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Antitrust and Competition Policy
The antitrust litigation process is, to a large and perhaps surprising degree, driven by the underlying economic literature. The articles in this volume have been chosen to provide a sense of both the history and the current state of thinking about antitrust.
More Information
Critical Acclaim
Contributors
Contents
More Information
The antitrust litigation process is, to a large and perhaps surprising degree, driven by the underlying economic literature. The articles in this volume have been chosen to provide a sense of both the history and the current state of thinking about antitrust.
The opening section considers the flaws in the 1960s view on monopoly. Part II then examines economic thinking with respect to mergers. The next three sections contain selections on three specific sets of practices that have been frequent targets of antitrust scrutiny. Part VI examines perspectives on exclusionary behavior. Part VII studies the literature on network externalities. The final part explores works in the area of bureaucracy and politics.
This insightful volume will be a valuable source of reference for both economists and lawyers concerned with antitrust and competition issues.
The opening section considers the flaws in the 1960s view on monopoly. Part II then examines economic thinking with respect to mergers. The next three sections contain selections on three specific sets of practices that have been frequent targets of antitrust scrutiny. Part VI examines perspectives on exclusionary behavior. Part VII studies the literature on network externalities. The final part explores works in the area of bureaucracy and politics.
This insightful volume will be a valuable source of reference for both economists and lawyers concerned with antitrust and competition issues.
Critical Acclaim
‘It is most welcome to see classic law and economics pieces by Harold Demsetz, Oliver Williamson, Lester Telser, George Stigler and other giants of the field together in one volume along with newer and more enforcement oriented voices. . . Antitrust and Competition Policy fills and important need for both attorneys and economists in their continuing collaboration in the competition field. . . provides a comprehensive collection of the major voices and views that have shaped our profession over the past 50 years.’
– Spencer Weber Waller, World Competition
– Spencer Weber Waller, World Competition
Contributors
29 articles, dating from 1958 to 2001
Contributors include: J. Baker, T. Bresnahan, H. Demsetz, K. Elzinga, F. Fisher, T. Hogarty, J. McGowan, S. Salop, D. Scheffman, O. Williamson, R. Willig
Contributors include: J. Baker, T. Bresnahan, H. Demsetz, K. Elzinga, F. Fisher, T. Hogarty, J. McGowan, S. Salop, D. Scheffman, O. Williamson, R. Willig
Contents
Contents:
Acknowledgements
Introduction Andrew N. Kleit
PART I MONOPOLIZATION
1. Harold Demsetz (1974), ‘Two Systems of Belief About Monopoly’
2. Franklin M. Fisher and John J. McGowan (1983), ‘On the Misuse of Accounting Rates of Return to Infer Monopoly Profits’
PART II MERGERS
3. Oliver E. Williamson (1968), ‘Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs’
4. Kenneth G. Elzinga and Thomas F. Hogarty (1973), ‘The Problem of Geographic Market Delineation in Antimerger Suits’
5. Robert D. Willig (1991), ‘Merger Analysis, Industrial Organization Theory, and Merger Guidelines’
6. Barry C. Harris and Joseph J. Simons (1989), ‘Focusing Market Definition: How Much Substitution is Necessary?’
7. Jonathan B. Baker and Timothy F. Bresnahan (1988), ‘Estimating the Residual Demand Curve Facing a Single Firm’
8. Gregory J. Werden and Luke M. Froeb (1994), ‘The Effects of Mergers in Differentiated Products Industries: Logit Demand and Merger Policy’
PART III COLLUSION
9. George J. Stigler (1964), ‘A Theory of Oligopoly’
10. George A. Hay and Daniel Kelley (1974), ‘An Empirical Survey of Price Fixing Conspiracies’
11. Thomas E. Cooper (1986), ‘Most-Favored-Customer Pricing and Tacit Collusion’
PART IV VERTICAL RESTRAINTS
12. Lester G. Telser (1960), ‘Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?’
13. Benjamin Klein and Kevin M. Murphy (1988), ‘Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement Mechanisms’
PART V PREDATORY PRICING
14. John S. McGee (1958), ‘Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case’
15. Robert H. Bork (1978), ‘Injury to Competition: The Law''s Basic Theories’
16. Paul Milgrom and John Roberts (1982), ‘Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence’
PART VI EXCLUSIONARY BEHAVIOR
17. Steven C. Salop and David T. Scheffman (1987), ‘Cost-Raising Strategies’
18. Timothy J. Brennan (1988), ‘Understanding “Raising Rivals'' Costs”’
19. Janusz A. Ordover, Garth Saloner and Steven C. Salop (1990), ‘Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure’
20. David Reiffen (1992), ‘Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure: Comment’
21. Philippe Aghion and Patrick Bolton (1987), ‘Contracts as a Barrier to Entry’
22. David A. Butz and Andrew N. Kleit (2001), ‘Are Vertical Restraints Pro- or Anticompetitive? Lessons from Interstate Circuit’
PART VII NETWORK EXTERNALITIES
23. Michael L. Katz and Carl Shapiro (1985), ‘Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility’
24. Paul A. David (1985), ‘Clio and the Economics of QWERTY’
25. S.J. Liebowitz and Stephen E. Margolis (1990), ‘The Fable of the Keys’
PART VIII ANTITRUST, REGULATION, AND BUREAUCRACY
26. William J. Baumol and Janusz A. Ordover (1985), ‘Use of Antitrust to Subvert Competition’
27. Timothy J. Brennan (1995), ‘Is the Theory Behind U.S. v. AT&T Applicable Today?’
28. Malcolm B. Coate, Richard S. Higgins and Fred S. McChesney (1990), ‘Bureaucracy and Politics in FTC Merger Challenges’
29. Malcolm B. Coate, Andrew N. Kleit and Rene Bustamante (1995), ‘Fight, Fold or Settle?: Modelling the Reaction to FTC Merger Challenges’
Name Index
Acknowledgements
Introduction Andrew N. Kleit
PART I MONOPOLIZATION
1. Harold Demsetz (1974), ‘Two Systems of Belief About Monopoly’
2. Franklin M. Fisher and John J. McGowan (1983), ‘On the Misuse of Accounting Rates of Return to Infer Monopoly Profits’
PART II MERGERS
3. Oliver E. Williamson (1968), ‘Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs’
4. Kenneth G. Elzinga and Thomas F. Hogarty (1973), ‘The Problem of Geographic Market Delineation in Antimerger Suits’
5. Robert D. Willig (1991), ‘Merger Analysis, Industrial Organization Theory, and Merger Guidelines’
6. Barry C. Harris and Joseph J. Simons (1989), ‘Focusing Market Definition: How Much Substitution is Necessary?’
7. Jonathan B. Baker and Timothy F. Bresnahan (1988), ‘Estimating the Residual Demand Curve Facing a Single Firm’
8. Gregory J. Werden and Luke M. Froeb (1994), ‘The Effects of Mergers in Differentiated Products Industries: Logit Demand and Merger Policy’
PART III COLLUSION
9. George J. Stigler (1964), ‘A Theory of Oligopoly’
10. George A. Hay and Daniel Kelley (1974), ‘An Empirical Survey of Price Fixing Conspiracies’
11. Thomas E. Cooper (1986), ‘Most-Favored-Customer Pricing and Tacit Collusion’
PART IV VERTICAL RESTRAINTS
12. Lester G. Telser (1960), ‘Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?’
13. Benjamin Klein and Kevin M. Murphy (1988), ‘Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement Mechanisms’
PART V PREDATORY PRICING
14. John S. McGee (1958), ‘Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case’
15. Robert H. Bork (1978), ‘Injury to Competition: The Law''s Basic Theories’
16. Paul Milgrom and John Roberts (1982), ‘Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence’
PART VI EXCLUSIONARY BEHAVIOR
17. Steven C. Salop and David T. Scheffman (1987), ‘Cost-Raising Strategies’
18. Timothy J. Brennan (1988), ‘Understanding “Raising Rivals'' Costs”’
19. Janusz A. Ordover, Garth Saloner and Steven C. Salop (1990), ‘Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure’
20. David Reiffen (1992), ‘Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure: Comment’
21. Philippe Aghion and Patrick Bolton (1987), ‘Contracts as a Barrier to Entry’
22. David A. Butz and Andrew N. Kleit (2001), ‘Are Vertical Restraints Pro- or Anticompetitive? Lessons from Interstate Circuit’
PART VII NETWORK EXTERNALITIES
23. Michael L. Katz and Carl Shapiro (1985), ‘Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility’
24. Paul A. David (1985), ‘Clio and the Economics of QWERTY’
25. S.J. Liebowitz and Stephen E. Margolis (1990), ‘The Fable of the Keys’
PART VIII ANTITRUST, REGULATION, AND BUREAUCRACY
26. William J. Baumol and Janusz A. Ordover (1985), ‘Use of Antitrust to Subvert Competition’
27. Timothy J. Brennan (1995), ‘Is the Theory Behind U.S. v. AT&T Applicable Today?’
28. Malcolm B. Coate, Richard S. Higgins and Fred S. McChesney (1990), ‘Bureaucracy and Politics in FTC Merger Challenges’
29. Malcolm B. Coate, Andrew N. Kleit and Rene Bustamante (1995), ‘Fight, Fold or Settle?: Modelling the Reaction to FTC Merger Challenges’
Name Index
