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THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION
The economic landscape of today recognizes a rich and diverse array of private information including information about product and resource quality, technological opportunities, effort levels, productivity and individual preferences. The literature on information is closely tied to that on uncertainty, for without uncertainty there can be no new information with strategic value.
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Critical Acclaim
Contributors
Contents
More Information
The economic landscape of today recognizes a rich and diverse array of private information including information about product and resource quality, technological opportunities, effort levels, productivity and individual preferences. The literature on information is closely tied to that on uncertainty, for without uncertainty there can be no new information with strategic value.
This major reference collection – prepared by leading economists in the field – traces the origins of the subject as it developed in the 1960s, expanded in the 1970s using the search framework and then exploded in the 1980s with the use of game theory. The economics of information is now an important part of all sub-divisions of economic science. This volume makes a single contribution by presenting in an accessible form the most important articles and papers in this vibrant and exciting area of the subject.
This major reference collection – prepared by leading economists in the field – traces the origins of the subject as it developed in the 1960s, expanded in the 1970s using the search framework and then exploded in the 1980s with the use of game theory. The economics of information is now an important part of all sub-divisions of economic science. This volume makes a single contribution by presenting in an accessible form the most important articles and papers in this vibrant and exciting area of the subject.
Critical Acclaim
‘The book can be recommended without restrictions: Those who are working with information economics will be happy to have such a comprehensive collection of classical (although not out-dated!) papers and those who have not yet worked in the field will have a reliable source of information which allows them to survey path-breaking contributions.’
– Thorsten Posselt, Kyklos
– Thorsten Posselt, Kyklos
Contributors
Contributors: G.A. Akerloft, B. Allen, D. Backus, Y. Balcer, K.C. Border, I.-K. Cho, P.A. Diamond, J. Driffill, M. Engers, J. Farrell, L. Fernandez, D. Fudenberg, G.M. Grossman, S.J. Grossman, M. Harris, J.M. Harrison, F.A. Hayek, J. Hirschleifer, B. Holmstrom, B. Jovanovic, M.L. Katz, B. Klein, D.M. Kreps, J.-J. Laffont, E. Maskin, J.J. McCall, K.F. McCardle, P.R. Milgrom, R.B. Myerson, I.P.L. Ping, G.L. Priest, R. Radner, J.F. Reinganum, J. Riley, J. Roberts, M. Rothschild, A. Rubinstein, R.P. Rumelt, S. W. Salant, G. Saloner, S. Salop, W.F. Samuelson, A. Schwartz, J. Sobel, M. Spence, G.J. Stigler, J.E. Stiglitz, J. Tirole, R.M. Townsend, W. Vickrey, R.J. Weber, L.L. Wilde, C. Wilson, R.B. Wilson, A. Wolinsky
Contents
CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
INTRODUCTION
VOLUME 1
PART I
THE BEGINNINGS
1. F. A. Hayek (1945), ‘The Use of Knowledge in Society’
2. William Vickrey (1961), ‘Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders’
3. Robert B. Wilson (1969), ‘Competitive Bidding with Disparate Information’
4. George J. Stigler (1961), ‘The Economics of Information’
5. Jack Hirshleifer (1973), ‘Where Are We in the Theory of Information’
PART II
THE VALUE OF INFORMATION
6. Jack Hirshleifer (1971), ‘The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity’
7. Sanford J. Grossman and Joseph E. Stiglitz (1980), ‘On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets’
8. Kevin F. McCardle (1985), ‘Information Acquisition and the Adoption of New Technology’
9. Beth Allen (1990), ‘Information as an Economic Commodity’
PART III
SEARCH AND PRICE DISPERSION
10. J. J. McCall (1970), ‘Economics of Information and Job Search’
11. Steven A. Lippman and John J. McCall (1981), ‘The Economics of Belated Information’
12. Boyan Jovanovic (1979), ‘Job Matching and the Theory of Turnover’
13. Peter A. Diamond (1971), ‘A Model of Price Adjustment’
14. Louis L. Wilde and Alan Schwartz (1979), ‘Equilibrium Comparison Shopping’
15. Steven Salop and Joseph Stiglitz (1977), ‘Bargains and Ripoffs: A Model of Monopolistically Competitive Price Dispersion’
16. Yves Balcer (1983), ‘F.O.B. Pricing Versus Uniform Delivered Pricing: A Welfare Analysis in a Stochastic Environment’
17. Asher Wolinsky (1987), ‘Matching, Search, and Bargaining’
PART IV
SPECULATION
18. J. Michael Harrison and David M. Kreps (1978), ‘Speculative Investor Behavior in a Stock Market with Heterogeneous Expectations’
19. J. Hirshleifer (1975), ‘Speculation and Equilibrium: Information, Risk, and Markets’
20. Stephen W. Salant (1983), ‘The Vulnerability of Price Stabilization Schemes to Speculative Attack’
PART V
INFORMATION AND THE LAW
A: Enforcement Issues
21. Jennifer F. Reinganum and Louis L. Wilde (1986), ‘Equilibrium Verification and Reporting Policies in a Model of Tax Compliance’
22. Kim C. Border and Joel Sobel (1987), ‘Samurai Accountant: A Theory of Auditing and Plunder’
23. A. Rubinstein (1979), ‘An Optimal Conviction Policy for Offenses that May Have Been Committed by Accident’
B: SETTLEMENT vs. TRIAL
24. I. P. L. P’ng (1983), ‘Strategic Behavior in Suit, Settlement, and Trial’
25. Gene M. Grossman and Michael L. Katz (1983), ‘Plea Bargaining and Social Welfare’
26. George L. Priest and Benjamin Klein (1984), ‘The Selection of Disputes for Litigation’
VOLUME 2
PART I
SIGNALLING AND ADVERSE SELECTION
1. George A. Akerlof (1970), ‘The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism’
2. Michael Spence (1973), ‘Job Market Signaling’
3. Maxim Engers and Luis Fernandez (1987), ‘Market Equilibrium with Hidden Knowledge and Self-Selection’
4. In-Koo and David M. Kreps (1987), ‘Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria’
5. Charles Wilson (1980), ‘The Nature of Equilibrium in Markets with Adverse Selection’
PART II
MECHANISM DESIGN, CONTRACTING AND MORAL HAZARD
6. Milton Harris and Robert M. Townsend (1981), ‘Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information’
7. Bengt R. Holmström (1979), ‘Moral Hazard and Observability’
8. Eric Maskin and John Riley (1984), ‘Monopoly with Incomplete Information’
PART III
AUCTIONS
9. John G. Riley and William F. Samuelson (1981), ‘Optimal Auctions’
10. Roger B. Myerson (1981), ‘Optimal Auction Design’
11. Paul R. Milgrom and Robert J. Weber (1982), ‘A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding’
12. Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole (1987), ‘Auctioning Incentive Contracts’
PART IV
REPUTATION MODELS
13. David M. Kreps ad Robert Wilson (1982), ‘Reputation and Imperfect Information’
14. David Backus and John Driffil (1985), ‘Inflation and Reputation’
15. Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine (1989), ‘Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player’
PART V
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
16. Roy Radner and Michael Rothschild (1975), ‘On the Allocation of Effort’
17. S. A. Lippman and R. P. Rumelt (1982), ‘Uncertain Imitability: An Analysis of Interfirm Differences in Efficiency Under Competition’
18. Joseph Farrell and Garth Saloner (1985), ‘Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation’
19. Paul Milgrom and John Roberts (1982), ‘Limit Pricing and Entry Under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis’
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
INTRODUCTION
VOLUME 1
PART I
THE BEGINNINGS
1. F. A. Hayek (1945), ‘The Use of Knowledge in Society’
2. William Vickrey (1961), ‘Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders’
3. Robert B. Wilson (1969), ‘Competitive Bidding with Disparate Information’
4. George J. Stigler (1961), ‘The Economics of Information’
5. Jack Hirshleifer (1973), ‘Where Are We in the Theory of Information’
PART II
THE VALUE OF INFORMATION
6. Jack Hirshleifer (1971), ‘The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity’
7. Sanford J. Grossman and Joseph E. Stiglitz (1980), ‘On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets’
8. Kevin F. McCardle (1985), ‘Information Acquisition and the Adoption of New Technology’
9. Beth Allen (1990), ‘Information as an Economic Commodity’
PART III
SEARCH AND PRICE DISPERSION
10. J. J. McCall (1970), ‘Economics of Information and Job Search’
11. Steven A. Lippman and John J. McCall (1981), ‘The Economics of Belated Information’
12. Boyan Jovanovic (1979), ‘Job Matching and the Theory of Turnover’
13. Peter A. Diamond (1971), ‘A Model of Price Adjustment’
14. Louis L. Wilde and Alan Schwartz (1979), ‘Equilibrium Comparison Shopping’
15. Steven Salop and Joseph Stiglitz (1977), ‘Bargains and Ripoffs: A Model of Monopolistically Competitive Price Dispersion’
16. Yves Balcer (1983), ‘F.O.B. Pricing Versus Uniform Delivered Pricing: A Welfare Analysis in a Stochastic Environment’
17. Asher Wolinsky (1987), ‘Matching, Search, and Bargaining’
PART IV
SPECULATION
18. J. Michael Harrison and David M. Kreps (1978), ‘Speculative Investor Behavior in a Stock Market with Heterogeneous Expectations’
19. J. Hirshleifer (1975), ‘Speculation and Equilibrium: Information, Risk, and Markets’
20. Stephen W. Salant (1983), ‘The Vulnerability of Price Stabilization Schemes to Speculative Attack’
PART V
INFORMATION AND THE LAW
A: Enforcement Issues
21. Jennifer F. Reinganum and Louis L. Wilde (1986), ‘Equilibrium Verification and Reporting Policies in a Model of Tax Compliance’
22. Kim C. Border and Joel Sobel (1987), ‘Samurai Accountant: A Theory of Auditing and Plunder’
23. A. Rubinstein (1979), ‘An Optimal Conviction Policy for Offenses that May Have Been Committed by Accident’
B: SETTLEMENT vs. TRIAL
24. I. P. L. P’ng (1983), ‘Strategic Behavior in Suit, Settlement, and Trial’
25. Gene M. Grossman and Michael L. Katz (1983), ‘Plea Bargaining and Social Welfare’
26. George L. Priest and Benjamin Klein (1984), ‘The Selection of Disputes for Litigation’
VOLUME 2
PART I
SIGNALLING AND ADVERSE SELECTION
1. George A. Akerlof (1970), ‘The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism’
2. Michael Spence (1973), ‘Job Market Signaling’
3. Maxim Engers and Luis Fernandez (1987), ‘Market Equilibrium with Hidden Knowledge and Self-Selection’
4. In-Koo and David M. Kreps (1987), ‘Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria’
5. Charles Wilson (1980), ‘The Nature of Equilibrium in Markets with Adverse Selection’
PART II
MECHANISM DESIGN, CONTRACTING AND MORAL HAZARD
6. Milton Harris and Robert M. Townsend (1981), ‘Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information’
7. Bengt R. Holmström (1979), ‘Moral Hazard and Observability’
8. Eric Maskin and John Riley (1984), ‘Monopoly with Incomplete Information’
PART III
AUCTIONS
9. John G. Riley and William F. Samuelson (1981), ‘Optimal Auctions’
10. Roger B. Myerson (1981), ‘Optimal Auction Design’
11. Paul R. Milgrom and Robert J. Weber (1982), ‘A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding’
12. Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole (1987), ‘Auctioning Incentive Contracts’
PART IV
REPUTATION MODELS
13. David M. Kreps ad Robert Wilson (1982), ‘Reputation and Imperfect Information’
14. David Backus and John Driffil (1985), ‘Inflation and Reputation’
15. Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine (1989), ‘Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player’
PART V
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
16. Roy Radner and Michael Rothschild (1975), ‘On the Allocation of Effort’
17. S. A. Lippman and R. P. Rumelt (1982), ‘Uncertain Imitability: An Analysis of Interfirm Differences in Efficiency Under Competition’
18. Joseph Farrell and Garth Saloner (1985), ‘Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation’
19. Paul Milgrom and John Roberts (1982), ‘Limit Pricing and Entry Under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis’
