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The WTO and the Political Economy of Trade Policy
This indispensable volume brings together the key contributions to the academic literature on the subject of the political economy of trade policy. Topics covered include unilateral and multilateral trade policies, international trade agreements and administered protection. In their comprehensive introduction, the editors present an insightful discussion of the political economy approach, the development of multilateral trade agreements, the trade and internal motives that guide unilateral trade policy and the features that characterise unilateralism. This volume is essential for professors, researchers and policymakers concerned with international trade policy.
More Information
Contributors
Contents
More Information
This indispensable volume brings together the key contributions to the academic literature on the subject of the political economy of trade policy. Topics covered include unilateral and multilateral trade policies, international trade agreements and administered protection. In their comprehensive introduction, the editors present an insightful discussion of the political economy approach, the development of multilateral trade agreements, the trade and internal motives that guide unilateral trade policy and the features that characterise unilateralism. This volume is essential for professors, researchers and policymakers concerned with international trade policy.
Contributors
28 articles, dating from 1953 to 2006
Contributors include: K. Bagwell, A. Dixit, J. Eaton, G. Grossman, E. Helpman, J. Levinsohn, S. Magee, G. Maggi, W. Mayer, R. Staiger
Contributors include: K. Bagwell, A. Dixit, J. Eaton, G. Grossman, E. Helpman, J. Levinsohn, S. Magee, G. Maggi, W. Mayer, R. Staiger
Contents
Contents:
Acknowledgements
Introduction Wilfred J. Ethier and Arye L. Hillman
PART I UNILATERAL TRADE POLICIES
1. Harry G. Johnson (1953–4), ‘Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation’
2. Richard E. Caves (1976), ‘Economic Models of Political Choice: Canada’s Tariff Structure’
3. William A. Brock and Stephen P. Magee (1978), ‘The Economics of Special Interest Politics: The Case of the Tariff’
4. Arye L. Hillman (1982), ‘Declining Industries and Political-Support Protectionist Motives’
5. Wolfgang Mayer (1984), ‘Endogenous Tariff Formation’
6. James H. Cassing and Arye L. Hillman (1986), ‘Shifting Comparative Advantage and Senescent Industry Collapse’
7. Jonathan Eaton and Gene M. Grossman (1986), ‘Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy Under Oligopoly’
8. Arye L. Hillman and Heinrich W. Ursprung (1988), ‘Domestic Politics, Foreign Interests and International Trade Policy’
9. Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1994), ‘Protection for Sale’
10. James H. Cassing (1996), ‘Protectionist Mutual Funds’
11. Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg and Giovanni Maggi (1999), ‘Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation’
12. JoAnne Feeney and Arye L. Hillman (2004), ‘Trade Liberalization Through Asset Markets’
13. Wilfred J. Ethier (2006), ‘Selling “Protection for Sale”’
PART II INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS
14. Wolfgang Mayer (1981), ‘Theoretical Considerations on Negotiated Tariff Adjustments’
15. Avinash Dixit (1987), ‘Strategic Aspects of Trade Policy’
16. Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1995), ‘Trade Wars and Trade Talks’
17. Arye L. Hillman and Peter Moser (1996), ‘Trade Liberalization as Politically Optimal Exchange of Market Access’
18. Giovanni Maggi and Andrés Rodríguez-Clare (1998), ‘The Value of Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressures’
19. Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger (1999), ‘An Economic Theory of GATT’
20. Wilfred J. Ethier (2004), ‘Political Externalities, Nondiscrimination and a Multilateral World’
PART III NONDISCRIMINATION IN MULTILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS
21. Warren F. Schwartz and Alan O. Sykes (1996), ‘Toward a Positive Theory of the Most Favored Nation Obligation and Its Exceptions in the WTO/GATT System’
22. Henrik Horn and Petros C. Mavroidis (2001), ‘Economic and Legal Aspects of the Most-Favored-Nation Clause’
PART IV ADMINISTERED PROTECTION AND MULTILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS
23. J.M. Finger, H. Keith Hall and Douglas R. Nelson (1982), ‘The Political Economy of Administered Protection’
24. Robert W. Staiger and Guido Tabellini (1987), ‘Discretionary Trade Policy and Excessive Protection’
25. Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger (1990), ‘A Theory of Managed Trade’
26. Wilfred J. Ethier (1991), ‘The Economics and Political Economy of Managed Trade’
27. Steven Berry, James Levinsohn and Ariel Pakes (1999), ‘Voluntary Export Restraints on Automobiles: Evaluating a Trade Policy’
28. Wilfred J. Ethier (2002), ‘Unilateralism in a Multilateral World’
Name Index
Acknowledgements
Introduction Wilfred J. Ethier and Arye L. Hillman
PART I UNILATERAL TRADE POLICIES
1. Harry G. Johnson (1953–4), ‘Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation’
2. Richard E. Caves (1976), ‘Economic Models of Political Choice: Canada’s Tariff Structure’
3. William A. Brock and Stephen P. Magee (1978), ‘The Economics of Special Interest Politics: The Case of the Tariff’
4. Arye L. Hillman (1982), ‘Declining Industries and Political-Support Protectionist Motives’
5. Wolfgang Mayer (1984), ‘Endogenous Tariff Formation’
6. James H. Cassing and Arye L. Hillman (1986), ‘Shifting Comparative Advantage and Senescent Industry Collapse’
7. Jonathan Eaton and Gene M. Grossman (1986), ‘Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy Under Oligopoly’
8. Arye L. Hillman and Heinrich W. Ursprung (1988), ‘Domestic Politics, Foreign Interests and International Trade Policy’
9. Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1994), ‘Protection for Sale’
10. James H. Cassing (1996), ‘Protectionist Mutual Funds’
11. Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg and Giovanni Maggi (1999), ‘Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation’
12. JoAnne Feeney and Arye L. Hillman (2004), ‘Trade Liberalization Through Asset Markets’
13. Wilfred J. Ethier (2006), ‘Selling “Protection for Sale”’
PART II INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS
14. Wolfgang Mayer (1981), ‘Theoretical Considerations on Negotiated Tariff Adjustments’
15. Avinash Dixit (1987), ‘Strategic Aspects of Trade Policy’
16. Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1995), ‘Trade Wars and Trade Talks’
17. Arye L. Hillman and Peter Moser (1996), ‘Trade Liberalization as Politically Optimal Exchange of Market Access’
18. Giovanni Maggi and Andrés Rodríguez-Clare (1998), ‘The Value of Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressures’
19. Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger (1999), ‘An Economic Theory of GATT’
20. Wilfred J. Ethier (2004), ‘Political Externalities, Nondiscrimination and a Multilateral World’
PART III NONDISCRIMINATION IN MULTILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS
21. Warren F. Schwartz and Alan O. Sykes (1996), ‘Toward a Positive Theory of the Most Favored Nation Obligation and Its Exceptions in the WTO/GATT System’
22. Henrik Horn and Petros C. Mavroidis (2001), ‘Economic and Legal Aspects of the Most-Favored-Nation Clause’
PART IV ADMINISTERED PROTECTION AND MULTILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS
23. J.M. Finger, H. Keith Hall and Douglas R. Nelson (1982), ‘The Political Economy of Administered Protection’
24. Robert W. Staiger and Guido Tabellini (1987), ‘Discretionary Trade Policy and Excessive Protection’
25. Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger (1990), ‘A Theory of Managed Trade’
26. Wilfred J. Ethier (1991), ‘The Economics and Political Economy of Managed Trade’
27. Steven Berry, James Levinsohn and Ariel Pakes (1999), ‘Voluntary Export Restraints on Automobiles: Evaluating a Trade Policy’
28. Wilfred J. Ethier (2002), ‘Unilateralism in a Multilateral World’
Name Index
