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The Economics of Crime
This authoritative and comprehensive collection contains the most important published papers and articles on the economics of crime. It presents a variety of different perspectives and will be an essential reference source for both researchers and policymakers.
The book examines the theory and methodology of the economics of law enforcement and crime prevention as they affect both public authorities and private individuals. It explores the economics of organized crime from the point of view of the criminal, but also considers the costs to the community of criminal acts and their effects. It studies the causes of crime and the costs and effectiveness of deterrence and punishment.
The book examines the theory and methodology of the economics of law enforcement and crime prevention as they affect both public authorities and private individuals. It explores the economics of organized crime from the point of view of the criminal, but also considers the costs to the community of criminal acts and their effects. It studies the causes of crime and the costs and effectiveness of deterrence and punishment.
More Information
Contributors
Contents
More Information
This authoritative and comprehensive collection contains the most important published papers and articles on the economics of crime. It presents a variety of different perspectives and will be an essential reference source for both researchers and policymakers.
The book examines the theory and methodology of the economics of law enforcement and crime prevention as they affect both public authorities and private individuals. It explores the economics of organized crime from the point of view of the criminal, but also considers the costs to the community of criminal acts and their effects. It studies the causes of crime and the costs and effectiveness of deterrence and punishment.
The editors have written a new authoritative introduction which gives a wide-ranging overview of the topics covered.
The book examines the theory and methodology of the economics of law enforcement and crime prevention as they affect both public authorities and private individuals. It explores the economics of organized crime from the point of view of the criminal, but also considers the costs to the community of criminal acts and their effects. It studies the causes of crime and the costs and effectiveness of deterrence and punishment.
The editors have written a new authoritative introduction which gives a wide-ranging overview of the topics covered.
Contributors
81 articles, dating from 1968 to 2004
Contributors include: A.P. Bartel, G.S. Becker, J.M. Buchanan, R.B. Freeman, E.L. Glaeser, W.M. Landes, S.D. Levitt, M.A. Polinsky, S. Shavell, G.J. Stigler
Contributors include: A.P. Bartel, G.S. Becker, J.M. Buchanan, R.B. Freeman, E.L. Glaeser, W.M. Landes, S.D. Levitt, M.A. Polinsky, S. Shavell, G.J. Stigler
Contents
Contents:
Volume I
Acknowledgements
Introduction Isaac Ehrlich and Zhiqiang Liu
PART I INTRODUCTION: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
1. Gary S. Becker (1968), ‘Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach’
2. George J. Stigler (1970), ‘The Optimum Enforcement of Laws’
3. Isaac Ehrlich (1996), ‘Crime, Punishment, and the Market for Offenses’
PART II SUPPLY OF OFFENSES – THEORY AND METHODOLOGY
4. Isaac Ehrlich (1973), ‘Participation in Illegitimate Activities: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation’
5. M.K. Block and J.M. Heineke (1975), ‘A Labor Theoretic Analysis of the Criminal Choice’
6. Raaj K. Sah (1991), ‘Social Osmosis and Patterns of Crime’
7. Edward L. Glaeser, Bruce Sacerdote and José A. Scheinkman (1996), ‘Crime and Social Interactions’
PART III PRIVATE DEMAND FOR PROTECTION – THEORY AND METHODOLOGY
A Private Demand for Self-protection – Negative Demand for Crime
8. Steven Shavell (1991), ‘Individual Precautions to Prevent Theft: Private versus Socially Optimal Behavior’
9. Tomas J. Philipson and Richard A. Posner (1996), ‘The Economic Epidemiology of Crime’
10. Charles T. Clotfelter (1977), ‘Public Services, Private Substitutes, and the Demand for Protection Against Crime’
11. Ann P. Bartel (1975), ‘An Analysis of Firm Demand for Protection Against Crime’
B Private Enforcement of Laws
12. William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner (1975), ‘The Private Enforcement of Law’
13. David Friedman (1984), ‘Efficient Institutions for the Private Enforcement of Law’
14. A. Mitchell Polinsky (1980), ‘Private versus Public Enforcement of Fines’
PART IV PUBLIC DEMAND FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT – THEORY AND METHODOLOGY
A The Production of Law Enforcement – Police, Prosecution, and Court
15. William M. Landes (1971), ‘An Economic Analysis of the Courts’
16. Llad Phillips (1981), ‘The Criminal Justice System: Its Technology and Inefficiencies’
17. Kwabena Gyimah-Brempong (1989), ‘Demand for Factors of Production in Municipal Police Department’
B Optimal Law Enforcement Strategies
18. Isaac Ehrlich (1982), ‘The Optimum Enforcement of Laws and the Concept of Justice: A Positive Analysis’
19. A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell (1979), ‘The Optimal Tradeoff between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines’
20. David Friedman (1999), ‘Why Not Hang Them All: The Virtues of Inefficient Punishment’
21. Gary S. Becker and George J. Stigler (1974), ‘Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers’
22. Isaac Ehrlich and Joel C. Gibbons (1977), ‘On the Measurement of the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment and the Theory of Deterrence’
PART V MARKET EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
A General Applications
23. Isaac Ehrlich (1981), ‘On the Usefulness of Controlling Individuals: An Economic Analysis of Rehabilitation, Incapacitation, and Deterrence’
24. Steven Balkin and John F. McDonald (1981), ‘The Market for Street Crime: An Economic Analysis of Victim-Offender Interaction’
25. Jennifer F. Reinganum (1993), ‘The Law Enforcement Process and Criminal Choice’
B Organized Crime
26. James M. Buchanan (1973), ‘A Defense of Organized Crime?’
27. Nuno Garoupa (2000), ‘The Economics of Organized Crime and Optimal Law Enforcement’
Name Index
Volume II
Acknowledgements
An introduction by the editors to all three volumes appears in Volume I
PART I GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODELS – CRIME AND THE ECONOMY
1. Ayse Imrohoroglu, Antonio Merlo and Peter Rupert (2000), ‘On the Political Economy of Income Redistribution and Crime’
2. Isaac Ehrlich and Francis T. Lui (1999), ‘Bureaucratic Corruption and Endogenous Economic Growth’
PART II EMPIRICAL IMPLEMENTATION
A The Social Cost of Crime
3. David A. Anderson (1999), ‘The Aggregate Burden of Crime’
B Some Methodological Issues in Implementing the Economic Approach
4. W. Kip Viscusi (1986), ‘The Risks and Rewards of Criminal Activity: A Comprehensive Test of Criminal Deterrence’
5. Isaac Ehrlich and George D. Brower (1987), ‘On the Issue of Causality in the Economic Model of Crime and Law Enforcement: Some Theoretical Considerations and Experimental Evidence’
6. Steven D. Levitt (1997), ‘Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring to Estimate the Effect of Police on Crime’
C Studies of Crime by Levels of Aggregation
7. Ann Dryden Witte (1980), ‘Estimating the Economic Model of Crime with Individual Data’
8. Samuel L. Myers, Jr. (1983), ‘Estimating the Economic Model of Crime: Employment versus Punishment Effects’
9. Helen Tauchen, Ann Dryden Witte and Harriet Griesinger (1994), ‘Criminal Deterrence: Revisiting the Issue with a Birth Cohort’
10. Ann P. Bartel (1979), ‘Women and Crime: An Economic Analysis’
11. Richard B. Freeman (1996), ‘Why Do So Many Young American Men Commit Crimes and What Might We Do About It?’
12. Steven D. Levitt (1998), ‘Juvenile Crime and Punishment’
13. Edward L. Glaeser and Bruce Sacerdote (1999), ‘Why is There More Crime in Cities?’
D Country-level Studies
14. Kenneth I. Wolpin (1978), ‘An Economic Analysis of Crime and Punishment in England and Wales, 1894–1967’
15. William J. Furlong and Stephen L. Mehay (1981), ‘Urban Law Enforcement in Canada: An Empirical Analysis’
16. Riccardo Marselli and Marco Vannini (1997), ‘Estimating a Crime Equation in the Presence of Organized Crime: Evidence from Italy’
17. Björn Wahlroos (1981), ‘On Finnish Property Criminality: An Empirical Analysis of the Postwar Era Using an Ehrlich Model’
18. Horst Entorf and Hannes Spengler (2000), ‘Socioeconomic and Demographic Factors of Crime in Germany – Evidence from Panel Data of the German States’
19. Kenneth I. Wolpin (1980), ‘A Time Series-Cross Section Analysis of International Variation in Crime and Punishment’
E Crime and the Labor Market
20. Richard B. Freeman (1983), ‘Crime and Unemployment’ 21. Steven Raphael and Rudolf Winter-Ebmer (2001), ‘Identifying the Effect of Unemployment on Crime’
22. Eric D. Gould, Bruce A. Weinberg and David B. Mustard (2002), ‘Crime Rates and Local Labor Market Opportunities in the United States: 1979–1997’
23. Lance Lochner (2004), ‘Education, Work, and Crime: A Human Capital Approach’
24. Morgan Kelly (2000), ‘Inequality and Crime’
F Specific Crime Categories
25. William M. Landes (1978), ‘An Economic Study of U.S. Aircraft Hijacking, 1961–1976’
26. Scott E. Atkinson, Todd Sandler and John Tschirhart (1987), ‘Terrorism in a Bargaining Framework’
27. Jeff Grogger and Michael Willis (2000), ‘The Emergence of Crack Cocaine and the Rise in Urban Crime Rates’
28. Hope Corman and H. Naci Mocan (2000), ‘A Time-Series Analysis of Crime, Deterrence, and Drug Abuse in New York City’
29. Donald S. Kenkel (1993), ‘Drinking, Driving, and Deterrence: The Effectiveness and Social Costs of Alternative Policies’
30. Joel Waldfogel (1995), ‘Are Fines and Prison Terms Used Efficiently? Evidence on Federal Fraud Offenders’
Name Index
Volume III
Acknowledgements
An introduction by the editors to all three volumes appears in Volume I
PART I FEDERAL AND CORPORATE CRIMES
(Specific Crime Categories, continued)
1. Michael G. Allingham and Agnar Sandmo (1972), ‘Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis’
2. Michael Kent Block, Frederick Carl Nold and Joseph Gregory Sidak (1981), ‘The Deterrent Effect of Antitrust Enforcement’
3. Jonathan M. Karpoff and John R. Lott, Jr. (1993), ‘The Reputational Penalty Firms Bear from Committing Criminal Fraud’
PART II DEMAND FOR PROTECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
A Demand for Protection
4. Itzhak Goldberg and Frederick C. Nold (1980), ‘Does Reporting Deter Burglars? An Empirical Analysis of Risk and Return in Crime’
5. Timothy H. Hannan (1982), ‘Bank Robberies and Bank Security Precautions’
6. Ian Ayres and Steven D. Levitt (1998), ‘Measuring Positive Externalities from Unobservable Victim Precaution: An Empirical Analysis of Lojack’
7. Julie Berry Cullen and Steven D. Levitt (1999), ‘Crime, Urban Flight, and the Consequences for Cities’
B Guns and Crime
8. John R. Lott, Jr. and David B. Mustard (1997), ‘Crime, Deterrence, and Right-to-Carry Concealed Handguns’
9. Mark Duggan (2001), ‘More Guns, More Crime’
C Production of Law Enforcement
10. Daniel P. Kessler and Anne Morrison Piehl (1998), ‘The Role of Discretion in the Criminal Justice System’
11. Chantale LaCasse and A. Abigail Payne (1999), ‘Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Mandatory Minimum Sentences: Do Defendants Bargain in the Shadow of the Judge?’
12. Joanna M. Shepherd (2002), ‘Fear of the First Strike: The Full Deterrent Effect of California’s Two- and Three-Strikes Legislation’
D Imprisonment and Rehabilitation
13. Philip J. Cook (1975), ‘The Correctional Carrot: Better Jobs for Parolees’
14. Samuel L. Myers, Jr. (1980), ‘The Rehabilitation Effect of Punishment’
15. Steven D. Levitt (1996), ‘The Effect of Prison Population Size on Crime Rates: Evidence from Prison Overcrowding Litigation’
PART III MURDER AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
16. Isaac Ehrlich (1975), ‘The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and Death’
17. Isaac Ehrlich (1977), ‘Capital Punishment and Deterrence: Some Further Thoughts and Additional Evidence’
18. Kenneth L. Avio (1979), ‘Capital Punishment in Canada: A Time-Series Analysis of the Deterrent Hypothesis’
19. Stephen A. Hoenack and William C. Weiler (1980), ‘A Structural Model of Murder Behavior and the Criminal Justice System’
20. Stephen K. Layson (1985), ‘Homicide and Deterrence: A Reexamination of the United States Time-Series Evidence’
21. Walter S. McManus (1985), ‘Estimates of the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: The Importance of the Researcher''s Prior Beliefs’
22. Isaac Ehrlich and Zhiqiang Liu (1999), ‘Sensitivity Analyses of the Deterrence Hypothesis: Let’s Keep the Econ in Econometrics’
23. Hashem Dezhbakhsh, Paul H. Rubin and Joanna M. Shepherd (2003), ‘Does Capital Punishment Have a Deterrent Effect? New Evidence from Postmoratorium Panel Data’
24. H. Naci Mocan and R. Kaj Gittings (2003), ‘Getting Off Death Row: Commuted Sentences and the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment’
Name Index
Volume I
Acknowledgements
Introduction Isaac Ehrlich and Zhiqiang Liu
PART I INTRODUCTION: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
1. Gary S. Becker (1968), ‘Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach’
2. George J. Stigler (1970), ‘The Optimum Enforcement of Laws’
3. Isaac Ehrlich (1996), ‘Crime, Punishment, and the Market for Offenses’
PART II SUPPLY OF OFFENSES – THEORY AND METHODOLOGY
4. Isaac Ehrlich (1973), ‘Participation in Illegitimate Activities: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation’
5. M.K. Block and J.M. Heineke (1975), ‘A Labor Theoretic Analysis of the Criminal Choice’
6. Raaj K. Sah (1991), ‘Social Osmosis and Patterns of Crime’
7. Edward L. Glaeser, Bruce Sacerdote and José A. Scheinkman (1996), ‘Crime and Social Interactions’
PART III PRIVATE DEMAND FOR PROTECTION – THEORY AND METHODOLOGY
A Private Demand for Self-protection – Negative Demand for Crime
8. Steven Shavell (1991), ‘Individual Precautions to Prevent Theft: Private versus Socially Optimal Behavior’
9. Tomas J. Philipson and Richard A. Posner (1996), ‘The Economic Epidemiology of Crime’
10. Charles T. Clotfelter (1977), ‘Public Services, Private Substitutes, and the Demand for Protection Against Crime’
11. Ann P. Bartel (1975), ‘An Analysis of Firm Demand for Protection Against Crime’
B Private Enforcement of Laws
12. William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner (1975), ‘The Private Enforcement of Law’
13. David Friedman (1984), ‘Efficient Institutions for the Private Enforcement of Law’
14. A. Mitchell Polinsky (1980), ‘Private versus Public Enforcement of Fines’
PART IV PUBLIC DEMAND FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT – THEORY AND METHODOLOGY
A The Production of Law Enforcement – Police, Prosecution, and Court
15. William M. Landes (1971), ‘An Economic Analysis of the Courts’
16. Llad Phillips (1981), ‘The Criminal Justice System: Its Technology and Inefficiencies’
17. Kwabena Gyimah-Brempong (1989), ‘Demand for Factors of Production in Municipal Police Department’
B Optimal Law Enforcement Strategies
18. Isaac Ehrlich (1982), ‘The Optimum Enforcement of Laws and the Concept of Justice: A Positive Analysis’
19. A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell (1979), ‘The Optimal Tradeoff between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines’
20. David Friedman (1999), ‘Why Not Hang Them All: The Virtues of Inefficient Punishment’
21. Gary S. Becker and George J. Stigler (1974), ‘Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers’
22. Isaac Ehrlich and Joel C. Gibbons (1977), ‘On the Measurement of the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment and the Theory of Deterrence’
PART V MARKET EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
A General Applications
23. Isaac Ehrlich (1981), ‘On the Usefulness of Controlling Individuals: An Economic Analysis of Rehabilitation, Incapacitation, and Deterrence’
24. Steven Balkin and John F. McDonald (1981), ‘The Market for Street Crime: An Economic Analysis of Victim-Offender Interaction’
25. Jennifer F. Reinganum (1993), ‘The Law Enforcement Process and Criminal Choice’
B Organized Crime
26. James M. Buchanan (1973), ‘A Defense of Organized Crime?’
27. Nuno Garoupa (2000), ‘The Economics of Organized Crime and Optimal Law Enforcement’
Name Index
Volume II
Acknowledgements
An introduction by the editors to all three volumes appears in Volume I
PART I GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODELS – CRIME AND THE ECONOMY
1. Ayse Imrohoroglu, Antonio Merlo and Peter Rupert (2000), ‘On the Political Economy of Income Redistribution and Crime’
2. Isaac Ehrlich and Francis T. Lui (1999), ‘Bureaucratic Corruption and Endogenous Economic Growth’
PART II EMPIRICAL IMPLEMENTATION
A The Social Cost of Crime
3. David A. Anderson (1999), ‘The Aggregate Burden of Crime’
B Some Methodological Issues in Implementing the Economic Approach
4. W. Kip Viscusi (1986), ‘The Risks and Rewards of Criminal Activity: A Comprehensive Test of Criminal Deterrence’
5. Isaac Ehrlich and George D. Brower (1987), ‘On the Issue of Causality in the Economic Model of Crime and Law Enforcement: Some Theoretical Considerations and Experimental Evidence’
6. Steven D. Levitt (1997), ‘Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring to Estimate the Effect of Police on Crime’
C Studies of Crime by Levels of Aggregation
7. Ann Dryden Witte (1980), ‘Estimating the Economic Model of Crime with Individual Data’
8. Samuel L. Myers, Jr. (1983), ‘Estimating the Economic Model of Crime: Employment versus Punishment Effects’
9. Helen Tauchen, Ann Dryden Witte and Harriet Griesinger (1994), ‘Criminal Deterrence: Revisiting the Issue with a Birth Cohort’
10. Ann P. Bartel (1979), ‘Women and Crime: An Economic Analysis’
11. Richard B. Freeman (1996), ‘Why Do So Many Young American Men Commit Crimes and What Might We Do About It?’
12. Steven D. Levitt (1998), ‘Juvenile Crime and Punishment’
13. Edward L. Glaeser and Bruce Sacerdote (1999), ‘Why is There More Crime in Cities?’
D Country-level Studies
14. Kenneth I. Wolpin (1978), ‘An Economic Analysis of Crime and Punishment in England and Wales, 1894–1967’
15. William J. Furlong and Stephen L. Mehay (1981), ‘Urban Law Enforcement in Canada: An Empirical Analysis’
16. Riccardo Marselli and Marco Vannini (1997), ‘Estimating a Crime Equation in the Presence of Organized Crime: Evidence from Italy’
17. Björn Wahlroos (1981), ‘On Finnish Property Criminality: An Empirical Analysis of the Postwar Era Using an Ehrlich Model’
18. Horst Entorf and Hannes Spengler (2000), ‘Socioeconomic and Demographic Factors of Crime in Germany – Evidence from Panel Data of the German States’
19. Kenneth I. Wolpin (1980), ‘A Time Series-Cross Section Analysis of International Variation in Crime and Punishment’
E Crime and the Labor Market
20. Richard B. Freeman (1983), ‘Crime and Unemployment’ 21. Steven Raphael and Rudolf Winter-Ebmer (2001), ‘Identifying the Effect of Unemployment on Crime’
22. Eric D. Gould, Bruce A. Weinberg and David B. Mustard (2002), ‘Crime Rates and Local Labor Market Opportunities in the United States: 1979–1997’
23. Lance Lochner (2004), ‘Education, Work, and Crime: A Human Capital Approach’
24. Morgan Kelly (2000), ‘Inequality and Crime’
F Specific Crime Categories
25. William M. Landes (1978), ‘An Economic Study of U.S. Aircraft Hijacking, 1961–1976’
26. Scott E. Atkinson, Todd Sandler and John Tschirhart (1987), ‘Terrorism in a Bargaining Framework’
27. Jeff Grogger and Michael Willis (2000), ‘The Emergence of Crack Cocaine and the Rise in Urban Crime Rates’
28. Hope Corman and H. Naci Mocan (2000), ‘A Time-Series Analysis of Crime, Deterrence, and Drug Abuse in New York City’
29. Donald S. Kenkel (1993), ‘Drinking, Driving, and Deterrence: The Effectiveness and Social Costs of Alternative Policies’
30. Joel Waldfogel (1995), ‘Are Fines and Prison Terms Used Efficiently? Evidence on Federal Fraud Offenders’
Name Index
Volume III
Acknowledgements
An introduction by the editors to all three volumes appears in Volume I
PART I FEDERAL AND CORPORATE CRIMES
(Specific Crime Categories, continued)
1. Michael G. Allingham and Agnar Sandmo (1972), ‘Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis’
2. Michael Kent Block, Frederick Carl Nold and Joseph Gregory Sidak (1981), ‘The Deterrent Effect of Antitrust Enforcement’
3. Jonathan M. Karpoff and John R. Lott, Jr. (1993), ‘The Reputational Penalty Firms Bear from Committing Criminal Fraud’
PART II DEMAND FOR PROTECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
A Demand for Protection
4. Itzhak Goldberg and Frederick C. Nold (1980), ‘Does Reporting Deter Burglars? An Empirical Analysis of Risk and Return in Crime’
5. Timothy H. Hannan (1982), ‘Bank Robberies and Bank Security Precautions’
6. Ian Ayres and Steven D. Levitt (1998), ‘Measuring Positive Externalities from Unobservable Victim Precaution: An Empirical Analysis of Lojack’
7. Julie Berry Cullen and Steven D. Levitt (1999), ‘Crime, Urban Flight, and the Consequences for Cities’
B Guns and Crime
8. John R. Lott, Jr. and David B. Mustard (1997), ‘Crime, Deterrence, and Right-to-Carry Concealed Handguns’
9. Mark Duggan (2001), ‘More Guns, More Crime’
C Production of Law Enforcement
10. Daniel P. Kessler and Anne Morrison Piehl (1998), ‘The Role of Discretion in the Criminal Justice System’
11. Chantale LaCasse and A. Abigail Payne (1999), ‘Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Mandatory Minimum Sentences: Do Defendants Bargain in the Shadow of the Judge?’
12. Joanna M. Shepherd (2002), ‘Fear of the First Strike: The Full Deterrent Effect of California’s Two- and Three-Strikes Legislation’
D Imprisonment and Rehabilitation
13. Philip J. Cook (1975), ‘The Correctional Carrot: Better Jobs for Parolees’
14. Samuel L. Myers, Jr. (1980), ‘The Rehabilitation Effect of Punishment’
15. Steven D. Levitt (1996), ‘The Effect of Prison Population Size on Crime Rates: Evidence from Prison Overcrowding Litigation’
PART III MURDER AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
16. Isaac Ehrlich (1975), ‘The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and Death’
17. Isaac Ehrlich (1977), ‘Capital Punishment and Deterrence: Some Further Thoughts and Additional Evidence’
18. Kenneth L. Avio (1979), ‘Capital Punishment in Canada: A Time-Series Analysis of the Deterrent Hypothesis’
19. Stephen A. Hoenack and William C. Weiler (1980), ‘A Structural Model of Murder Behavior and the Criminal Justice System’
20. Stephen K. Layson (1985), ‘Homicide and Deterrence: A Reexamination of the United States Time-Series Evidence’
21. Walter S. McManus (1985), ‘Estimates of the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: The Importance of the Researcher''s Prior Beliefs’
22. Isaac Ehrlich and Zhiqiang Liu (1999), ‘Sensitivity Analyses of the Deterrence Hypothesis: Let’s Keep the Econ in Econometrics’
23. Hashem Dezhbakhsh, Paul H. Rubin and Joanna M. Shepherd (2003), ‘Does Capital Punishment Have a Deterrent Effect? New Evidence from Postmoratorium Panel Data’
24. H. Naci Mocan and R. Kaj Gittings (2003), ‘Getting Off Death Row: Commuted Sentences and the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment’
Name Index
