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The Economics of Judicial Behaviour
This excellent two-volume collection contains the very best studies that take an economic approach to the study of judicial behaviour. The authors hail from the disciplines of business, economics, history, law, and political science, and the topics they cover are equally varied. Subjects include the judges’ motivations, judicial independence, precedent, judging on collegial courts and in the hierarchy of justice and the relationship between judges and the other government actors. Together with an original introduction by Professor Epstein, this selection of papers will be a vital tool for students, academics and practitioners with an interest in the economics of judicial behaviour.
More Information
Contributors
Contents
More Information
This excellent two-volume collection contains the very best studies that take an economic approach to the study of judicial behaviour. The authors hail from the disciplines of business, economics, history, law, and political science, and the topics they cover are equally varied. Subjects include the judges’ motivations, judicial independence, precedent, judging on collegial courts and in the hierarchy of justice and the relationship between judges and the other government actors. Together with an original introduction by Professor Epstein, this selection of papers will be a vital tool for students, academics and practitioners with an interest in the economics of judicial behaviour.
Contributors
65 articles, dating from 1959 to 2011
Contributors include: F. Easterbrook, J. Ferejohn, M. Gulati, D. Klerman, L. Kornhauser, W. Landes, S. Lindquist, E. Posner, R. Posner, M. Ramseyer
Contributors include: F. Easterbrook, J. Ferejohn, M. Gulati, D. Klerman, L. Kornhauser, W. Landes, S. Lindquist, E. Posner, R. Posner, M. Ramseyer
Contents
Contents:
Volume I
Acknowledgements
Introduction Lee Epstein
PART I THE JUDGE: MOTIVATIONS, CAREERS AND PERFORMANCE
1. Richard A. Posner (1993), ‘What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does)’
2. Christopher R. Drahozal (1998), ‘Judicial Incentives and the Appeals Process’
3. J. Mark Ramseyer and Eric B. Rasmusen (2001), ‘Why Are Japanese Judges So Conservative in Politically Charged Cases?’
4. Mark A. Cohen (1991), ‘Explaining Judicial Behavior or What''s “Unconstitutional” about the Sentencing Commission?’
5. Daniel Klerman (1999), ‘Nonpromotion and Judicial Independence’
6. Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati and Eric A. Posner (2009), ‘Are Judges Overpaid?: A Skeptical Response to the Judicial Salary Debate’
7. Thomas J. Miceli and Metin M. Coşgel (1994), ‘Reputation and Judicial Decision-Making’
8. Hon. Richard A. Posner (2005), ‘Judicial Behavior and Performance: An Economic Approach’
9. William M. Landes, Lawrence Lessig and Michael E. Solimine (1998), ‘Judicial Influence: A Citation Analysis of Federal Courts of Appeals Judges’
10. Gilat Levy (2005), ‘Careerist Judges and the Appeals Process’
11. James F. Spriggs, II and Paul J. Wahlbeck (1995), ‘Calling It Quits: Strategic Retirement on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 1893–1991’
PART II JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND DEPENDENCE
12. Rafael La Porta, Florencio López-de-Silanes, Cristian Pop-Eleches and Andrei Shleifer (2004), ‘Judicial Checks and Balances’
13. Daniel M. Klerman and Paul G. Mahoney (2005), ‘The Value of Judicial Independence: Evidence from Eighteenth Century England’
14. William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner (1975), ‘The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective’
15. John Ferejohn (1999), ‘Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Explaining Judicial Independence’
16. Melinda Gann Hall (1992), ‘Electoral Politics and Strategic Voting in State Supreme Courts’
17. Alexander Tabarrok and Eric Helland (1999), ‘Court Politics: The Political Economy of Tort Awards’
18. Gregory A. Huber and Sanford C. Gordon (2004), ‘Accountability and Coercion: Is Justice Blind when It Runs for Office?’
PART III OPINIONS AND PRECEDENT
19. Jeffrey K. Staton and Georg Vanberg (2008) ‘The Value of Vagueness: Delegation, Defiance, and Judicial Opinions’
20. Michael Abramowicz and Emerson H. Tiller (2009), ‘Citation to Legislative History: Empirical Evidence on Positive Political and Contextual Theories of Judicial Decision Making’
21. William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner (1980), ‘Legal Change, Judicial Behavior, and the Diversity Jurisdiction’
22. Lee Epstein, William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner (2011), ‘Why (and When) Judges Dissent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis’
23. Virginia A. Hettinger, Stefanie A. Lindquist and Wendy L. Martinek (2004), ‘Comparing Attitudinal and Strategic Accounts of Dissenting Behavior on the U.S. Courts of Appeals’
24. Eric Rasmusen (1994), ‘Judicial Legitimacy as a Repeated Game’
25. William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner (1976), ‘Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis’
26. Lewis A. Kornhauser (1992), ‘Modeling Collegial Courts I: Path-Dependence’
27. Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold J. Spaeth (1996), ‘The Influence of Stare Decisis on the Votes of United States Supreme Court Justices’
28. Jack Knight and Lee Epstein (1996), ‘The Norm of Stare Decisis’
29. Lewis A. Kornhauser (1995), ‘Adjudication by a Resource-Constrained Team: Hierarchy and Precedent in a Judicial System’
30. Ethan Bueno de Mesquita and Matthew Stephenson (2002), ‘Informative Precedent and Intrajudicial Communication’
31. Vincy Fon and Francesco Parisi (2006), ‘Judicial Precedents in Civil Law Systems: A Dynamic Analysis’
32. McNollgast (1995), ‘Politics and the Courts: A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the Rule of Law’
33. Nicola Gennaioli and Andrei Shleifer (2007), ‘Overruling and the Instability of Law’
Volume II
Acknowledgements
An introduction by the editor to both volumes appears in Volume I
PART IV COLLEGIAL COURTS
1. Gregory A. Caldeira, John R. Wright and Christopher J.W. Zorn (1999), ‘Sophisticated Voting and Gate-Keeping in the Supreme Court’
2. David W. Rohde (1972), ‘Policy Goals, Strategic Choice and Majority Opinion Assignments in the U.S. Supreme Court’
3. Jeffrey R. Lax and Charles M. Cameron (2007), ‘Bargaining and Opinion Assignment on the US Supreme Court’
4. Paul J. Wahlbeck, James F. Spriggs and Forrest Maltzman (1998), ‘Marshalling the Court: Bargaining and Accommodation on the United States Supreme Court’
5. Chris W. Bonneau, Thomas H. Hammond, Forrest Maltzman and Paul J. Wahlbeck (2007), ‘Agenda Control, the Median Justice, and the Majority Opinion on the U.S. Supreme Court’
6. Jeffrey R. Lax (2007), ‘Constructing Legal Rules on Appellate Courts’
7. Frank H. Easterbrook (1982), ‘Ways of Criticizing the Court’
8. Lewis A. Kornhauser and Lawrence G. Sager (1986), ‘Unpacking the Court’
9. Robert Anderson IV and Alexander M. Tahk (2007), ‘Institutions and Equilibrium in the United States Supreme Court’
10. Frank B. Cross and Emerson H. Tiller (1998), ‘Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeal’
11. Sean Farhang and Gregory Wawro (2004), ‘Institutional Dynamics on the U.S. Court of Appeals: Minority Representation under Panel Decision Making’
12. Jonathan P. Kastellec (2007), ‘Panel Composition and Judicial Compliance on the US Courts of Appeals’
PART V THE HIERARCHY OF JUSTICE
13. Jeffrey R. Lax (2003), ‘Certiorari and Compliance in the Judicial Hierarchy: Discretion, Reputation and the Rule of Four’
14. Charles M. Cameron, Jeffrey A. Segal and Donald Songer (2000), ‘Strategic Auditing in a Political Hierarchy: An Informational Model of the Supreme Court’s Certiorari Decisions’
15. Tracey E. George and Michael E. Solimine (2001), ‘Supreme Court Monitoring of the United States Courts of Appeals En Banc’
16. Tom S. Clark (2009), ‘A Principal-Agent Theory of En Banc Review’
17. Linda R. Cohen and Matthew L. Spitzer (1994), ‘Solving the Chevron Puzzle’
18. Matt Spitzer and Eric Talley (2000), ‘Judicial Auditing’
19. Steven Shavell, (1995), ‘The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction’
20. Chad Westerland, Jeffrey A. Segal, Lee Epstein, Charles M. Cameron and Scott Comparato (2010), ‘Strategic Defiance and Compliance in the U.S. Courts of Appeals’
21. Walter F. Murphy (1959), ‘Lower Court Checks on Supreme Court Power’
PART VI EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATURE
22. Rafael Gely and Pablo T. Spiller (1990), ‘A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court Statutory Decisions with Applications to the “State Farm” and “Grove City Cases”’
23. William N. Eskridge, Jr. (1991), ‘Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions’
24. John A. Ferejohn and Barry R. Weingast (1992), ‘A Positive Theory of Statutory Interpretation’
25. Jeffrey A. Segal, Chad Westerland and Stefanie A. Lindquist (2011), ‘Congress, the Supreme Court, and Judicial Review: Testing a Constitutional Separation of Powers Model’
26. Tom S. Clark (2009), ‘The Separation of Powers, Court Curbing, and Judicial Legitimacy’
27. Gretchen Helmke (2002), ‘The Logic of Strategic Defection: Court-Executive Relations in Argentina Under Dictatorship and Democracy’
28. Lee Epstein, Jack Knight and Olga Shvetsova (2001), ‘The Role of Constitutional Courts in the Establishment and Maintenance of Democratic Systems of Government’
29. Georg Vanberg (2001), ‘Legislative-Judicial Relations: A Game-Theoretic Approach to Constitutional Review’
30. James R. Rogers (2001), ‘Information and Judicial Review: A Signaling Game of Legislative-Judicial Interaction’
31. Joseph L. Smith and Emerson H. Tiller (2002), ‘The Strategy of Judging: Evidence from Administrative Law’
32. William H. Riker and Barry R. Weingast (1988), ‘Constitutional Regulation of Legislative Choice: The Political Consequences of Judicial Deference to Legislatures’
Volume I
Acknowledgements
Introduction Lee Epstein
PART I THE JUDGE: MOTIVATIONS, CAREERS AND PERFORMANCE
1. Richard A. Posner (1993), ‘What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does)’
2. Christopher R. Drahozal (1998), ‘Judicial Incentives and the Appeals Process’
3. J. Mark Ramseyer and Eric B. Rasmusen (2001), ‘Why Are Japanese Judges So Conservative in Politically Charged Cases?’
4. Mark A. Cohen (1991), ‘Explaining Judicial Behavior or What''s “Unconstitutional” about the Sentencing Commission?’
5. Daniel Klerman (1999), ‘Nonpromotion and Judicial Independence’
6. Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati and Eric A. Posner (2009), ‘Are Judges Overpaid?: A Skeptical Response to the Judicial Salary Debate’
7. Thomas J. Miceli and Metin M. Coşgel (1994), ‘Reputation and Judicial Decision-Making’
8. Hon. Richard A. Posner (2005), ‘Judicial Behavior and Performance: An Economic Approach’
9. William M. Landes, Lawrence Lessig and Michael E. Solimine (1998), ‘Judicial Influence: A Citation Analysis of Federal Courts of Appeals Judges’
10. Gilat Levy (2005), ‘Careerist Judges and the Appeals Process’
11. James F. Spriggs, II and Paul J. Wahlbeck (1995), ‘Calling It Quits: Strategic Retirement on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 1893–1991’
PART II JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND DEPENDENCE
12. Rafael La Porta, Florencio López-de-Silanes, Cristian Pop-Eleches and Andrei Shleifer (2004), ‘Judicial Checks and Balances’
13. Daniel M. Klerman and Paul G. Mahoney (2005), ‘The Value of Judicial Independence: Evidence from Eighteenth Century England’
14. William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner (1975), ‘The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective’
15. John Ferejohn (1999), ‘Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Explaining Judicial Independence’
16. Melinda Gann Hall (1992), ‘Electoral Politics and Strategic Voting in State Supreme Courts’
17. Alexander Tabarrok and Eric Helland (1999), ‘Court Politics: The Political Economy of Tort Awards’
18. Gregory A. Huber and Sanford C. Gordon (2004), ‘Accountability and Coercion: Is Justice Blind when It Runs for Office?’
PART III OPINIONS AND PRECEDENT
19. Jeffrey K. Staton and Georg Vanberg (2008) ‘The Value of Vagueness: Delegation, Defiance, and Judicial Opinions’
20. Michael Abramowicz and Emerson H. Tiller (2009), ‘Citation to Legislative History: Empirical Evidence on Positive Political and Contextual Theories of Judicial Decision Making’
21. William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner (1980), ‘Legal Change, Judicial Behavior, and the Diversity Jurisdiction’
22. Lee Epstein, William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner (2011), ‘Why (and When) Judges Dissent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis’
23. Virginia A. Hettinger, Stefanie A. Lindquist and Wendy L. Martinek (2004), ‘Comparing Attitudinal and Strategic Accounts of Dissenting Behavior on the U.S. Courts of Appeals’
24. Eric Rasmusen (1994), ‘Judicial Legitimacy as a Repeated Game’
25. William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner (1976), ‘Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis’
26. Lewis A. Kornhauser (1992), ‘Modeling Collegial Courts I: Path-Dependence’
27. Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold J. Spaeth (1996), ‘The Influence of Stare Decisis on the Votes of United States Supreme Court Justices’
28. Jack Knight and Lee Epstein (1996), ‘The Norm of Stare Decisis’
29. Lewis A. Kornhauser (1995), ‘Adjudication by a Resource-Constrained Team: Hierarchy and Precedent in a Judicial System’
30. Ethan Bueno de Mesquita and Matthew Stephenson (2002), ‘Informative Precedent and Intrajudicial Communication’
31. Vincy Fon and Francesco Parisi (2006), ‘Judicial Precedents in Civil Law Systems: A Dynamic Analysis’
32. McNollgast (1995), ‘Politics and the Courts: A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the Rule of Law’
33. Nicola Gennaioli and Andrei Shleifer (2007), ‘Overruling and the Instability of Law’
Volume II
Acknowledgements
An introduction by the editor to both volumes appears in Volume I
PART IV COLLEGIAL COURTS
1. Gregory A. Caldeira, John R. Wright and Christopher J.W. Zorn (1999), ‘Sophisticated Voting and Gate-Keeping in the Supreme Court’
2. David W. Rohde (1972), ‘Policy Goals, Strategic Choice and Majority Opinion Assignments in the U.S. Supreme Court’
3. Jeffrey R. Lax and Charles M. Cameron (2007), ‘Bargaining and Opinion Assignment on the US Supreme Court’
4. Paul J. Wahlbeck, James F. Spriggs and Forrest Maltzman (1998), ‘Marshalling the Court: Bargaining and Accommodation on the United States Supreme Court’
5. Chris W. Bonneau, Thomas H. Hammond, Forrest Maltzman and Paul J. Wahlbeck (2007), ‘Agenda Control, the Median Justice, and the Majority Opinion on the U.S. Supreme Court’
6. Jeffrey R. Lax (2007), ‘Constructing Legal Rules on Appellate Courts’
7. Frank H. Easterbrook (1982), ‘Ways of Criticizing the Court’
8. Lewis A. Kornhauser and Lawrence G. Sager (1986), ‘Unpacking the Court’
9. Robert Anderson IV and Alexander M. Tahk (2007), ‘Institutions and Equilibrium in the United States Supreme Court’
10. Frank B. Cross and Emerson H. Tiller (1998), ‘Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeal’
11. Sean Farhang and Gregory Wawro (2004), ‘Institutional Dynamics on the U.S. Court of Appeals: Minority Representation under Panel Decision Making’
12. Jonathan P. Kastellec (2007), ‘Panel Composition and Judicial Compliance on the US Courts of Appeals’
PART V THE HIERARCHY OF JUSTICE
13. Jeffrey R. Lax (2003), ‘Certiorari and Compliance in the Judicial Hierarchy: Discretion, Reputation and the Rule of Four’
14. Charles M. Cameron, Jeffrey A. Segal and Donald Songer (2000), ‘Strategic Auditing in a Political Hierarchy: An Informational Model of the Supreme Court’s Certiorari Decisions’
15. Tracey E. George and Michael E. Solimine (2001), ‘Supreme Court Monitoring of the United States Courts of Appeals En Banc’
16. Tom S. Clark (2009), ‘A Principal-Agent Theory of En Banc Review’
17. Linda R. Cohen and Matthew L. Spitzer (1994), ‘Solving the Chevron Puzzle’
18. Matt Spitzer and Eric Talley (2000), ‘Judicial Auditing’
19. Steven Shavell, (1995), ‘The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction’
20. Chad Westerland, Jeffrey A. Segal, Lee Epstein, Charles M. Cameron and Scott Comparato (2010), ‘Strategic Defiance and Compliance in the U.S. Courts of Appeals’
21. Walter F. Murphy (1959), ‘Lower Court Checks on Supreme Court Power’
PART VI EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATURE
22. Rafael Gely and Pablo T. Spiller (1990), ‘A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court Statutory Decisions with Applications to the “State Farm” and “Grove City Cases”’
23. William N. Eskridge, Jr. (1991), ‘Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions’
24. John A. Ferejohn and Barry R. Weingast (1992), ‘A Positive Theory of Statutory Interpretation’
25. Jeffrey A. Segal, Chad Westerland and Stefanie A. Lindquist (2011), ‘Congress, the Supreme Court, and Judicial Review: Testing a Constitutional Separation of Powers Model’
26. Tom S. Clark (2009), ‘The Separation of Powers, Court Curbing, and Judicial Legitimacy’
27. Gretchen Helmke (2002), ‘The Logic of Strategic Defection: Court-Executive Relations in Argentina Under Dictatorship and Democracy’
28. Lee Epstein, Jack Knight and Olga Shvetsova (2001), ‘The Role of Constitutional Courts in the Establishment and Maintenance of Democratic Systems of Government’
29. Georg Vanberg (2001), ‘Legislative-Judicial Relations: A Game-Theoretic Approach to Constitutional Review’
30. James R. Rogers (2001), ‘Information and Judicial Review: A Signaling Game of Legislative-Judicial Interaction’
31. Joseph L. Smith and Emerson H. Tiller (2002), ‘The Strategy of Judging: Evidence from Administrative Law’
32. William H. Riker and Barry R. Weingast (1988), ‘Constitutional Regulation of Legislative Choice: The Political Consequences of Judicial Deference to Legislatures’
