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Business and Government
This comprehensive volume brings together the key articles on relations between business and government from a variety of perspectives and disciplines. The editors have selected works that explore the themes of business and the state, organizing the firm for political action, managing government affairs, lobbying models, business governance and regulation, comparative business– political systems and internationalization and transnational business regulation.
With an original introduction by the editors, this volume is an essential resource for scholars, students and policy makers interested in political science, business studies and economics.
With an original introduction by the editors, this volume is an essential resource for scholars, students and policy makers interested in political science, business studies and economics.
More Information
Critical Acclaim
Contributors
Contents
More Information
This comprehensive volume brings together the key articles on relations between business and government from a variety of perspectives and disciplines. The editors have selected works that explore the themes of business and the state, organizing the firm for political action, managing government affairs, lobbying models, business governance and regulation, comparative business – political systems and internationalization and transnational business regulation.
With an original introduction by the editors, this volume is an essential resource for scholars, students and policy makers interested in political science, business studies and economics.
With an original introduction by the editors, this volume is an essential resource for scholars, students and policy makers interested in political science, business studies and economics.
Critical Acclaim
‘The remarkable new edited volume Business and Government by Coen and Grant brings together the most important recent contributions to our understanding of the tenuous balance between markets, societies and polities. This groundbreaking volume demonstrates how this balance has changed over time, and shapes what we know about markets and their institutions. It will be a must-read for students of economics, politics, business, sociology, and many other fields.’
– Andrew B. Whitford, University of Georgia, US
– Andrew B. Whitford, University of Georgia, US
Contributors
43 articles, dating from 1964 to 2009
Contributors include: F. Baumgartner, P. Hall, T. Lowi, C. Lindblom, H. Milner, J.G. Ruggie, P. Schmitter, P. Spiller, G. Wilson, D. Vogel
Contributors include: F. Baumgartner, P. Hall, T. Lowi, C. Lindblom, H. Milner, J.G. Ruggie, P. Schmitter, P. Spiller, G. Wilson, D. Vogel
Contents
Contents:
Introduction
David Coen and Wyn Grant
PART I BUSINESS AND THE STATE
1. E. E. Schattschneider (1948), ‘Pressure Groups Versus Political Parties’, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 259, September, 17–23
2. Theodore J. Lowi (1964), ‘American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political Theory’, World Politics, 16 (4), July, 677–93, 695, 697, 699, 701, 703, 705, 707, 709, 711, 713, 715
3. George J. Stigler (1971), ‘The Theory of Economic Regulation’, Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 2 (1), Spring, 3–21
4. Charles E. Lindblom (1977), ‘The Priviledged Position of Business’, in Politics and Markets: The World’s Political-Economic Systems, Chapter 13, New York, NY, USA: Basic Books, 170–88
5. David Vogel (1978), ‘Why Businessmen Distrust Their State: The Political Consciouness of American Corporate Executives’, British Journal of Political Science, 8 (1), January, 45–78
6. Gary S. Becker (1985), ‘Public Policies, Pressure Groups, and Dead Weight Costs’, Journal of Public Economics, 28 (3), December, 329–47
7. Robert H. Salisbury (1984), ‘Interest Representation: The Dominance of Institutions, ’ American Political Science Review,78 (1), March, 64–76
8. Philippe C. Schmitter (1974), ‘Still the Century of Corporatism?’, Review of Politics, 36 (1), January, 85–131
9. Hugh Heclo (1978), ‘Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment’, in Anthony King (ed.) The New American Political System, Chapter 3, Washington, DC, USA: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 87–124
PART II ORGANISING THE FIRM FOR POLITICAL ACTION
10. Mancur Olson (1971) [1965]), ‘A Taxonomy of Groups’ and ‘Group Size and Group Behavior’, in The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Chapter 1, Section F and Chapter 2, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London,UK: Harvard University Press, 43–52, 53–65
11. Terry M. Moe (1981), ‘Toward a Broader View of Interest Groups’, Journal of Politics, 43 (2), May, 531–43
12. David M. Hart (2004), ‘“Business” Is Not an Interest Group: On the Study of Companies in American National Politics’, Annual Review of Political Science, 7, 47–69
13. Wendy L. Hansen, Neil J. Mitchell and Jeffrey M. Drope (2004), ‘Collective Action, Pluralism, and the Legitimacy Tariff: Corporate Activity or Inactivity in Politics’, Political Research Quarterly, 57 (3), September, 421–9
14. Kevin B. Grier, Michael C. Munger and Brian E. Roberts (1994), ‘The Determinants of Industry Political Activity, 1978–1986’,
American Political Science Review, 88 (4), December, 911–26
15. Wendy L. Hansen and Neil J. Mitchell (2000), ‘Disaggregating and Explaining Corporate Political Activity: Domestic and Foreign Corporations in National Politics’, American Political Science Review, 94 (4), December, 891–903
16. Holly Brasher and David Lowery (2006), ‘The Corporate Context of Lobbying Activity’, Business and Politics, 8 (1), i, 1–23
PART III MANAGING GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS
17. Graham K. Wilson (1990), ‘Corporate Political Strategies’, British Journal of Political Science, 20 (2), April, 281–8
18. David B. Yoffie and Sigrid Bergenstein (1985), ‘Creating Political Advantage: The Rise of the Corporate Political Entrepreneur’, California Management Review, XXVIII (1), Fall, 124–39
19. Wyn Grant (1984), ‘Large Firms and Public Policy in Britain’, Journal of Public Policy, 4 (1), February, 1–17
20. Kathleen A. Getz (2001), ‘Public Affairs and Political Strategy: Theoretical Foundations’, Journal of Public Affairs: Special Issue Papers, 1 (4), December, 305–29 394
PART IV LOBBYING MODELS
21. David Austen-Smith and John R. Wright (1996), ‘Theory and Evidence for Counteractive Lobbying’, American Journal of Political Science, 40 (2), May, 543–64
22. Marie Hojnacki and David C. Kimball (1998), ‘Organized Interests and the Decision of Whom to Lobby in Congress’, American Political Science Review, 92 (4), December, 775–90
23. John M. De Figueiredo (2002), ‘Lobbying and Information in Politics’, Business and Politics, 4 (2), 125–29
24. Andreas Broscheid and David Coen (2003), ‘Insider and Outsider Lobbying of the European Commission: An Informational Model of Forum Politics’, European Union Politics, 4 (2), June, 165–89
25. Richard L. Hall and Alan V. Deardorff (2006), ‘Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy’, American Political Science Review, 100 (1), February, 69–84
PART V BUSINESS GOVERNANCE AND REGULATION
26. Sam Peltzman (1976), ‘Toward a More General Theory of Regulation’, Journal of Law and Economics, 19 (2), August, 211–40
27. Pablo T. Spiller (1990), ‘Politicians, Interest Groups, and Regulators: A Multiple-Principals Agency Theory of Regulation, or “Let Them be Bribed”’, Journal of Law and Economics, 33 (1), April, 65–101
28. Michael Moran (2000), ‘The Frank Stacey Memorial Lecture: From Command State to Regulatory State?’, Public Policy and Administration, 15 (4), Winter, 1–13
29. David Coen (1998), ‘The European Business Interest and The Nation State: Large-firm Lobbying in the European Union and Member States’, Journal of Public Policy, 18 (1), January–April, 75–100
30. Jason Webb Yackee and Susan Webb Yackee (2006), ‘A Bias Towards Business? Assessing Interest Group Influence on the U.S Bureaucracy’, Journal of Politics, 68 (1), February, 128–39
PART VI COMPARATIVE BUSINESS–POLITICAL SYSTEMS
31. Peter A. Hall and Daniel W. Gingerich (2009), ‘Varieties of Capitalism and Institutional Complementarities in the Political Economy: An Empirical Analysis’, British Journal of Political Science, 39 (3), July, 449–82
32. Beth L. Leech, Frank R. Baumgartner, Timothy M. La Pira and Nicholas A. Semanko (2005), ‘Drawing Lobbyists to Washington: Government Activity and the Demand for Advocacy’, Political Research Quarterly, 58 (1), March, 19–30
33. David Coen (1997), ‘The Evolution of the Large Firm as a Political Actor in the European Union’, Journal of European Public Policy, 4 (1), March, 91–108
34. Wyn Grant, Alberto Martinelli and William Paterson (1989), ‘Large Firms as Political Actors: A Comparative Analysis of the Chemical Industry in Britain, Italy and West Germany’, West European Politics, 12 (2), 72–90
35. Jean C. Oi (1992), ‘Fiscal Reform and the Economic Foundations of Local State Corporatism in China’, World Politics, 45 (1), October, 99–126
36. Kent E. Calder (1989), ‘Elites in an Equalizing Role: Ex- Bureaucrats as Coordinators and Intermediaries in the Japanese Government-Business Relationship’, Comparative Politics, 21 (4), July, 379–403
PART VII INTERNATIONALIASTION AND TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS REGULATION
37. William A. Brock and Stephen P. Magee (1978) ‘Decentralization, Bureaucracy, and Government: The Economics of Special Interest Politics: The Case of the Tariff’, American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings of the Ninetieth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association,
68 (2), May, 246–50
38. Helen Milner (1987), ‘Resisting the Protectionist Temptation: Industry and the Making of Trade Policy in France and the United States during the 1970s’, International Organization, 41 (4), Autumn, 639–65
39. Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1994), ‘Protection for Sale’, American Economic Review, 84 (4), September, 833–50
40. A. Claire Cutler (1997), ‘Artiface, Ideology and Paradox: The Public/Private Distinction in International Law’, Review of International Political Economy, 4 (2), Summer, 261–85
41. John Gerard Ruggie (2004), ‘Reconstituting the Global Public Domain—Issues, Actors, and Practices’, European Journal of International Relations, 10 (4), 499–531
42. David Vogel (2008), ‘Private Global Business Regulation’, Annual Review of Political Science, 11, 261–82
43. Aseem Prakash and Matthew Potoski (2014), ‘Global Private Regimes, Domestic Public Law: ISO 14001 and Pollution Reduction’, Comparative Political Studies, 47 (3), 369–94
Index
Introduction
David Coen and Wyn Grant
PART I BUSINESS AND THE STATE
1. E. E. Schattschneider (1948), ‘Pressure Groups Versus Political Parties’, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 259, September, 17–23
2. Theodore J. Lowi (1964), ‘American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political Theory’, World Politics, 16 (4), July, 677–93, 695, 697, 699, 701, 703, 705, 707, 709, 711, 713, 715
3. George J. Stigler (1971), ‘The Theory of Economic Regulation’, Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 2 (1), Spring, 3–21
4. Charles E. Lindblom (1977), ‘The Priviledged Position of Business’, in Politics and Markets: The World’s Political-Economic Systems, Chapter 13, New York, NY, USA: Basic Books, 170–88
5. David Vogel (1978), ‘Why Businessmen Distrust Their State: The Political Consciouness of American Corporate Executives’, British Journal of Political Science, 8 (1), January, 45–78
6. Gary S. Becker (1985), ‘Public Policies, Pressure Groups, and Dead Weight Costs’, Journal of Public Economics, 28 (3), December, 329–47
7. Robert H. Salisbury (1984), ‘Interest Representation: The Dominance of Institutions, ’ American Political Science Review,78 (1), March, 64–76
8. Philippe C. Schmitter (1974), ‘Still the Century of Corporatism?’, Review of Politics, 36 (1), January, 85–131
9. Hugh Heclo (1978), ‘Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment’, in Anthony King (ed.) The New American Political System, Chapter 3, Washington, DC, USA: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 87–124
PART II ORGANISING THE FIRM FOR POLITICAL ACTION
10. Mancur Olson (1971) [1965]), ‘A Taxonomy of Groups’ and ‘Group Size and Group Behavior’, in The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Chapter 1, Section F and Chapter 2, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London,UK: Harvard University Press, 43–52, 53–65
11. Terry M. Moe (1981), ‘Toward a Broader View of Interest Groups’, Journal of Politics, 43 (2), May, 531–43
12. David M. Hart (2004), ‘“Business” Is Not an Interest Group: On the Study of Companies in American National Politics’, Annual Review of Political Science, 7, 47–69
13. Wendy L. Hansen, Neil J. Mitchell and Jeffrey M. Drope (2004), ‘Collective Action, Pluralism, and the Legitimacy Tariff: Corporate Activity or Inactivity in Politics’, Political Research Quarterly, 57 (3), September, 421–9
14. Kevin B. Grier, Michael C. Munger and Brian E. Roberts (1994), ‘The Determinants of Industry Political Activity, 1978–1986’,
American Political Science Review, 88 (4), December, 911–26
15. Wendy L. Hansen and Neil J. Mitchell (2000), ‘Disaggregating and Explaining Corporate Political Activity: Domestic and Foreign Corporations in National Politics’, American Political Science Review, 94 (4), December, 891–903
16. Holly Brasher and David Lowery (2006), ‘The Corporate Context of Lobbying Activity’, Business and Politics, 8 (1), i, 1–23
PART III MANAGING GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS
17. Graham K. Wilson (1990), ‘Corporate Political Strategies’, British Journal of Political Science, 20 (2), April, 281–8
18. David B. Yoffie and Sigrid Bergenstein (1985), ‘Creating Political Advantage: The Rise of the Corporate Political Entrepreneur’, California Management Review, XXVIII (1), Fall, 124–39
19. Wyn Grant (1984), ‘Large Firms and Public Policy in Britain’, Journal of Public Policy, 4 (1), February, 1–17
20. Kathleen A. Getz (2001), ‘Public Affairs and Political Strategy: Theoretical Foundations’, Journal of Public Affairs: Special Issue Papers, 1 (4), December, 305–29 394
PART IV LOBBYING MODELS
21. David Austen-Smith and John R. Wright (1996), ‘Theory and Evidence for Counteractive Lobbying’, American Journal of Political Science, 40 (2), May, 543–64
22. Marie Hojnacki and David C. Kimball (1998), ‘Organized Interests and the Decision of Whom to Lobby in Congress’, American Political Science Review, 92 (4), December, 775–90
23. John M. De Figueiredo (2002), ‘Lobbying and Information in Politics’, Business and Politics, 4 (2), 125–29
24. Andreas Broscheid and David Coen (2003), ‘Insider and Outsider Lobbying of the European Commission: An Informational Model of Forum Politics’, European Union Politics, 4 (2), June, 165–89
25. Richard L. Hall and Alan V. Deardorff (2006), ‘Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy’, American Political Science Review, 100 (1), February, 69–84
PART V BUSINESS GOVERNANCE AND REGULATION
26. Sam Peltzman (1976), ‘Toward a More General Theory of Regulation’, Journal of Law and Economics, 19 (2), August, 211–40
27. Pablo T. Spiller (1990), ‘Politicians, Interest Groups, and Regulators: A Multiple-Principals Agency Theory of Regulation, or “Let Them be Bribed”’, Journal of Law and Economics, 33 (1), April, 65–101
28. Michael Moran (2000), ‘The Frank Stacey Memorial Lecture: From Command State to Regulatory State?’, Public Policy and Administration, 15 (4), Winter, 1–13
29. David Coen (1998), ‘The European Business Interest and The Nation State: Large-firm Lobbying in the European Union and Member States’, Journal of Public Policy, 18 (1), January–April, 75–100
30. Jason Webb Yackee and Susan Webb Yackee (2006), ‘A Bias Towards Business? Assessing Interest Group Influence on the U.S Bureaucracy’, Journal of Politics, 68 (1), February, 128–39
PART VI COMPARATIVE BUSINESS–POLITICAL SYSTEMS
31. Peter A. Hall and Daniel W. Gingerich (2009), ‘Varieties of Capitalism and Institutional Complementarities in the Political Economy: An Empirical Analysis’, British Journal of Political Science, 39 (3), July, 449–82
32. Beth L. Leech, Frank R. Baumgartner, Timothy M. La Pira and Nicholas A. Semanko (2005), ‘Drawing Lobbyists to Washington: Government Activity and the Demand for Advocacy’, Political Research Quarterly, 58 (1), March, 19–30
33. David Coen (1997), ‘The Evolution of the Large Firm as a Political Actor in the European Union’, Journal of European Public Policy, 4 (1), March, 91–108
34. Wyn Grant, Alberto Martinelli and William Paterson (1989), ‘Large Firms as Political Actors: A Comparative Analysis of the Chemical Industry in Britain, Italy and West Germany’, West European Politics, 12 (2), 72–90
35. Jean C. Oi (1992), ‘Fiscal Reform and the Economic Foundations of Local State Corporatism in China’, World Politics, 45 (1), October, 99–126
36. Kent E. Calder (1989), ‘Elites in an Equalizing Role: Ex- Bureaucrats as Coordinators and Intermediaries in the Japanese Government-Business Relationship’, Comparative Politics, 21 (4), July, 379–403
PART VII INTERNATIONALIASTION AND TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS REGULATION
37. William A. Brock and Stephen P. Magee (1978) ‘Decentralization, Bureaucracy, and Government: The Economics of Special Interest Politics: The Case of the Tariff’, American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings of the Ninetieth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association,
68 (2), May, 246–50
38. Helen Milner (1987), ‘Resisting the Protectionist Temptation: Industry and the Making of Trade Policy in France and the United States during the 1970s’, International Organization, 41 (4), Autumn, 639–65
39. Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1994), ‘Protection for Sale’, American Economic Review, 84 (4), September, 833–50
40. A. Claire Cutler (1997), ‘Artiface, Ideology and Paradox: The Public/Private Distinction in International Law’, Review of International Political Economy, 4 (2), Summer, 261–85
41. John Gerard Ruggie (2004), ‘Reconstituting the Global Public Domain—Issues, Actors, and Practices’, European Journal of International Relations, 10 (4), 499–531
42. David Vogel (2008), ‘Private Global Business Regulation’, Annual Review of Political Science, 11, 261–82
43. Aseem Prakash and Matthew Potoski (2014), ‘Global Private Regimes, Domestic Public Law: ISO 14001 and Pollution Reduction’, Comparative Political Studies, 47 (3), 369–94
Index
