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The Economics of Defence
This three-volume set presents over 100 of the most influential articles in defence economics, which have been selected for their enduring value and importance and for their contribution to an understanding of the field.
More Information
Contributors
Contents
More Information
This three-volume set presents over 100 of the most influential articles in defence economics, which have been selected for their enduring value and importance and for their contribution to an understanding of the field.
Topics covered in volume I include definitions of the field of defence economics, an examination of the demand side of defence economics, including the demand for military expenditures and the study of alliances, and an exploration of the impacts of defence spending on growth and development. Volume II examines the supply side of the subject, and covers the military production function, military personnel and weapon procurement. The supply side is further addressed in Volume III, which covers the defence industrial base, learning curves, costs, pricing and profits, industrial policies and the arms trade. This volume also discusses disarmament, conversion, peace and public policy and concludes with a section on non-conventional conflicts such as terrorism, insurrections and revolutions.
Topics covered in volume I include definitions of the field of defence economics, an examination of the demand side of defence economics, including the demand for military expenditures and the study of alliances, and an exploration of the impacts of defence spending on growth and development. Volume II examines the supply side of the subject, and covers the military production function, military personnel and weapon procurement. The supply side is further addressed in Volume III, which covers the defence industrial base, learning curves, costs, pricing and profits, industrial policies and the arms trade. This volume also discusses disarmament, conversion, peace and public policy and concludes with a section on non-conventional conflicts such as terrorism, insurrections and revolutions.
Contributors
101 articles, dating from 1936 to 1997
Contributors include: A. Alchian, D.P. Baron, E. Benoit, M. Intriligator, J.-J. Laffont, M. McGuire, M. Olson, L. Richardson, R. Smith, G. Stigler, B. Weisbrod
Contributors include: A. Alchian, D.P. Baron, E. Benoit, M. Intriligator, J.-J. Laffont, M. McGuire, M. Olson, L. Richardson, R. Smith, G. Stigler, B. Weisbrod
Contents
Contents:
Volume I
Acknowledgements
Introduction Keith Hartley and Todd Sandler
PART I INTRODUCTION: DEFENCE ECONOMICS – AN OVERVIEW
1. Michael D. Intriligator (1990), ‘On the Nature and Scope of Defence Economics’
2. Judith Reppy (1991), ‘On the Nature and Scope of Defence Economics: A Comment’
3. Michael D. Intriligator (1991), ‘On the Nature and Scope of Defence Economics: A Reply to Judith Reppy’s Comment’
4. M.W. Jones-Lee (1990), ‘Defence Expenditure and the Economics of Safety’
5. W. Grigor McClelland (1990), ‘Defence Expenditure and the Economics of Safety: A Comment’
6. M.W. Jones-Lee (1990), ‘Defence Expenditure and the Economics of Safety: Reply’
7. Walter Isard (1994), ‘Peace Economics: A Beginning at Definition’
PART II DEMAND, ARMS RACES AND ALLIANCES
A The Demand for Military Expenditure
8. Leonard Dudley and Claude Montmarquette (1981), ‘The Demand for Military Expenditures: An International Comparison’
9. James C. Murdoch and Todd Sandler (1984), ‘Complementarity, Free Riding, and the Military Expenditures of NATO Allies’
10. R.P. Smith (1989), ‘Models of Military Expenditure’
11. Minoru Okamura (1991), ‘Estimating the Impact of the Soviet Union’s Threat on the United States–Japan Alliance: A Demand System Approach’
B Arms Races
12. Lewis F. Richardson (1953), ‘The Submissiveness of Nations’
13. Anatol Rapoport (1957), ‘Lewis F. Richardson’s Mathematical Theory of War’
14. Stephen A. Richardson (1957), ‘Lewis Fry Richardson (1881–1953): A Personal Biography’
15. Robert P. Abelson (1963), ‘A “Derivation” of Richardson’s Equations’
16. Michael D. Intriligator (1975), ‘Strategic Considerations in the Richardson Model of Arms Races’
17. Martin McGuire (1977), ‘A Quantitative Study of the Strategic Arms Race in the Missile Age’
18. Michael D. Intriligator and Dagobert L. Brito (1984), ‘Can Arms Races Lead to the Outbreak of War?’
19. Thomas F. Mayer (1986), ‘Arms Races and War Initiation: Some Alternatives to the Intriligator-Brito Model’
20. J.D. Byers and D.A. Peel (1989), ‘The Determinants of Arms Expenditures of NATO and the Warsaw Pact: Some Further Evidence’
21. Charles H. Anderton (1990), ‘Teaching Arms-Race Concepts in Intermediate Microeconomics’
C Alliances
22. Mancur Olson, Jr. and Richard Zeckhauser (1966), ‘An Economic Theory of Alliances’
23. Jacques van Ypersele de Strihou (1967), ‘Sharing the Defense Burden Among Western Allies’
24. Harvey Starr (1974), ‘A Collective Goods Analysis of the Warsaw Pact after Czechoslovakia’
25. Todd Sandler (1977), ‘Impurity of Defense: An Application to the Economics of Alliances’
26. Todd Sandler and John F. Forbes (1980), ‘Burden Sharing, Strategy, and the Design of NATO’
27. Martin C. McGuire (1982), ‘U.S. Assistance, Israeli Allocation, and the Arms Race in the Middle East’
28. Mark A. Boyer (1989), ‘Trading Public Goods in the Western Alliance System’
PART III IMPACTS OF MILITARY EXPENDITURE: GROWTH, DEVELOPMENT AND MILITARY EXPENDITURE
29. Emile Benoit (1978), ‘Growth and Defense in Developing Countries’
30. Ronald P. Smith (1980), ‘Military Expenditure and Investment in OECD Countries, 1954–1973’
31. Gershon Feder (1982), ‘On Exports and Economic Growth’
32. Ådne Cappelen, Nils Petter Gleditsch and Olav Bjerkholt (1984), ‘Military Spending and Economic Growth in the OECD Countries’
33. Rati Ram (1986), ‘Government Size and Economic Growth: A New Framework and Some Evidence from Cross-Section and Time-Series Data’
34. W. Robert J. Alexander (1990), ‘The Impact of Defence Spending on Economic Growth: A Multi-Sectoral Approach to Defence Spending and Economic Growth with Evidence from Developed Economies’
35. Elizabeth S. Macnair, James C. Murdoch, Chung-Ron Pi and Todd Sandler (1995), ‘Growth and Defense: Pooled Estimates for the NATO Alliance, 1951–1988’
Name Index
Volume II
Acknowledgements
An introduction by the editors to all three volumes appears in volume I
PART I MILITARY PRODUCTION FUNCTION: MILITARY PERSONNEL
1. Franklin M. Fisher and Anton S. Morton (1967), ‘Reenlistments in the U.S. Navy: A Cost Effectiveness Study’
2. W. Lee Hansen and Burton A. Weisbrod (1967), ‘Economics of the Military Draft’
3. Walter Y. Oi (1967), ‘The Economic Cost of the Draft’
4. Anthony C. Fisher (1969), ‘The Cost of the Draft and the Cost of Ending the Draft’
5. B.F. Kiker and Jon Birkeli (1972), ‘Human Capital Losses Resulting from U.S. Casualties of the War in Vietnam’
6. Thomas W. Epps (1973), ‘An Econometric Analysis of the Effectiveness of the U.S. Army’s 1971 Paid Advertising Campaign’
7. Colin Ash, Bernard Udis and Robert F. McNown (1983), ‘Enlistments in the All-Volunteer Force: A Military Personnel Supply Model and Its Forecasts’
8. Matthew S. Goldberg and John T. Warner (1987), ‘Military Experience, Civilian Experience, and the Earnings of Veterans’
9. C.A. Knox Lovell, Richard C. Morey and Lisa L. Wood (1991), ‘Cost-Efficient Military Recruiting: An Econometric Approach’
10. François Melese, James Blandin and Phillip Fanchon (1992), ‘Benefits and Pay: The Economics of Military Compensation’
11. Richard Buddin (1993), ‘Recruiting for Joint Active/Reserve Tours’
PART II PROCUREMENT: DEMAND FOR EQUIPMENT
12. Keith Hartley (1969), ‘Estimating Military Aircraft Production Outlays: The British Experience’
13. J.J. McCall (1970), ‘The Simple Economics of Incentive Contracting’
14. Michael E. Canes (1975), ‘The Simple Economics of Incentive Contracting: Note’
15. J. Michael Cummins (1977), ‘Incentive Contracting for National Defense: A Problem of Optimal Risk Sharing’
16. Jean-Jacques Laffont (1987), ‘Toward a Normative Theory of Incentive Contracts Between Government and Private Firms’
17. Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole (1986), ‘Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms’
18. R. Preston McAfee and John McMillan (1986), ‘Bidding for Contracts: A Principal-Agent Analysis’
19. Rafael Rob (1986), ‘The Design of Procurement Contracts’
20. David P. Baron (1988), ‘Procurement Contracting: Efficiency, Renegotiation and Performance Evaluation’
21. Michael H. Riordan and David E.M. Sappington (1989), ‘Second Sourcing’
22. William P. Rogerson (1990), ‘Quality vs. Quantity in Military Procurement’
23. F.R. Lichtenberg (1990), ‘US Government Subsidies to Private Military R&D Investment: The Defense Department’s Independent R&D Policy’
24. Anthony G. Bower and Kent Osband (1991), ‘When More is Less: Defense Profit Policy in a Competitive Environment’
25. Edward S. Cavin (1991), ‘An Optimal Control Model of New Weapon System Development’
26. Tyler Cowen and Dwight Lee (1992), ‘The Usefulness of Inefficient Procurement’
27. David L.I. Kirkpatrick (1995), ‘The Rising Unit Cost of Defence Equipment – The Reasons and the Results’
Name Index
Volume III
Acknowledgements
An introduction by the editors to all three volumes appears in volume I
PART I SUPPLY OF EQUIPMENT
A Defence Industrial Base
1. Walter Adams and William James Adams (1972), ‘The Military-Industrial Complex: A Market Structure Analysis’
2. Seymour Melman (1972), ‘Ten Propositions on the War Economy’
3. Keith Hartley, Farooq Hussain and Ron Smith (1987), ‘The UK Defence Industrial Base’
4. R.P. Smith (1990), ‘Defence Procurement and Industrial Structure in the U.K.’
5. William E. Kovacic and Dennis E. Smallwood (1994), ‘Competition Policy, Rivalries, and Defense Industry Consolidation’
B Learning Curves
6. T.P. Wright (1936), ‘Factors Affecting the Cost of Airplanes’
7. Werner Z. Hirsch (1956), ‘Firm Progress Ratios’
8. Armen Alchian (1963), ‘Reliability of Progress Curves in Airframe Production’
9. Nicholas Baloff (1966), ‘The Learning Curve – Some Controversial Issues’
C Costs, Pricing and Profits
10. S.G. Sturmey (1964), ‘Cost Curves and Pricing in Aircraft Production’
11. George J. Stigler and Claire Friedland (1971), ‘Profits of Defense Contractors’
12. Keith Hartley and William J. Corcoran (1975), ‘Short-Run Employment Functions and Defence Contracts in the UK Aircraft Industry’
13. Ruben Trevino and Robert Higgs (1992), ‘Profits of US Defense Contractors’
D Industrial Policies
14. Bernard Udis and Keith E. Maskus (1991), ‘Offsets as Industrial Policy: Lessons from Aerospace’
15. Theodore H. Moran and David C. Mowery (1991), ‘Aerospace’
16. Keith Hartley and Stephen Martin (1993), ‘Evaluating Collaborative Programmes’
17. Peter Hall and Stefan Markowski (1994), ‘On the Normality and Abnormality of Offsets Obligations’
E Arms Trade
18. Ron Smith, Anthony Humm and Jacques Fontanel (1985), ‘The Economics of Exporting Arms’
19. Frederic S. Pearson (1989), ‘The Correlates of Arms Importation’
20. Paul Levine, Somnath Sen and Ron Smith (1994), ‘A Model of the International Arms Market’
PART II DISARMAMENT, CONVERSION, PEACE AND PUBLIC POLICY
A Disarmament
21. Dagobert L. Brito and Michael D. Intriligator (1981), ‘Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties and Innovations in Weapons Technology’
22. Robert S. McNamara (1992), ‘The Post-Cold War World: Implications for Military Expenditure in the Developing Countries’
23. Terry Barker, Paul Dunne and Ron Smith (1991), ‘Measuring the Peace Dividend in the United Kingdom’
24. Michael D. Intriligator (1992), ‘The Economics of Disarmament as an Investment Process’
25. Bruce Russett and Joel Slemrod (1993), ‘Diminished Expectations of Nuclear War and Increased Personal Savings: Evidence from Individual Survey Data’
26. Keith Hartley (1993), ‘The Economics of Disarmament: Some Guidelines for Public Policy’
27. Benedict Clements, Sanjeev Gupta and Jerald Schiff (1997), ‘What Happened to the Peace Dividend?’
B Conversion
28. Mark C. Berger and Barry T. Hirsch (1983), ‘The Civilian Earnings Experience of Vietnam-Era Veterans’
29. Susan Willett (1990), ‘Conversion Policy in the UK’
30. Euguene Bougrov (1994), ‘Conversion in Transitional Economies: The Case of the Former USSR and Russia’
31. Nick Hooper and Barbara Butler (1996), ‘A Case Study of Redundant Defence Workers’
32. Nick Hooper and Nick Cox (1996), ‘The European Union KONVER Programme’
PART III NON-CONVENTIONAL CONFLICTS: TERRORISM, INSURRECTIONS AND REVOLUTIONS
33. William M. Landes (1978), ‘An Economic Study of U.S. Aircraft Hijacking, 1961–1976’
34. Richard M. Kirk (1983), ‘Political Terrorism and the Size of Government: A Positive Institutional Analysis of Violent Political Activity’
35. Scott E. Atkinson, Todd Sandler and John Tschirhart (1987), ‘Terrorism in a Bargaining Framework’
36. Edward F. Mickolus (1989), ‘What Constitutes State Support to Terrorists?’
37. Timur Kuran (1991), ‘The East European Revolution of 1989: Is It Surprising that We Were Surprised?’
38. Herschel I. Grossman (1991), ‘A General Equilibrium Model of Insurrections’
39. Walter Enders and Todd Sandler (1993), ‘The Effectiveness of Antiterrorism Policies: A Vector-Autoregression-Intervention Analysis’
40. Todd Sandler (1997), ‘The Future Challenges of NATO: An Economic Viewpoint’
Name Index
Volume I
Acknowledgements
Introduction Keith Hartley and Todd Sandler
PART I INTRODUCTION: DEFENCE ECONOMICS – AN OVERVIEW
1. Michael D. Intriligator (1990), ‘On the Nature and Scope of Defence Economics’
2. Judith Reppy (1991), ‘On the Nature and Scope of Defence Economics: A Comment’
3. Michael D. Intriligator (1991), ‘On the Nature and Scope of Defence Economics: A Reply to Judith Reppy’s Comment’
4. M.W. Jones-Lee (1990), ‘Defence Expenditure and the Economics of Safety’
5. W. Grigor McClelland (1990), ‘Defence Expenditure and the Economics of Safety: A Comment’
6. M.W. Jones-Lee (1990), ‘Defence Expenditure and the Economics of Safety: Reply’
7. Walter Isard (1994), ‘Peace Economics: A Beginning at Definition’
PART II DEMAND, ARMS RACES AND ALLIANCES
A The Demand for Military Expenditure
8. Leonard Dudley and Claude Montmarquette (1981), ‘The Demand for Military Expenditures: An International Comparison’
9. James C. Murdoch and Todd Sandler (1984), ‘Complementarity, Free Riding, and the Military Expenditures of NATO Allies’
10. R.P. Smith (1989), ‘Models of Military Expenditure’
11. Minoru Okamura (1991), ‘Estimating the Impact of the Soviet Union’s Threat on the United States–Japan Alliance: A Demand System Approach’
B Arms Races
12. Lewis F. Richardson (1953), ‘The Submissiveness of Nations’
13. Anatol Rapoport (1957), ‘Lewis F. Richardson’s Mathematical Theory of War’
14. Stephen A. Richardson (1957), ‘Lewis Fry Richardson (1881–1953): A Personal Biography’
15. Robert P. Abelson (1963), ‘A “Derivation” of Richardson’s Equations’
16. Michael D. Intriligator (1975), ‘Strategic Considerations in the Richardson Model of Arms Races’
17. Martin McGuire (1977), ‘A Quantitative Study of the Strategic Arms Race in the Missile Age’
18. Michael D. Intriligator and Dagobert L. Brito (1984), ‘Can Arms Races Lead to the Outbreak of War?’
19. Thomas F. Mayer (1986), ‘Arms Races and War Initiation: Some Alternatives to the Intriligator-Brito Model’
20. J.D. Byers and D.A. Peel (1989), ‘The Determinants of Arms Expenditures of NATO and the Warsaw Pact: Some Further Evidence’
21. Charles H. Anderton (1990), ‘Teaching Arms-Race Concepts in Intermediate Microeconomics’
C Alliances
22. Mancur Olson, Jr. and Richard Zeckhauser (1966), ‘An Economic Theory of Alliances’
23. Jacques van Ypersele de Strihou (1967), ‘Sharing the Defense Burden Among Western Allies’
24. Harvey Starr (1974), ‘A Collective Goods Analysis of the Warsaw Pact after Czechoslovakia’
25. Todd Sandler (1977), ‘Impurity of Defense: An Application to the Economics of Alliances’
26. Todd Sandler and John F. Forbes (1980), ‘Burden Sharing, Strategy, and the Design of NATO’
27. Martin C. McGuire (1982), ‘U.S. Assistance, Israeli Allocation, and the Arms Race in the Middle East’
28. Mark A. Boyer (1989), ‘Trading Public Goods in the Western Alliance System’
PART III IMPACTS OF MILITARY EXPENDITURE: GROWTH, DEVELOPMENT AND MILITARY EXPENDITURE
29. Emile Benoit (1978), ‘Growth and Defense in Developing Countries’
30. Ronald P. Smith (1980), ‘Military Expenditure and Investment in OECD Countries, 1954–1973’
31. Gershon Feder (1982), ‘On Exports and Economic Growth’
32. Ådne Cappelen, Nils Petter Gleditsch and Olav Bjerkholt (1984), ‘Military Spending and Economic Growth in the OECD Countries’
33. Rati Ram (1986), ‘Government Size and Economic Growth: A New Framework and Some Evidence from Cross-Section and Time-Series Data’
34. W. Robert J. Alexander (1990), ‘The Impact of Defence Spending on Economic Growth: A Multi-Sectoral Approach to Defence Spending and Economic Growth with Evidence from Developed Economies’
35. Elizabeth S. Macnair, James C. Murdoch, Chung-Ron Pi and Todd Sandler (1995), ‘Growth and Defense: Pooled Estimates for the NATO Alliance, 1951–1988’
Name Index
Volume II
Acknowledgements
An introduction by the editors to all three volumes appears in volume I
PART I MILITARY PRODUCTION FUNCTION: MILITARY PERSONNEL
1. Franklin M. Fisher and Anton S. Morton (1967), ‘Reenlistments in the U.S. Navy: A Cost Effectiveness Study’
2. W. Lee Hansen and Burton A. Weisbrod (1967), ‘Economics of the Military Draft’
3. Walter Y. Oi (1967), ‘The Economic Cost of the Draft’
4. Anthony C. Fisher (1969), ‘The Cost of the Draft and the Cost of Ending the Draft’
5. B.F. Kiker and Jon Birkeli (1972), ‘Human Capital Losses Resulting from U.S. Casualties of the War in Vietnam’
6. Thomas W. Epps (1973), ‘An Econometric Analysis of the Effectiveness of the U.S. Army’s 1971 Paid Advertising Campaign’
7. Colin Ash, Bernard Udis and Robert F. McNown (1983), ‘Enlistments in the All-Volunteer Force: A Military Personnel Supply Model and Its Forecasts’
8. Matthew S. Goldberg and John T. Warner (1987), ‘Military Experience, Civilian Experience, and the Earnings of Veterans’
9. C.A. Knox Lovell, Richard C. Morey and Lisa L. Wood (1991), ‘Cost-Efficient Military Recruiting: An Econometric Approach’
10. François Melese, James Blandin and Phillip Fanchon (1992), ‘Benefits and Pay: The Economics of Military Compensation’
11. Richard Buddin (1993), ‘Recruiting for Joint Active/Reserve Tours’
PART II PROCUREMENT: DEMAND FOR EQUIPMENT
12. Keith Hartley (1969), ‘Estimating Military Aircraft Production Outlays: The British Experience’
13. J.J. McCall (1970), ‘The Simple Economics of Incentive Contracting’
14. Michael E. Canes (1975), ‘The Simple Economics of Incentive Contracting: Note’
15. J. Michael Cummins (1977), ‘Incentive Contracting for National Defense: A Problem of Optimal Risk Sharing’
16. Jean-Jacques Laffont (1987), ‘Toward a Normative Theory of Incentive Contracts Between Government and Private Firms’
17. Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole (1986), ‘Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms’
18. R. Preston McAfee and John McMillan (1986), ‘Bidding for Contracts: A Principal-Agent Analysis’
19. Rafael Rob (1986), ‘The Design of Procurement Contracts’
20. David P. Baron (1988), ‘Procurement Contracting: Efficiency, Renegotiation and Performance Evaluation’
21. Michael H. Riordan and David E.M. Sappington (1989), ‘Second Sourcing’
22. William P. Rogerson (1990), ‘Quality vs. Quantity in Military Procurement’
23. F.R. Lichtenberg (1990), ‘US Government Subsidies to Private Military R&D Investment: The Defense Department’s Independent R&D Policy’
24. Anthony G. Bower and Kent Osband (1991), ‘When More is Less: Defense Profit Policy in a Competitive Environment’
25. Edward S. Cavin (1991), ‘An Optimal Control Model of New Weapon System Development’
26. Tyler Cowen and Dwight Lee (1992), ‘The Usefulness of Inefficient Procurement’
27. David L.I. Kirkpatrick (1995), ‘The Rising Unit Cost of Defence Equipment – The Reasons and the Results’
Name Index
Volume III
Acknowledgements
An introduction by the editors to all three volumes appears in volume I
PART I SUPPLY OF EQUIPMENT
A Defence Industrial Base
1. Walter Adams and William James Adams (1972), ‘The Military-Industrial Complex: A Market Structure Analysis’
2. Seymour Melman (1972), ‘Ten Propositions on the War Economy’
3. Keith Hartley, Farooq Hussain and Ron Smith (1987), ‘The UK Defence Industrial Base’
4. R.P. Smith (1990), ‘Defence Procurement and Industrial Structure in the U.K.’
5. William E. Kovacic and Dennis E. Smallwood (1994), ‘Competition Policy, Rivalries, and Defense Industry Consolidation’
B Learning Curves
6. T.P. Wright (1936), ‘Factors Affecting the Cost of Airplanes’
7. Werner Z. Hirsch (1956), ‘Firm Progress Ratios’
8. Armen Alchian (1963), ‘Reliability of Progress Curves in Airframe Production’
9. Nicholas Baloff (1966), ‘The Learning Curve – Some Controversial Issues’
C Costs, Pricing and Profits
10. S.G. Sturmey (1964), ‘Cost Curves and Pricing in Aircraft Production’
11. George J. Stigler and Claire Friedland (1971), ‘Profits of Defense Contractors’
12. Keith Hartley and William J. Corcoran (1975), ‘Short-Run Employment Functions and Defence Contracts in the UK Aircraft Industry’
13. Ruben Trevino and Robert Higgs (1992), ‘Profits of US Defense Contractors’
D Industrial Policies
14. Bernard Udis and Keith E. Maskus (1991), ‘Offsets as Industrial Policy: Lessons from Aerospace’
15. Theodore H. Moran and David C. Mowery (1991), ‘Aerospace’
16. Keith Hartley and Stephen Martin (1993), ‘Evaluating Collaborative Programmes’
17. Peter Hall and Stefan Markowski (1994), ‘On the Normality and Abnormality of Offsets Obligations’
E Arms Trade
18. Ron Smith, Anthony Humm and Jacques Fontanel (1985), ‘The Economics of Exporting Arms’
19. Frederic S. Pearson (1989), ‘The Correlates of Arms Importation’
20. Paul Levine, Somnath Sen and Ron Smith (1994), ‘A Model of the International Arms Market’
PART II DISARMAMENT, CONVERSION, PEACE AND PUBLIC POLICY
A Disarmament
21. Dagobert L. Brito and Michael D. Intriligator (1981), ‘Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties and Innovations in Weapons Technology’
22. Robert S. McNamara (1992), ‘The Post-Cold War World: Implications for Military Expenditure in the Developing Countries’
23. Terry Barker, Paul Dunne and Ron Smith (1991), ‘Measuring the Peace Dividend in the United Kingdom’
24. Michael D. Intriligator (1992), ‘The Economics of Disarmament as an Investment Process’
25. Bruce Russett and Joel Slemrod (1993), ‘Diminished Expectations of Nuclear War and Increased Personal Savings: Evidence from Individual Survey Data’
26. Keith Hartley (1993), ‘The Economics of Disarmament: Some Guidelines for Public Policy’
27. Benedict Clements, Sanjeev Gupta and Jerald Schiff (1997), ‘What Happened to the Peace Dividend?’
B Conversion
28. Mark C. Berger and Barry T. Hirsch (1983), ‘The Civilian Earnings Experience of Vietnam-Era Veterans’
29. Susan Willett (1990), ‘Conversion Policy in the UK’
30. Euguene Bougrov (1994), ‘Conversion in Transitional Economies: The Case of the Former USSR and Russia’
31. Nick Hooper and Barbara Butler (1996), ‘A Case Study of Redundant Defence Workers’
32. Nick Hooper and Nick Cox (1996), ‘The European Union KONVER Programme’
PART III NON-CONVENTIONAL CONFLICTS: TERRORISM, INSURRECTIONS AND REVOLUTIONS
33. William M. Landes (1978), ‘An Economic Study of U.S. Aircraft Hijacking, 1961–1976’
34. Richard M. Kirk (1983), ‘Political Terrorism and the Size of Government: A Positive Institutional Analysis of Violent Political Activity’
35. Scott E. Atkinson, Todd Sandler and John Tschirhart (1987), ‘Terrorism in a Bargaining Framework’
36. Edward F. Mickolus (1989), ‘What Constitutes State Support to Terrorists?’
37. Timur Kuran (1991), ‘The East European Revolution of 1989: Is It Surprising that We Were Surprised?’
38. Herschel I. Grossman (1991), ‘A General Equilibrium Model of Insurrections’
39. Walter Enders and Todd Sandler (1993), ‘The Effectiveness of Antiterrorism Policies: A Vector-Autoregression-Intervention Analysis’
40. Todd Sandler (1997), ‘The Future Challenges of NATO: An Economic Viewpoint’
Name Index
