Hardback
The Economics of Governance
This collection of articles uses economic theory to explain the governance of organizations. It covers the governance of families, oligarchies, democracies, for profit firms and non-profit institutions such as religious organizations. The widespread and novel subject matter within a set of focused economic questions results in fascinating reading allowing the reader to see how similar issues can be answered in areas where the person has little knowledge of the subject. This is an engaging and useful tool for students, researchers and academics wanting to expand their area of expertise into new and exciting realms.
More Information
Contributors
Contents
More Information
This collection of articles uses economic theory to explain the governance of organizations. It covers the governance of families, oligarchies, democracies, for profit firms and non-profit institutions such as religious organizations. The widespread and novel subject matter within a set of focused economic questions results in fascinating reading allowing the reader to see how similar issues can be answered in areas where the person has little knowledge of the subject. This is an engaging and useful tool for students, researchers and academics wanting to expand their area of expertise into new and exciting realms.
Contributors
Contributors include: D. Acemoglu, R. Gibbons, H. Hansmann, P. Leeson, P. Rubin, B. Weingast
Contents
Contents:
Introduction Donald Wittman
PART I WHO GOVERNS?
1. Henry Hansmann (1988), ‘Ownership of the Firm’, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, IV (2), Fall, 267–304
2. Paul H. Rubin (1978), ‘The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise Contract’, Journal of Law and Economics, 21 (1),
April, 223–33
3. Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart (1986), ‘The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration’, Journal of Political Economy, 94 (4), August, 691–719
4. Jonathan Levin and Steven Tadelis (2005), ‘Profit Sharing and the Role of Professional Partnerships’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120 (1), February, 131–71
5. Peter T. Leeson (2007), ‘An-arrgh-chy: The Law and Economics of Pirate Organization’, Journal of Political Economy, 115 (6), December, 1049–94
PART II POWER RELATIONS IN SHARED-GOVERNANCE
6. Shelly Lundberg and Robert A. Pollak (1996), ‘Bargaining and Distribution in Marriage’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10 (4), Fall, 139–58
7. L.S. Shapley and Martin Shubik (1954), ‘A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System’, American Political Science Review, 48 (3), September, 787–92
8. David P. Baron and John A. Ferejohn (1989), ‘Bargaining in Legislatures’, American Political Science Review, 83 (4), December, 1181–206
9. Rui J.P. de Figueiredo, Tonja Jacobi and Barry R. Weingast (2006), ‘The New Separation-of-Powers Approach to American Politics’, in Barry R. Weingast and Donald A.Wittman (eds), Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, Chapter 11, New York, USA: Oxford University Press, 199–222
PART III HOW DO THOSE WHO GOVERN ACTUALLY CONTROL?
10. Eugene F. Fama and Michael C. Jensen (1983), ‘Separation of Ownership and Control’, Journal of Law and Economics, XXVI (2), June, 301–25
11. Neil Bruce and Michael Waldman (1990), ‘The Rotten-Kid Theorem Meets the Samaritan’s Dilemma’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 105 (1), February, 155–65
12. Donald Wittman (2005), ‘The Internal Organization of the Family: Economic Analysis and Psychological Advice’, Kyklos, 58 (1), February, 121–44
13. Ronald Wintrobe (1990), ‘The Tinpot and the Totalitarian: An Economic Theory of Dictatorship’, American Political Science Review, 84 (3), September, 849–72
14. Daron Acemoglu, Thierry Verdier and James A. Robinson (2004), ‘Alfred Marshall Lecture: Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule: A Model of Personal Rule’, Journal of the European Economic Association, 2 (2–3), April–May, 162–92
15. Donald Wittman (2013), ‘Strategic Behavior and Organizational Structure in Religions’, British Journal of Political Science, 44 (4), October, 717–39
16. Mathew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz (1984), ‘Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms’, American Journal of Political Science, 28 (1), February, 165–79
PART IV DEMOCRACIES VERSUS OLIGARCHIES
17. James M. Enelow and Melvin J. Hinich (1984), ‘Probabilistic Voting and the Importance of Centrist Ideologies in Democratic Elections’, Journal of Politics, 46 (2), May, 459–78
18. Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1996), ‘Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics’, Review of Economic Studies, 63 (2), April, 265–86
19. Donald Wittman (2009), ‘How Pressure Groups Activate Voters and Move Candidates Closer to the Median’, Economic Journal, 119 (540), October, 1324–43
20. Mancur Olson (1993), ‘Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development’, American Political Science Review, 87 (3), September, 567–76
21. Daron Acemoglu (2008), ‘Oligarchic versus Democratic Societies’, Journal of the European Economic Association, 6 (1), March, 1–44
PART V WHY GOVERNANCE?
22. Robert Gibbons (2005), ‘Four Formal(izable) Theories of the Firm?’, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 58 (2), October, 200–245
23. Kai A. Konrad and Stergios Skaperdas (2012), ‘The Market for Protection and the Origin of the State’, Economic Theory, 50 (2), June, 417–43
24. Jack Hirshleifer (1995), ‘Anarchy and Its Breakdown’, Journal of Political Economy, 103 (1), February, 26–52
25. David Skarbek (2011), ‘Governance and Prison Gangs’, American Political Science Review, 105 (4), November, 702–16
Index
Introduction Donald Wittman
PART I WHO GOVERNS?
1. Henry Hansmann (1988), ‘Ownership of the Firm’, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, IV (2), Fall, 267–304
2. Paul H. Rubin (1978), ‘The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise Contract’, Journal of Law and Economics, 21 (1),
April, 223–33
3. Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart (1986), ‘The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration’, Journal of Political Economy, 94 (4), August, 691–719
4. Jonathan Levin and Steven Tadelis (2005), ‘Profit Sharing and the Role of Professional Partnerships’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120 (1), February, 131–71
5. Peter T. Leeson (2007), ‘An-arrgh-chy: The Law and Economics of Pirate Organization’, Journal of Political Economy, 115 (6), December, 1049–94
PART II POWER RELATIONS IN SHARED-GOVERNANCE
6. Shelly Lundberg and Robert A. Pollak (1996), ‘Bargaining and Distribution in Marriage’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10 (4), Fall, 139–58
7. L.S. Shapley and Martin Shubik (1954), ‘A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System’, American Political Science Review, 48 (3), September, 787–92
8. David P. Baron and John A. Ferejohn (1989), ‘Bargaining in Legislatures’, American Political Science Review, 83 (4), December, 1181–206
9. Rui J.P. de Figueiredo, Tonja Jacobi and Barry R. Weingast (2006), ‘The New Separation-of-Powers Approach to American Politics’, in Barry R. Weingast and Donald A.Wittman (eds), Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, Chapter 11, New York, USA: Oxford University Press, 199–222
PART III HOW DO THOSE WHO GOVERN ACTUALLY CONTROL?
10. Eugene F. Fama and Michael C. Jensen (1983), ‘Separation of Ownership and Control’, Journal of Law and Economics, XXVI (2), June, 301–25
11. Neil Bruce and Michael Waldman (1990), ‘The Rotten-Kid Theorem Meets the Samaritan’s Dilemma’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 105 (1), February, 155–65
12. Donald Wittman (2005), ‘The Internal Organization of the Family: Economic Analysis and Psychological Advice’, Kyklos, 58 (1), February, 121–44
13. Ronald Wintrobe (1990), ‘The Tinpot and the Totalitarian: An Economic Theory of Dictatorship’, American Political Science Review, 84 (3), September, 849–72
14. Daron Acemoglu, Thierry Verdier and James A. Robinson (2004), ‘Alfred Marshall Lecture: Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule: A Model of Personal Rule’, Journal of the European Economic Association, 2 (2–3), April–May, 162–92
15. Donald Wittman (2013), ‘Strategic Behavior and Organizational Structure in Religions’, British Journal of Political Science, 44 (4), October, 717–39
16. Mathew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz (1984), ‘Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms’, American Journal of Political Science, 28 (1), February, 165–79
PART IV DEMOCRACIES VERSUS OLIGARCHIES
17. James M. Enelow and Melvin J. Hinich (1984), ‘Probabilistic Voting and the Importance of Centrist Ideologies in Democratic Elections’, Journal of Politics, 46 (2), May, 459–78
18. Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1996), ‘Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics’, Review of Economic Studies, 63 (2), April, 265–86
19. Donald Wittman (2009), ‘How Pressure Groups Activate Voters and Move Candidates Closer to the Median’, Economic Journal, 119 (540), October, 1324–43
20. Mancur Olson (1993), ‘Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development’, American Political Science Review, 87 (3), September, 567–76
21. Daron Acemoglu (2008), ‘Oligarchic versus Democratic Societies’, Journal of the European Economic Association, 6 (1), March, 1–44
PART V WHY GOVERNANCE?
22. Robert Gibbons (2005), ‘Four Formal(izable) Theories of the Firm?’, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 58 (2), October, 200–245
23. Kai A. Konrad and Stergios Skaperdas (2012), ‘The Market for Protection and the Origin of the State’, Economic Theory, 50 (2), June, 417–43
24. Jack Hirshleifer (1995), ‘Anarchy and Its Breakdown’, Journal of Political Economy, 103 (1), February, 26–52
25. David Skarbek (2011), ‘Governance and Prison Gangs’, American Political Science Review, 105 (4), November, 702–16
Index
