), February, 1–32
Index
Introduction Geoffrey P. Miller
PART I ORIGINS
1. Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller (1991), ‘Origin of the Blue Sky Laws’, Texas Law Review, 70 (2), December, 347–97
2. William O. Douglas and George E. Bates (1933), ‘The Federal Securities Act of 1933’, Yale Law Journal, 43 (2), December, 171–217
PART II DISCLOSURE
3. George J. Stigler (1964), ‘Public Regulation of the Securities Markets’, Journal of Business, 37 (2), April, 117–42
4. George J. Benston (1973), ‘Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934’, American Economic Review, 63 (1), March, 132–55
5. Gregg A. Jarrell (1981), ‘The Economic Effects of Federal Regulation of the Market for New Security Issues’, Journal of Law and Economics, 24 (3), December, 613–75
6. Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel (1984), ‘Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors’, Virginia Law Review, 70 (4), May, 669–715
7. John C. Coffee, Jr. (1984), ‘Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System’, Virginia Law Review, 70 (4), May, 717–53
8. Paul G. Mahoney (1995), ‘Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems’, University of Chicago Law Review, 62 (3), Summer, 1047–112
9. Douglas W. Diamond (1985), ‘Optimal Release of Information by Firms’, Journal of Finance, 40 (4), September, 1071–94
PART III EFFICIENT MARKETS
10. Eugene F. Fama (1970), ‘Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work’, Journal of Finance, Papers and Proceedings, 25 (2), May, 383–417
11. Michael C. Jensen (1978), ‘Some Anomalous Evidence Regarding Market Efficiency’, Journal of Financial Economics, 6 (2–3), June–September, 95–101
12. Charles M.C. Lee, Andrei Shleifer and Richard H. Thaler (1991), ‘Investor Sentiment and the Closed-End Fund Puzzle’, Journal of Finance, 46 (1), March, 75–109
13. Sanford J. Grossman and Joseph E. Stiglitz (1980), ‘On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets’, American Economic Review, 70 (3), June, 393–408
14. Ronald J. Gilson and Reinier Kraakman (2014), ‘Market Efficiency After the Financial Crisis: It''s Still a Matter of Information Costs’, Virginia Law Review, 100 (2), April, 313–75
PART IV ASSET PRICING AND DIVERSIFICATION
15. Harry Markowitz (1952), ‘Portfolio Selection’, Journal of Finance, 7 (1), March, 77–91
16. William F. Sharpe (1964), ‘Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk’, Journal of Finance, 19 (3), September, 425–42
PART V SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS
17. Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller (1990), ‘Good Finance, Bad Economics: An Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory’, Stanford Law Review, 42, April, 1059–92
18. John C. Coffee, Jr. (2006), ‘Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its Implementation’, Columbia Law Review, 106 (7), November, 1534–86
19. Donald C. Langevoort (2009), ‘Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market’, Wisconsin Law Review, 2009 (2), April, 151–98
Index
Volume II
An introduction to both volumes by the editor appears in Volume I
PART I TAKEOVERS
1. Henry G. Manne (1965), ‘Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control’, Journal of Political Economy, 73 (2), April, 110–20
2. Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel (1981), ‘The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer’, Harvard Law Review, 94 (6), April, 1161–204
3. Lucian A. Bebchuk (1982), ‘The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers’, Harvard Law Review, 95, 1028–56
4. Michael C. Jensen and Richard S. Ruback (1983), ‘The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence’, Journal of Financial Economics, 11 (1–4), April, 5–50
PART II INSIDER TRADING
5. Henry G. Manne (1966), ‘In Defense of Insider Trading’, Harvard Business Review, 44, November–December, 113–22
6. Dennis W. Carlton and Daniel R. Fischel (1982), ‘The Regulation of Insider Trading’, Stanford Law Review, 35, May, 857–95
7. David D. Haddock and Jonathan R. Macey (1986), ‘A Coasian Model of Insider Trading’, Northwestern University Law Review, 80 (6), 1449–72
8. James D. Cox (1986), ‘Insider Trading and Contracting: A Critical Response to the “Chicago School”’, Duke Law Journal, 35 (4), September, 628–59
9. Lawrence R. Glosten and Paul R. Milgrom (1985), ‘Bid, Ask and Transaction Prices in a Specialist Market with Heterogeneously Informed Traders’, Journal of Financial Economics, 14 (1), March, 71–100
PART III BEHAVIOURAL FINANCE
10. Malcolm Baker, Jeffrey Wurgler and Yu Yuan (2012), ‘Global, Local, and Contagious Investor Sentiment’, Journal of Financial Economics, 104 (2), May, 272–87
11. David Hirshleifer (2001), ‘Investor Psychology and Asset Pricing’, Journal of Finance, 56 (4), August, 1533–97
12. Robert J. Shiller (2003), ‘From Efficient Markets Theory to Behavioral Finance’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17 (1), Winter, 83–104
13. Stephen J. Choi and A.C. Pritchard (2003), ‘Behavioral Economics and the SEC’, Stanford Law Review, 56 (1), October, 1–73
PART IV REGULATORY DESIGN
14. Roberta Romano (1998), ‘Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation’, Yale Law Journal, 107, 2359–430
15. Jennifer H. Arlen and William J. Carney (1992), ‘Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities Markets: Theory and Evidence’, University of Illinois Law Review, 1992, 691–740
PART V THE ROLE OF SHAREHOLDERS
16. John C. Coffee, Jr. (1991), ‘Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor’, Columbia Law Review, 91 (6), October, 1277–368
17. Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock (2011), ‘The Insignificance of Proxy Access’, Virginia Law Review, 97, 1347–434
18. Henry T.C. Hu and Bernard Black (2006), ‘Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership: Taxonomy, Implications, and Reforms’, Business Lawyer, 61 (3), May, 1011–70
PART VI COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
19. Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer (2006), ‘What Works in Securities Laws?’, Journal of Finance, 61 (1), February, 1–32
Index
