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Classics in Corporate Law and Economics
The spate of corporate governance scandals in the USA, Asia and Europe during the late 1990s has renewed interest in the role of corporations in society. International organizations such as the World Bank and OECD have come to recognize that corporate law plays an important role in economic development and GDP growth. In this timely and important collection, Jonathan Macey presents the key papers that have influenced the development of corporate law scholarship.
More Information
Critical Acclaim
Contributors
Contents
More Information
The spate of corporate governance scandals in the USA, Asia and Europe during the late 1990s has renewed interest in the role of corporations in society. International organizations such as the World Bank and OECD have come to recognize that corporate law plays an important role in economic development and GDP growth. In this timely and important collection, Jonathan Macey presents the key papers that have influenced the development of corporate law scholarship.
The many topics covered include the foundations of the economics of corporate law, the corporation as a nexus of contracts, corporate law from a Coasean perspective, insider trading and jurisdictional competition. The articles and the editor’s authoritative introduction are essential readings for those with an interest in corporate law and its economic underpinnings.
The many topics covered include the foundations of the economics of corporate law, the corporation as a nexus of contracts, corporate law from a Coasean perspective, insider trading and jurisdictional competition. The articles and the editor’s authoritative introduction are essential readings for those with an interest in corporate law and its economic underpinnings.
Critical Acclaim
‘Jonathan Macey’s Classics in Corporate Law and Economics ties together a collection of some of the most interesting and creative writers on the subject of law and economics since its birth as a discipline. Beginning with the foundations of the economics of corporate law and a look at the Coasean perspective, the work comprises of a two-volume array of essays that provide an enlightening and in-depth consideration of the most current and essential issues in the field today. The book is a masterpiece long overdue and will surely be heralded as a “classic” in itself for a long time to come.’
– Peter Nobel, University of St. Gallen, Switzerland
‘An invaluable set for everyone with an interest in the theoretical foundations of business corporations. Covering both classic and more contemporary thought, the collection provides readers with an excellent survey of how corporate scholarship has evolved and developed in the past decades.’
– Hideki Kanda, University of Tokyo, Japan
– Peter Nobel, University of St. Gallen, Switzerland
‘An invaluable set for everyone with an interest in the theoretical foundations of business corporations. Covering both classic and more contemporary thought, the collection provides readers with an excellent survey of how corporate scholarship has evolved and developed in the past decades.’
– Hideki Kanda, University of Tokyo, Japan
Contributors
33 articles, dating from 1937 to 2004
Contributors include: L. Bebchuk, R. Coase, F. Easterbrook, D. Fischel, R. Gilson, H. Manne, M. Roe, R. Romano, O. Williamson, R. Winter
Contributors include: L. Bebchuk, R. Coase, F. Easterbrook, D. Fischel, R. Gilson, H. Manne, M. Roe, R. Romano, O. Williamson, R. Winter
Contents
Contents:
Volume I
Acknowledgements
Introduction Jonathan Macey
PART I THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW
1. R.H. Coase (1937), ‘The Nature of the Firm’
2. Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling (1976), ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure’
PART II THE CORPORATION AS A NEXUS OF CONTRACTS
3. Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel (1989), ‘The Corporate Contract’
4. John C. Coffee, Jr. (1989), ‘The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role’
5. Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel (1986), ‘Close Corporations and Agency Costs’
PART III CORPORATE LAW FROM A COASEAN PERSPECTIVE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES, VOTING AND THE ROLE OF SHAREHOLDERS AND OTHER CONSTITUTENCIES
6. Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel (1983), ‘Voting in Corporate Law’
7. Jonathan R. Macey (1999), ‘Fiduciary Duties as Residual Claims: Obligations to Nonshareholder Constituencies from a Theory of the Firm Perspective’
8. Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller (1993), ‘Corporate Stakeholders: A Contractual Perspective’
PART IV CORPORATE LAWYERS AND OTHER “INSTITUTIONAL FEATURES” OF CORPORATE LAW
9. Oliver E. Williamson (1979), ‘Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations’
10. Arnoud W.A. Boot and Jonathan R. Macey (2004), ‘Monitoring Corporate Performance: The Role of Objectivity, Proximity, and Adaptability in Corporate Governance’
11. Ronald J. Gilson (1984), ‘Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing’
12. Ronald J. Gilson (1996), ‘Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency: When Do Institutions Matter?’
13. Mark J. Roe (2002), ‘Corporate Law’s Limits’
14. Oliver E Williamson (1988), ‘Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance’
15. Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller (1995), ‘Corporate Governance and Commercial Banking: A Comparative Examination of Germany, Japan, and the United States’
16. Clifford W. Smith, Jr. and Jerold B. Warner (1979), ‘On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants’
17. Roberta Romano (1991), ‘The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?’
Name Index
Volume II
Acknowledgements
An introduction by the editor to both volumes appears in Volume I
PART I INSIDER TRADING
1. Dennis W. Carlton and Daniel R. Fischel (1983), ‘The Regulation of Insider Trading’
2. David D. Haddock and Jonathan R. Macey (1987), ‘A Coasian Model of Insider Trading’
3. David D. Haddock and Jonathan R. Macey (1987), ‘Regulation on Demand: A Private Interest Model, with an Application to Insider Trading Regulation’
PART II THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL
4. Henry G. Manne (1965), ‘Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control’
5. Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel (1981), ‘The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer’
6. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV and Guhan Subramanian (2002), ‘The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy’
7. Richard Roll (1986), ‘The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers’
8. Ronald J. Gilson (1982), ‘Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer Defense’, Stanford Law Review, 35, November, 51-67 [17]
9. Jonathan R. Macey and Fred S. McChesney (1985), ‘A Theoretical Analysis of Corporate Greenmail’
PART III JURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION FOR CORPORATE CHARTERS
10. Ralph K. Winter, Jr. (1977), ‘State Law, Shareholder Protection and the Theory of the Corporation’
11. Roberta Romano (1985), ‘Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle’
12. Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller (1987), ‘Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law’
13. William J. Carney (1997), ‘The Political Economy of Competition for Corporate Charters’
PART IV POLITICS AND THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW
14. John Pound (1993), ‘The Rise of the Political Model of Corporate Governance and Corporate Control’
15. Vikramaditya S. Khanna (2004), ‘Corporate Crime Legislation: A Political Economy Analysis’
16. Mark J. Roe (1991), ‘A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance’
Name Index
Volume I
Acknowledgements
Introduction Jonathan Macey
PART I THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW
1. R.H. Coase (1937), ‘The Nature of the Firm’
2. Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling (1976), ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure’
PART II THE CORPORATION AS A NEXUS OF CONTRACTS
3. Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel (1989), ‘The Corporate Contract’
4. John C. Coffee, Jr. (1989), ‘The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role’
5. Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel (1986), ‘Close Corporations and Agency Costs’
PART III CORPORATE LAW FROM A COASEAN PERSPECTIVE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES, VOTING AND THE ROLE OF SHAREHOLDERS AND OTHER CONSTITUTENCIES
6. Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel (1983), ‘Voting in Corporate Law’
7. Jonathan R. Macey (1999), ‘Fiduciary Duties as Residual Claims: Obligations to Nonshareholder Constituencies from a Theory of the Firm Perspective’
8. Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller (1993), ‘Corporate Stakeholders: A Contractual Perspective’
PART IV CORPORATE LAWYERS AND OTHER “INSTITUTIONAL FEATURES” OF CORPORATE LAW
9. Oliver E. Williamson (1979), ‘Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations’
10. Arnoud W.A. Boot and Jonathan R. Macey (2004), ‘Monitoring Corporate Performance: The Role of Objectivity, Proximity, and Adaptability in Corporate Governance’
11. Ronald J. Gilson (1984), ‘Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing’
12. Ronald J. Gilson (1996), ‘Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency: When Do Institutions Matter?’
13. Mark J. Roe (2002), ‘Corporate Law’s Limits’
14. Oliver E Williamson (1988), ‘Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance’
15. Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller (1995), ‘Corporate Governance and Commercial Banking: A Comparative Examination of Germany, Japan, and the United States’
16. Clifford W. Smith, Jr. and Jerold B. Warner (1979), ‘On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants’
17. Roberta Romano (1991), ‘The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?’
Name Index
Volume II
Acknowledgements
An introduction by the editor to both volumes appears in Volume I
PART I INSIDER TRADING
1. Dennis W. Carlton and Daniel R. Fischel (1983), ‘The Regulation of Insider Trading’
2. David D. Haddock and Jonathan R. Macey (1987), ‘A Coasian Model of Insider Trading’
3. David D. Haddock and Jonathan R. Macey (1987), ‘Regulation on Demand: A Private Interest Model, with an Application to Insider Trading Regulation’
PART II THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL
4. Henry G. Manne (1965), ‘Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control’
5. Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel (1981), ‘The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer’
6. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV and Guhan Subramanian (2002), ‘The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy’
7. Richard Roll (1986), ‘The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers’
8. Ronald J. Gilson (1982), ‘Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer Defense’, Stanford Law Review, 35, November, 51-67 [17]
9. Jonathan R. Macey and Fred S. McChesney (1985), ‘A Theoretical Analysis of Corporate Greenmail’
PART III JURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION FOR CORPORATE CHARTERS
10. Ralph K. Winter, Jr. (1977), ‘State Law, Shareholder Protection and the Theory of the Corporation’
11. Roberta Romano (1985), ‘Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle’
12. Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller (1987), ‘Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law’
13. William J. Carney (1997), ‘The Political Economy of Competition for Corporate Charters’
PART IV POLITICS AND THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW
14. John Pound (1993), ‘The Rise of the Political Model of Corporate Governance and Corporate Control’
15. Vikramaditya S. Khanna (2004), ‘Corporate Crime Legislation: A Political Economy Analysis’
16. Mark J. Roe (1991), ‘A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance’
Name Index
