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The Economic Theory of Incentives
This comprehensive two-volume research collection recaps major literary contributions to the economic theory of incentives. The carefully selected papers spanning forty years analyse and review collective decision problems in the context of asymmetric information, moral hazard and incomplete contracting. Together with an original introduction by the editor, this collection would be a valuable addition to the bookshelves of any serious scholar and student in the field.
More Information
Contributors
Contents
More Information
This comprehensive two-volume research collection recaps major literary contributions to the economic theory of incentives. The carefully selected papers spanning forty years analyse and review collective decision problems in the context of asymmetric information, moral hazard and incomplete contracting. Together with an original introduction by the editor, this collection would be a valuable addition to the bookshelves of any serious scholar and student in the field.
Contributors
73 articles, dating from 1973 to 2012
Contributors include: P. Dasgupta, O.D. Hart, B. Holmström, P. Klemperer, J-J. Laffont, E. Maskin, J.E. Stiglitz, J. Tirole, H.R. Varian
Contributors include: P. Dasgupta, O.D. Hart, B. Holmström, P. Klemperer, J-J. Laffont, E. Maskin, J.E. Stiglitz, J. Tirole, H.R. Varian
Contents
Contents:
Introduction David Martimort
PART I COLLECTIVE DECISION PROBLEMS UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
A. Public Goods and the Free Riding Problem
1. Claude d’Aspremont and Louis-André Gérard-Varet (1979), ‘Incentives and Incomplete Information’, Journal of Public Economics, 11 (1), February, 25–45
2. Jerry Green and Jean-Jacques Laffont (1977), ’Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods’, Econometrica, 45 (2), March, 427–38
3. Theodore Groves (1973), ‘Incentives in Teams’, Econometrica, 41 (4), July, 617–31
4. Jean-Jacques Laffont and Eric Maskin (1979), ‘A Differential Approach to Expected Utility Maximizing Mechanisms’, in Jean-Jacques Laffont (ed.), Aggregation and Revelation of Preferences: Studies in Public Economics Volume 2, Part IV, Chapter 16, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, New York, NY, USA and Oxford, UK: North-Holland Publishing Company, 289–308
5. Jean-Jacques Laffont and Eric Maskin (1980), ‘A Differential Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms’, Econometrica, 48 (6), September, 1507–20
6. George J. Mailath and Andrew Postlewaite (1990), ‘Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents’, Review of Economic Studies, 57 (3), July, 351–67
B. Incentive Compatibility and the Revelation Principle
7. Allan Gibbard (1973), ‘Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result’, Econometrica, 41 (4), July, 587–601
8. Partha Dasgupta, Peter Hammond and Eric Maskin (1979), ‘The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility’, Review of Economic Studies, 46 (2), April, 185–216
9. Roger B. Myerson (1979), ‘Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem’, Econometrica, 47 (1), January, 61–73
10. Roger B. Myerson (1982), ‘Optimal Coordination Mechanisms in Generalized Principal-Agent Problems’, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 10 (1), June, 67–81
C. Full Implementation
11. Joel S. Demski and David Sappington (1984), ‘Optimal Incentive Contracts with Multiple Agents’, Journal of Economic Theory, 33 (1), June 152–71
12. Eric Maskin (1999), ‘Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality’, Review of Economic Studies, Special Issue: Contracts, 66 (1), January, 23–38
13. Eric Maskin and John Moore (1999), ‘Implementation and Renegotiation’, Review of Economic Studies, Special Issue: Contracts, 66 (1), January, 39–56
14. John Moore and Rafael Repullo (1988), ‘Subgame Perfect Implementation’, Econometrica, 56 (5), September, 1191–1220
15. John Moore and Rafael Repullo (1990), ‘Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization’, Econometrica, 58 (5), September, 1083–99
16. Thomas R. Palfrey and Sanjay Srivastava (1989), ‘Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies’, Econometrica, 57 (1), January, 115–34
17. Dilip Mookherjee and Stefan Reichelstein (1990), ‘Implementation via Augmented Revelation Mechanisms’, Review of Economic Studies, 57 (3), July, 453–75
D. Interim Efficiency
18. Bengt Holmström and Roger B. Myerson (1983), ‘Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information’, Econometrica, 51 (6), November, 1799–1819
19. John O. Ledyard and Thomas R. Palfrey (1999), ‘A Characterization of Interim Efficiency with Public Goods’, Econometrica, 67 (2), March, 435–48
E. Auctions
20. Jacques Crémer and Richard P. McLean (1988), ‘Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions’, Econometrica, 56 (6), November, 1247–57
21. Philippe Jehiel and Benny Moldovanu (2001), ‘Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations’, Econometrica, 69 (5), September, 1237–59
22. Eric Maskin and John Riley (1989), ‘Optimal Multi-unit Auctions’, in Frank Hahn (ed.), The Economics of Missing Markets, Information, and Games, Chapter 14, Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 312–35
23. Roger B. Myerson (1981), ‘Optimal Auction Design’, Mathematics of Operations Research, 6 (1), February, 58–73
24. John G. Riley and William F. Samuelson (1981), ‘Optimal Auctions’, American Economic Review, 71 (3), June, 381–92
F. Robust Mechanism Design
25. Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris (2005), ‘Robust Mechanism Design’, Econometrica, 73 (6), November, 1771–1813
26. Philippe Jehiel, Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn, Benny Moldovanu and William R. Zame (2006), ‘The Limits of Ex Post Implementation’, Econometrica, 74 (3), May, 585–610
27. Dilip Mookherjee and Stefan Reichelstein (1992), ‘Dominant Strategy Implementation of Bayesian Incentive Compatible Allocation Rules’, Journal of Economic Theory, 56 (2), April, 378–99
28. Zvika Neeman (2004), ‘The Relevance of Private Information in Mechanism Design’, Journal of Economic Theory, 117 (1), July, 55–77
29. Robert Wilson (1987), ‘Game-Theoretic Analyses of Trading Processes’, in Truman F. Bewley (ed.), Advances in Economic Theory: Fifth World Congress, Chapter 2, Cambridge, UK, New York, NY, USA and Melbourne, Australia: Cambridge University Press, 33–70
G. The Coase Theorem under Asymmetric Information: Scope and Value
30. Roger B. Myerson and Mark A. Satterthwaite (1983), ‘Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading’, Journal of Economic Theory, 29 (2), April, 265–81
31. Peter Cramton, Robert Gibbons and Paul Klemperer (1987), ‘Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently’, Econometrica, 55 (3), May, 615–32, 1493 (Erratum)
32. Steven R. Williams (1999), ‘A Characterization of Efficient, Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanisms’, Economic Theory, 14 (1), July, 155–8
PART II COLLECTIVE DECISION PROBLEMS UNDER MORAL HAZARD
A. Moral Hazard in Teams
33. Bengt Holmström (1982), ‘Moral Hazard in Teams’, Bell Journal of Economics, 13 (2), Autumn, 324–40
34. Patrick Legros and Steven A. Matthews (1993), ‘Efficient and Nearly-Efficient Partnerships’, Review of Economic Studies, 60 (3), July, 599–611
35. Eric Rasmusen (1987), ‘Moral Hazard in Risk-Averse Teams’, RAND Journal of Economics, 18 (3), Autumn, 428–35
36. David Rahman (2012), ‘But Who Will Monitor the Monitor?’, American Economic Review, 102 (6), October, 2767–97
B. The Firm as a Hierarchy: Relative or Joint Performance Evaluations?
37. Yeon-Koo Che and Seung-Weon Yoo (2001), ‘Optimal Incentives for Teams’, American Economic Review, 91 (3), June, 525–41
38. Edward P. Lazear and Sherwin Rosen (1981), ‘Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts’, Journal of Political Economy, 89 (5), October, 841–64
39. Hideshi Itoh (1991), ‘Incentives to Help in Multi-Agent Situations’, Econometrica, 59 (3), May, 611–36
40. Dilip Mookherjee (1984), ‘Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents’, Review of Economic Studies, LI (3), July, 433–46
41. Barry J. Nalebuff and Joseph E. Stiglitz (1983), ‘Prizes and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of Compensation and Competition’, Bell Journal of Economics, 14 (1), Spring, 21–43
42. Ching-To Ma (1988), ‘Unique Implementation of Incentive Contracts with Many Agents’, Review of Economic Studies, LV (4), October, 555–71
Volume II
Contents:
Introduction An introduction by the editor appears in Volume I
PART I COLLECTIVE DECISION PROBLEMS: INCOMPLETE CONTRACTING AND THE NON-VERIFIABILITY PARADIGM
A. Property Rights, Authority and Capital Structure
1. Philippe Aghion and Patrick Bolton (1992), ‘An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting’, Review of Economic Studies, 59 (3), July, 473–94
2. Philippe Aghion and Jean Tirole (1997), ‘Formal and Real Authority in Organizations’, Journal of Political Economy, 105 (1), February, 1–29
3. Aaron S. Edlin and Stefan Reichelstein (1996), ‘Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment’, American Economic Review, 86 (3), June, 478–501
4. Mathias Dewatripont and Jean Tirole (1994), ‘A Theory of Debt and Equity: Diversity of Securities and Manager-Shareholder Congruence’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109 (4), November, 1027–54
5. Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart (1986), ‘The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration’, Journal of Political Economy, 94 (4), August, 691–719
6. Oliver Hart and John Moore (1990), ‘Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm’, Journal of Political Economy, 98 (6), December, 1119–58 [40]
7. Jean Tirole (1986), ‘Procurement and Renegotiation’, Journal of Political Economy, 94 (2), April, 235–59
B. The Foundations of Incomplete Contracts
8. Ilya Segal (1999), ‘Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts’, Review of Economic Studies, Special Issue: Contracts, 66 (1), January, 57–82
9. Eric Maskin and Jean Tirole (1999), ‘Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts’, Review of Economic Studies, Special Issue: Contracts, 66 (1), January, 83–114
C. Relational Contracts and Subjective Evaluations
10. Jonathan Levin (2003), ‘Relational Incentive Contracts’, American Economic Review, 93 (3), June, 835–57
11. W. Bentley MacLeod and James M. Malcomson (1989), ‘Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment’, Econometrica, 57 (2), March, 447–80
12. W. Bentley MacLeod (2003), ‘Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation’, American Economic Review, 93 (1), March, 216–40
PART II COLLECTIVE DECISION PROBLEMS: THE MULTI-CONTRACTING ORGANIZATION
A. Collusion: When Agents Share Information and Coordinate Actions
13. Hideshi Itoh (1993), ‘Coalitions, Incentives, and Risk Sharing’, Journal of Economic Theory, 60 (2), August, 410–27
14. Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort (1999), ‘Separation of Regulators against Collusive Behavior’, RAND Journal of Economics, 30 (2), Summer, 232–62
15. Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole (1991), ‘The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106 (4), November, 1089–1127
16. Jean Tirole (1986), ‘Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations’, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2 (2), Fall, 181–214
17. Hal R. Varian (1990), ‘Monitoring Agents With Other Agents’, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 146 (1), March, 153–74
B. Collusion with Asymmetric and Soft Information
18. Yeon-Koo Che and Jinwoo Kim (2006), ‘Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation’, Econometrica, 74 (4), July, 1063–1107
19. Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort (1997), ‘Collusion under Asymmetric Information’, Econometrica, 65 (4), July, 875–911
C. Hierarchies and Decentralization
20. Sandeep Baliga and Tomas Sjöström (1998), ‘Decentralization and Collusion’, Journal of Economic Theory, 83 (2), December, 196–232
21. David P. Baron and David Besanko (1992), ‘Information, Control, and Organizational Structure’, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 1 (2), Summer, 237–75
22. Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort (1998), ‘Collusion and Delegation’, RAND Journal of Economics, 29 (2), Summer, 280–305
23. Nahum D. Melumad, Dilip Mookherjee and Stefan Reichelstein (1995), ‘Hierarchical Decentralization of Incentive Contracts’, RAND Journal of Economics: Symposium on the Economics of Organization, 26 (4), Winter, 654–72
24. Dilip Mookherjee and Masatoshi Tsumagari (2004), ‘The Organization of Supplier Networks: Effects of Delegation and Intermediation’, Econometrica, 72 (4), July, 1179–1219
D. Multilateral Contracting and Common Agency
25. B. Douglas Bernheim and Michael D. Whinston (1986), ‘Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, CI (1), February, 1–31
26. B. Douglas Bernheim and Michael D. Whinston (1986), ‘Common Agency’, Econometrica, 54 (4), July, 923–42
27. David Martimort and Lars Stole (2002), ‘The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games’, Econometrica, 70 (4), July, 1659–73
28. David Martimort and Lars Stole (2009), ‘Market Participation in Delegated and Intrinsic Common-Agency Games’, RAND Journal of Economics, 40 (1), Spring, 78–102
29. Ilya Segal (1999), ‘Contracting with Externalities’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, CXIV (2), May, 337–88
E. Endogenous Common Agency
30. B. Douglas Bernheim and Michael D. Whinston (1998), ‘Exclusive Dealing’, Journal of Political Economy, 106 (1), February, 64–103
31. David Martimort (1996), ‘Exclusive Dealing, Common Agency, and Multiprincipals Incentive Theory’, RAND Journal of Economics, 27 (1), Spring, 1–31
Index
Introduction David Martimort
PART I COLLECTIVE DECISION PROBLEMS UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
A. Public Goods and the Free Riding Problem
1. Claude d’Aspremont and Louis-André Gérard-Varet (1979), ‘Incentives and Incomplete Information’, Journal of Public Economics, 11 (1), February, 25–45
2. Jerry Green and Jean-Jacques Laffont (1977), ’Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods’, Econometrica, 45 (2), March, 427–38
3. Theodore Groves (1973), ‘Incentives in Teams’, Econometrica, 41 (4), July, 617–31
4. Jean-Jacques Laffont and Eric Maskin (1979), ‘A Differential Approach to Expected Utility Maximizing Mechanisms’, in Jean-Jacques Laffont (ed.), Aggregation and Revelation of Preferences: Studies in Public Economics Volume 2, Part IV, Chapter 16, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, New York, NY, USA and Oxford, UK: North-Holland Publishing Company, 289–308
5. Jean-Jacques Laffont and Eric Maskin (1980), ‘A Differential Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms’, Econometrica, 48 (6), September, 1507–20
6. George J. Mailath and Andrew Postlewaite (1990), ‘Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents’, Review of Economic Studies, 57 (3), July, 351–67
B. Incentive Compatibility and the Revelation Principle
7. Allan Gibbard (1973), ‘Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result’, Econometrica, 41 (4), July, 587–601
8. Partha Dasgupta, Peter Hammond and Eric Maskin (1979), ‘The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility’, Review of Economic Studies, 46 (2), April, 185–216
9. Roger B. Myerson (1979), ‘Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem’, Econometrica, 47 (1), January, 61–73
10. Roger B. Myerson (1982), ‘Optimal Coordination Mechanisms in Generalized Principal-Agent Problems’, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 10 (1), June, 67–81
C. Full Implementation
11. Joel S. Demski and David Sappington (1984), ‘Optimal Incentive Contracts with Multiple Agents’, Journal of Economic Theory, 33 (1), June 152–71
12. Eric Maskin (1999), ‘Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality’, Review of Economic Studies, Special Issue: Contracts, 66 (1), January, 23–38
13. Eric Maskin and John Moore (1999), ‘Implementation and Renegotiation’, Review of Economic Studies, Special Issue: Contracts, 66 (1), January, 39–56
14. John Moore and Rafael Repullo (1988), ‘Subgame Perfect Implementation’, Econometrica, 56 (5), September, 1191–1220
15. John Moore and Rafael Repullo (1990), ‘Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization’, Econometrica, 58 (5), September, 1083–99
16. Thomas R. Palfrey and Sanjay Srivastava (1989), ‘Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies’, Econometrica, 57 (1), January, 115–34
17. Dilip Mookherjee and Stefan Reichelstein (1990), ‘Implementation via Augmented Revelation Mechanisms’, Review of Economic Studies, 57 (3), July, 453–75
D. Interim Efficiency
18. Bengt Holmström and Roger B. Myerson (1983), ‘Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information’, Econometrica, 51 (6), November, 1799–1819
19. John O. Ledyard and Thomas R. Palfrey (1999), ‘A Characterization of Interim Efficiency with Public Goods’, Econometrica, 67 (2), March, 435–48
E. Auctions
20. Jacques Crémer and Richard P. McLean (1988), ‘Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions’, Econometrica, 56 (6), November, 1247–57
21. Philippe Jehiel and Benny Moldovanu (2001), ‘Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations’, Econometrica, 69 (5), September, 1237–59
22. Eric Maskin and John Riley (1989), ‘Optimal Multi-unit Auctions’, in Frank Hahn (ed.), The Economics of Missing Markets, Information, and Games, Chapter 14, Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 312–35
23. Roger B. Myerson (1981), ‘Optimal Auction Design’, Mathematics of Operations Research, 6 (1), February, 58–73
24. John G. Riley and William F. Samuelson (1981), ‘Optimal Auctions’, American Economic Review, 71 (3), June, 381–92
F. Robust Mechanism Design
25. Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris (2005), ‘Robust Mechanism Design’, Econometrica, 73 (6), November, 1771–1813
26. Philippe Jehiel, Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn, Benny Moldovanu and William R. Zame (2006), ‘The Limits of Ex Post Implementation’, Econometrica, 74 (3), May, 585–610
27. Dilip Mookherjee and Stefan Reichelstein (1992), ‘Dominant Strategy Implementation of Bayesian Incentive Compatible Allocation Rules’, Journal of Economic Theory, 56 (2), April, 378–99
28. Zvika Neeman (2004), ‘The Relevance of Private Information in Mechanism Design’, Journal of Economic Theory, 117 (1), July, 55–77
29. Robert Wilson (1987), ‘Game-Theoretic Analyses of Trading Processes’, in Truman F. Bewley (ed.), Advances in Economic Theory: Fifth World Congress, Chapter 2, Cambridge, UK, New York, NY, USA and Melbourne, Australia: Cambridge University Press, 33–70
G. The Coase Theorem under Asymmetric Information: Scope and Value
30. Roger B. Myerson and Mark A. Satterthwaite (1983), ‘Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading’, Journal of Economic Theory, 29 (2), April, 265–81
31. Peter Cramton, Robert Gibbons and Paul Klemperer (1987), ‘Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently’, Econometrica, 55 (3), May, 615–32, 1493 (Erratum)
32. Steven R. Williams (1999), ‘A Characterization of Efficient, Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanisms’, Economic Theory, 14 (1), July, 155–8
PART II COLLECTIVE DECISION PROBLEMS UNDER MORAL HAZARD
A. Moral Hazard in Teams
33. Bengt Holmström (1982), ‘Moral Hazard in Teams’, Bell Journal of Economics, 13 (2), Autumn, 324–40
34. Patrick Legros and Steven A. Matthews (1993), ‘Efficient and Nearly-Efficient Partnerships’, Review of Economic Studies, 60 (3), July, 599–611
35. Eric Rasmusen (1987), ‘Moral Hazard in Risk-Averse Teams’, RAND Journal of Economics, 18 (3), Autumn, 428–35
36. David Rahman (2012), ‘But Who Will Monitor the Monitor?’, American Economic Review, 102 (6), October, 2767–97
B. The Firm as a Hierarchy: Relative or Joint Performance Evaluations?
37. Yeon-Koo Che and Seung-Weon Yoo (2001), ‘Optimal Incentives for Teams’, American Economic Review, 91 (3), June, 525–41
38. Edward P. Lazear and Sherwin Rosen (1981), ‘Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts’, Journal of Political Economy, 89 (5), October, 841–64
39. Hideshi Itoh (1991), ‘Incentives to Help in Multi-Agent Situations’, Econometrica, 59 (3), May, 611–36
40. Dilip Mookherjee (1984), ‘Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents’, Review of Economic Studies, LI (3), July, 433–46
41. Barry J. Nalebuff and Joseph E. Stiglitz (1983), ‘Prizes and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of Compensation and Competition’, Bell Journal of Economics, 14 (1), Spring, 21–43
42. Ching-To Ma (1988), ‘Unique Implementation of Incentive Contracts with Many Agents’, Review of Economic Studies, LV (4), October, 555–71
Volume II
Contents:
Introduction An introduction by the editor appears in Volume I
PART I COLLECTIVE DECISION PROBLEMS: INCOMPLETE CONTRACTING AND THE NON-VERIFIABILITY PARADIGM
A. Property Rights, Authority and Capital Structure
1. Philippe Aghion and Patrick Bolton (1992), ‘An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting’, Review of Economic Studies, 59 (3), July, 473–94
2. Philippe Aghion and Jean Tirole (1997), ‘Formal and Real Authority in Organizations’, Journal of Political Economy, 105 (1), February, 1–29
3. Aaron S. Edlin and Stefan Reichelstein (1996), ‘Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment’, American Economic Review, 86 (3), June, 478–501
4. Mathias Dewatripont and Jean Tirole (1994), ‘A Theory of Debt and Equity: Diversity of Securities and Manager-Shareholder Congruence’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109 (4), November, 1027–54
5. Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart (1986), ‘The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration’, Journal of Political Economy, 94 (4), August, 691–719
6. Oliver Hart and John Moore (1990), ‘Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm’, Journal of Political Economy, 98 (6), December, 1119–58 [40]
7. Jean Tirole (1986), ‘Procurement and Renegotiation’, Journal of Political Economy, 94 (2), April, 235–59
B. The Foundations of Incomplete Contracts
8. Ilya Segal (1999), ‘Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts’, Review of Economic Studies, Special Issue: Contracts, 66 (1), January, 57–82
9. Eric Maskin and Jean Tirole (1999), ‘Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts’, Review of Economic Studies, Special Issue: Contracts, 66 (1), January, 83–114
C. Relational Contracts and Subjective Evaluations
10. Jonathan Levin (2003), ‘Relational Incentive Contracts’, American Economic Review, 93 (3), June, 835–57
11. W. Bentley MacLeod and James M. Malcomson (1989), ‘Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment’, Econometrica, 57 (2), March, 447–80
12. W. Bentley MacLeod (2003), ‘Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation’, American Economic Review, 93 (1), March, 216–40
PART II COLLECTIVE DECISION PROBLEMS: THE MULTI-CONTRACTING ORGANIZATION
A. Collusion: When Agents Share Information and Coordinate Actions
13. Hideshi Itoh (1993), ‘Coalitions, Incentives, and Risk Sharing’, Journal of Economic Theory, 60 (2), August, 410–27
14. Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort (1999), ‘Separation of Regulators against Collusive Behavior’, RAND Journal of Economics, 30 (2), Summer, 232–62
15. Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole (1991), ‘The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106 (4), November, 1089–1127
16. Jean Tirole (1986), ‘Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations’, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2 (2), Fall, 181–214
17. Hal R. Varian (1990), ‘Monitoring Agents With Other Agents’, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 146 (1), March, 153–74
B. Collusion with Asymmetric and Soft Information
18. Yeon-Koo Che and Jinwoo Kim (2006), ‘Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation’, Econometrica, 74 (4), July, 1063–1107
19. Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort (1997), ‘Collusion under Asymmetric Information’, Econometrica, 65 (4), July, 875–911
C. Hierarchies and Decentralization
20. Sandeep Baliga and Tomas Sjöström (1998), ‘Decentralization and Collusion’, Journal of Economic Theory, 83 (2), December, 196–232
21. David P. Baron and David Besanko (1992), ‘Information, Control, and Organizational Structure’, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 1 (2), Summer, 237–75
22. Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort (1998), ‘Collusion and Delegation’, RAND Journal of Economics, 29 (2), Summer, 280–305
23. Nahum D. Melumad, Dilip Mookherjee and Stefan Reichelstein (1995), ‘Hierarchical Decentralization of Incentive Contracts’, RAND Journal of Economics: Symposium on the Economics of Organization, 26 (4), Winter, 654–72
24. Dilip Mookherjee and Masatoshi Tsumagari (2004), ‘The Organization of Supplier Networks: Effects of Delegation and Intermediation’, Econometrica, 72 (4), July, 1179–1219
D. Multilateral Contracting and Common Agency
25. B. Douglas Bernheim and Michael D. Whinston (1986), ‘Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, CI (1), February, 1–31
26. B. Douglas Bernheim and Michael D. Whinston (1986), ‘Common Agency’, Econometrica, 54 (4), July, 923–42
27. David Martimort and Lars Stole (2002), ‘The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games’, Econometrica, 70 (4), July, 1659–73
28. David Martimort and Lars Stole (2009), ‘Market Participation in Delegated and Intrinsic Common-Agency Games’, RAND Journal of Economics, 40 (1), Spring, 78–102
29. Ilya Segal (1999), ‘Contracting with Externalities’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, CXIV (2), May, 337–88
E. Endogenous Common Agency
30. B. Douglas Bernheim and Michael D. Whinston (1998), ‘Exclusive Dealing’, Journal of Political Economy, 106 (1), February, 64–103
31. David Martimort (1996), ‘Exclusive Dealing, Common Agency, and Multiprincipals Incentive Theory’, RAND Journal of Economics, 27 (1), Spring, 1–31
Index
