The Political Economy of Central Banking

Hardback

The Political Economy of Central Banking

9781858987422 Edward Elgar Publishing
Edited by Philip Arestis, University Director of Research, Cambridge Centre for Economic and Public Policy, Department of Land Economy, University of Cambridge and Fellow, Wolfson College, UK and Malcolm Sawyer, Emeritus Professor of Economics, University of Leeds, UK
Publication Date: August 1998 ISBN: 978 1 85898 742 2 Extent: 256 pp
A number of the authors challenge the foundations for the growing claims that increased central bank independence will ensure, at no cost, that inflation is both lower and less variable, finding that there are significant employment costs associated with central bank independence. The authors also discuss theoretical issues, including the meaning of, and possibilities for, monetary policy in an endogenous money framework. They go on to examine central banking in a number of countries including the G7 group, Italy and New Zealand. Finally, they also provide explanations for the evident instabilities of the Exchange Rate Mechanism in recent years and offer words of caution for the European Central Bank.

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There have been rapid and substantial changes in the importance, economic power and operation of financial markets over the past three decades. This innovative book examines the control which central banks have over financial markets, focusing on the implications of the current trend towards the granting of ‘independence’ to central banks. The contributors examine central banking in a number of countries including the G7 group, Italy and New Zealand. They also provide explanations for the evident instabilities of the Exchange Rate Mechanism and offer words of caution for the European Central Bank.

A number of the authors challenge the foundations for the growing claims that increased central bank independence will ensure, at no cost, that inflation is both lower and less variable, finding that there are significant employment costs associated with central bank independence. The authors also discuss theoretical issues, including the meaning of, and possibilities for, monetary policy in an endogenous money framework. They go on to examine central banking in a number of countries including the G7 group, Italy and New Zealand. Finally, they also provide explanations for the evident instabilities of the Exchange Rate Mechanism in recent years and offer words of caution for the European Central Bank.

Students and scholars of financial and monetary economics will find this book invaluable as will practitioners in government and central banking.
Critical Acclaim
‘. . . provides a wealth of practical policy advice including cautions for the proposed European Central Bank.’
– Aslib Book Guide
Contributors
Contributors: P. Arestis, S. Aybar, K. Bain, I. Begg, J. Chadha, J. Cornwall, W. Cornwall, P. Dalziel, S. Dow, G. Erber, I. Grabel, A. Graziani, D. Green, H. Hagemann, L. Harris, D. Isenberg, N. Janssen, C. Rodriguez-Fuentes, M.C. Sawyer, M. Seccareccia, H.P. Spahn
Contents
Contents: Introduction 1. The Political Economy of Monetary Policy 2. How Credible are Credibility Models of Central Banking? 3. Some Problems with the use of ‘Credibility’ and ‘Reputation’ to Support the Independence of Central Banks 4. Unemployment Costs of Inflation Targeting 5. Leadership and Stability in Key Currency Systems: A Simple Game-theoretic Approach 6. Coercing Credibility: Neoliberal Policies and Monetary Institutions in Developing and Transitional Economies 7. Credibility: Measurement and Impacts. Central Bank Experience and Euro-perspectives 8. The Political Economy of the European Central Bank 9. The Political Economy of Monetary Policy: The Effects of Globalization and Financial Integration on the EU 10. Same Tune, Different Words?: The Reaction Function of G7 Monetary Authorities 11. The Independence of Central Banks: The Case of Italy 12. Wicksellian Norm, Central Bank Real Interest Rate Targeting and Macroeconomic Performance 13. New Zealand’s Experience with an Independent Central Bank Since 1989
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