Hardback
Comparative Law and Economics
This is an authoritative collection on comparative law and economics, a new research field in which differences among legal systems are analysed using an economic methodology. Comparative law and economics brings comparative law to a higher scientific level, and enriches traditional comparative economics, in which insufficient attention has been paid to legal environments.
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Critical Acclaim
Contributors
Contents
More Information
This is an authoritative collection on comparative law and economics, a new research field in which differences among legal systems are analysed using an economic methodology. Comparative law and economics brings comparative law to a higher scientific level, and enriches traditional comparative economics, in which insufficient attention has been paid to legal environments.
This comprehensive three-volume collection covers the following subjects: general theories and general historical perspectives, regulatory competition and legal transplants, legal systems and economic growth, property, tort law and restitution, contracts and consumer protection, corporate law and organizations, and procedural law.
Comparative Law and Economics will be an indispensable reference source for those with an interest in these fields.
This comprehensive three-volume collection covers the following subjects: general theories and general historical perspectives, regulatory competition and legal transplants, legal systems and economic growth, property, tort law and restitution, contracts and consumer protection, corporate law and organizations, and procedural law.
Comparative Law and Economics will be an indispensable reference source for those with an interest in these fields.
Critical Acclaim
‘This is an extremely fine, wide-ranging anthology of essays applying economic analysis to comparative law. Comparative law – the comparison of the world’s extraordinarily diverse legal systems – with special reference to the legal challenges facing developing nations offers an enormous and underexplored field for the application of economics. These essays demonstrate the promise of the economic approach and will go far to stimulate further research, thinking, and reform.’
– Richard A. Posner, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and University of Chicago Law School, US
– Richard A. Posner, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and University of Chicago Law School, US
Contributors
46 articles, dating from 1967 to 2003
Contributors include: E. Buscaglia, R.D. Cooter, H. Hansmann, R. Kraakman, S. Levmore, U. Mattei, F. Parisi, R.A. Posner, J.M. Ramseyer, A. Shleifer
Contributors include: E. Buscaglia, R.D. Cooter, H. Hansmann, R. Kraakman, S. Levmore, U. Mattei, F. Parisi, R.A. Posner, J.M. Ramseyer, A. Shleifer
Contents
Contents:
Volume I
Acknowledgements
Introduction Gerrit De Geest and Roger Van den Bergh
PART I GENERAL THEORIES AND GENERAL HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES
1. Saul Levmore (1986), ‘Rethinking Comparative Law: Variety and Uniformity in Ancient and Modern Tort Law’
2. Ugo Mattei (1997), ‘The Competitive Relationship among Sources of Law’
3. Anthony Ogus (2002), ‘The Economic Basis of Legal Culture: Networks and Monopolization’
4. Edward L. Glaeser and Andrei Shleifer (2002), ‘Legal Origins’
5. Richard A. Posner (1981), ‘The Economic Theory of Primitive Law’
6. Francesco Parisi (2001), ‘The Genesis of Liability in Ancient Law’
PART II REGULATORY COMPETITION AND LEGAL TRANSPLANTS
7. Wallace E. Oates and Robert M. Schwab (1988), ‘Economic Competition Among Jurisdictions: Efficiency Enhancing or Distortion Inducing?’
8. Roger Van den Bergh (2000), ‘Towards an Institutional Legal Framework for Regulatory Competition in Europe’
9. Edgardo Buscaglia and William Ratliff (2000), ‘Legal and Economic Integration: The Cases For and Against Legal Transplants’
10. Gerrit De Geest (2002), ‘Information Problems Caused by Regulatory Competition, and Their Solution: International Standard Codes’
11. Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor and Jean-Francois Richard (2003), ‘The Transplant Effect’
PART III LEGAL SYSTEMS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
12. Douglass C. North and Robert Paul Thomas (1973), ‘The Issue’ and ‘France and Spain – The Also-rans’
13. Mancur Olson (1982), ‘The Developed Democracies Since World War II’
14. Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny (1999), ‘The Quality of Government’
15. Paul G. Mahoney (2001), ‘The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be Right’
Name Index
Volume II
Acknowledgements
An introduction by the editors to all three volumes appears in Volume I
PART I PROPERTY
1. Harold Demsetz (1967), ‘Toward a Theory of Property Rights’
2. Saul Levmore (1987), ‘Variety and Uniformity in the Treatment of the Good-Faith Purchaser’
3. J. Mark Ramseyer (1989), ‘Water Law in Imperial Japan: Public Goods, Private Claims, and Legal Convergence’
4. Kathryn Firmin-Sellers (2000), ‘Custom, Capitalism, and the State: The Origins of Insecure Land Tenure in West Africa’
5. Michael A. Heller (1998), ‘The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets’
6. Francesco Parisi (2002), ‘Entropy in Property’
PART II TORT LAW AND RESTITUTION
7. Michelle J. White (1989), ‘An Empirical Test of the Comparative and Contributory Negligence Rules in Accident Law’
8. J. Finsinger, T. Hoehn and A. Pototschnig (1991), ‘The Enforcement of Product Liability Rules: A Two-Country Analysis of Court Cases’
9. Boudewijn Bouckaert and Gerrit De Geest (1995), ‘Private Takings, Private Taxes, Private Compulsory Services: The Economic Doctrine of Quasi Contracts’
10. Claus Ott and Hans-Bernd Schäfer (1997), ‘Negligence as Untaken Precaution, Limited Information, and Efficient Standard Formation in the Civil Liability System’
11. Mauro Bussani, Vernon Valentine Palmer and Francesco Parisi (2003), ‘Liability for Pure Financial Loss in Europe: An Economic Restatement’
PART III CONTRACTS AND CONSUMER PROTECTION
12. Steven N.S. Cheung (1969), ‘Transaction Costs, Risk Aversion, and the Choice of Contractual Arrangements’
13. Janet T. Landa (1981), ‘A Theory of the Ethnically Homogeneous Middleman Group: An Institutional Alternative to Contract Law’
14. Heidi Kroll (1987), ‘Breach of Contract in the Soviet Economy’
15. Wouter P.J. Wils (1993), ‘Who Should Bear the Costs of Failed Negotiations? A Functional Inquiry into Precontractual Liability’
16. Hein Kötz (2000), ‘Precontractual Duties of Disclosure: A Comparative and Economic Perspective’
17. Ronald J. Gilson (1999), ‘The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete’
18. Pamaria Rekaiti and Roger Van den Bergh (2000), ‘Cooling-off Periods in the Consumer Laws of the EC Member States. A Comparative Law and Economics Approach’
Name Index
Volume III
Acknowledgements
An introduction by the editors to all three volumes appears in Volume I
PART I CORPORATE LAW AND ORGANIZATIONS
1. Mark J. Roe (1993), ‘Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and the United States’
2. Michelle J. White (1996), ‘The Costs of Corporate Bankruptcy: A U.S.-European Comparison’
3. Henry Hansmann and Ugo Mattei (1998), ‘The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis’
4. Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny (1998), ‘Law and Finance’
5. Bernard Black, Reinier Kraakman and Anna Tarassova (2000), ‘Russian Privatization and Corporate Governance: What Went Wrong?’
6. Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman (2001), ‘The End of History for Corporate Law’
7. John C. Coffee, Jr. (2001), ‘Do Norms Matter? A Cross-country Evaluation’
PART II PROCEDURAL LAW
8. Geoffrey P. Miller (1997), ‘The Legal-Economic Analysis of Comparative Civil Procedure’
9. J. Mark Ramseyer and Minoru Nakazato (1989), ‘The Rational Litigant: Settlement Amounts and Verdict Rates in Japan’
10. Michael Adams (1995), ‘The Conflict of Jurisdictions – An Economic Analysis of Pre-trial Discovery, Fact Gathering and Cost Shifting Rules in the United States and Germany’
11. Richard A. Posner (1996), ‘Lecture Three: Functional, Systemic Comparisons of Legal Systems’
12. Robert D. Cooter and Tom Ginsburg (1996), ‘Comparative Judicial Discretion: An Empirical Test of Economic Models’
13. Edgardo Buscaglia and Thomas Ulen (1997), ‘A Quantitative Assessment of the Efficiency of the Judicial Sector in Latin America’
Name Index
Volume I
Acknowledgements
Introduction Gerrit De Geest and Roger Van den Bergh
PART I GENERAL THEORIES AND GENERAL HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES
1. Saul Levmore (1986), ‘Rethinking Comparative Law: Variety and Uniformity in Ancient and Modern Tort Law’
2. Ugo Mattei (1997), ‘The Competitive Relationship among Sources of Law’
3. Anthony Ogus (2002), ‘The Economic Basis of Legal Culture: Networks and Monopolization’
4. Edward L. Glaeser and Andrei Shleifer (2002), ‘Legal Origins’
5. Richard A. Posner (1981), ‘The Economic Theory of Primitive Law’
6. Francesco Parisi (2001), ‘The Genesis of Liability in Ancient Law’
PART II REGULATORY COMPETITION AND LEGAL TRANSPLANTS
7. Wallace E. Oates and Robert M. Schwab (1988), ‘Economic Competition Among Jurisdictions: Efficiency Enhancing or Distortion Inducing?’
8. Roger Van den Bergh (2000), ‘Towards an Institutional Legal Framework for Regulatory Competition in Europe’
9. Edgardo Buscaglia and William Ratliff (2000), ‘Legal and Economic Integration: The Cases For and Against Legal Transplants’
10. Gerrit De Geest (2002), ‘Information Problems Caused by Regulatory Competition, and Their Solution: International Standard Codes’
11. Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor and Jean-Francois Richard (2003), ‘The Transplant Effect’
PART III LEGAL SYSTEMS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
12. Douglass C. North and Robert Paul Thomas (1973), ‘The Issue’ and ‘France and Spain – The Also-rans’
13. Mancur Olson (1982), ‘The Developed Democracies Since World War II’
14. Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny (1999), ‘The Quality of Government’
15. Paul G. Mahoney (2001), ‘The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be Right’
Name Index
Volume II
Acknowledgements
An introduction by the editors to all three volumes appears in Volume I
PART I PROPERTY
1. Harold Demsetz (1967), ‘Toward a Theory of Property Rights’
2. Saul Levmore (1987), ‘Variety and Uniformity in the Treatment of the Good-Faith Purchaser’
3. J. Mark Ramseyer (1989), ‘Water Law in Imperial Japan: Public Goods, Private Claims, and Legal Convergence’
4. Kathryn Firmin-Sellers (2000), ‘Custom, Capitalism, and the State: The Origins of Insecure Land Tenure in West Africa’
5. Michael A. Heller (1998), ‘The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets’
6. Francesco Parisi (2002), ‘Entropy in Property’
PART II TORT LAW AND RESTITUTION
7. Michelle J. White (1989), ‘An Empirical Test of the Comparative and Contributory Negligence Rules in Accident Law’
8. J. Finsinger, T. Hoehn and A. Pototschnig (1991), ‘The Enforcement of Product Liability Rules: A Two-Country Analysis of Court Cases’
9. Boudewijn Bouckaert and Gerrit De Geest (1995), ‘Private Takings, Private Taxes, Private Compulsory Services: The Economic Doctrine of Quasi Contracts’
10. Claus Ott and Hans-Bernd Schäfer (1997), ‘Negligence as Untaken Precaution, Limited Information, and Efficient Standard Formation in the Civil Liability System’
11. Mauro Bussani, Vernon Valentine Palmer and Francesco Parisi (2003), ‘Liability for Pure Financial Loss in Europe: An Economic Restatement’
PART III CONTRACTS AND CONSUMER PROTECTION
12. Steven N.S. Cheung (1969), ‘Transaction Costs, Risk Aversion, and the Choice of Contractual Arrangements’
13. Janet T. Landa (1981), ‘A Theory of the Ethnically Homogeneous Middleman Group: An Institutional Alternative to Contract Law’
14. Heidi Kroll (1987), ‘Breach of Contract in the Soviet Economy’
15. Wouter P.J. Wils (1993), ‘Who Should Bear the Costs of Failed Negotiations? A Functional Inquiry into Precontractual Liability’
16. Hein Kötz (2000), ‘Precontractual Duties of Disclosure: A Comparative and Economic Perspective’
17. Ronald J. Gilson (1999), ‘The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete’
18. Pamaria Rekaiti and Roger Van den Bergh (2000), ‘Cooling-off Periods in the Consumer Laws of the EC Member States. A Comparative Law and Economics Approach’
Name Index
Volume III
Acknowledgements
An introduction by the editors to all three volumes appears in Volume I
PART I CORPORATE LAW AND ORGANIZATIONS
1. Mark J. Roe (1993), ‘Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and the United States’
2. Michelle J. White (1996), ‘The Costs of Corporate Bankruptcy: A U.S.-European Comparison’
3. Henry Hansmann and Ugo Mattei (1998), ‘The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis’
4. Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny (1998), ‘Law and Finance’
5. Bernard Black, Reinier Kraakman and Anna Tarassova (2000), ‘Russian Privatization and Corporate Governance: What Went Wrong?’
6. Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman (2001), ‘The End of History for Corporate Law’
7. John C. Coffee, Jr. (2001), ‘Do Norms Matter? A Cross-country Evaluation’
PART II PROCEDURAL LAW
8. Geoffrey P. Miller (1997), ‘The Legal-Economic Analysis of Comparative Civil Procedure’
9. J. Mark Ramseyer and Minoru Nakazato (1989), ‘The Rational Litigant: Settlement Amounts and Verdict Rates in Japan’
10. Michael Adams (1995), ‘The Conflict of Jurisdictions – An Economic Analysis of Pre-trial Discovery, Fact Gathering and Cost Shifting Rules in the United States and Germany’
11. Richard A. Posner (1996), ‘Lecture Three: Functional, Systemic Comparisons of Legal Systems’
12. Robert D. Cooter and Tom Ginsburg (1996), ‘Comparative Judicial Discretion: An Empirical Test of Economic Models’
13. Edgardo Buscaglia and Thomas Ulen (1997), ‘A Quantitative Assessment of the Efficiency of the Judicial Sector in Latin America’
Name Index