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PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY
This title is of this important reference collection focuses on the economics of politics. It centres attention on key debates within the literature, counter-poising the approaches of the major schools with their differing theoretical methods and empirical emphasis. The importance of institutions is noted both in the selection of articles and in the introductory essay which offers a Virginian perspective on the subject.
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Critical Acclaim
Contributors
Contents
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The first volume of this important reference collection focuses on the economics of politics. It centres attention on key debates within the literature, counter-poising the approaches of the major schools with their differing theoretical methods and empirical emphasis. The importance of institutions is noted both in the selection of articles and in the introductory essay which offers a Virginian perspective on the subject.
The second and third volumes focus on constitutional political economy – a research programme closely associated with the work of Gordon Tullock and James M. Buchanan, Nobel Laureate in 1986. It has become established as a major field of scholarship, fueled in part by the re-emergence of democracy in Eastern Europe and in Latin America, following decades of autocratic government. The book focuses attention on a range of approaches to the subject that have emerged from differing backgrounds of political philosophy. The selection of papers and the introductory essay both emphasize the importance of institutional relevance and recognize the constraints placed upon constitutional theorizing by the ever present forces of the political market place.
The second and third volumes focus on constitutional political economy – a research programme closely associated with the work of Gordon Tullock and James M. Buchanan, Nobel Laureate in 1986. It has become established as a major field of scholarship, fueled in part by the re-emergence of democracy in Eastern Europe and in Latin America, following decades of autocratic government. The book focuses attention on a range of approaches to the subject that have emerged from differing backgrounds of political philosophy. The selection of papers and the introductory essay both emphasize the importance of institutional relevance and recognize the constraints placed upon constitutional theorizing by the ever present forces of the political market place.
Critical Acclaim
‘The most important essays of renowned scholars of public choice are present and bear witness to the editors’ subtle taste. . . . these volumes represent an excellent choice.’
– C. Seidl, Journal of Economics
– C. Seidl, Journal of Economics
Contributors
74 articles, dating from 1929 to 1991
Contributors include: G.S. Becker, J.M. Buchanan, H. Hotelling, A.O. Krueger, M. Olson, H. Rosenthal, G.J. Stigler, R.D. Tollison, G. Tullock, B.R. Weingast
Contributors include: G.S. Becker, J.M. Buchanan, H. Hotelling, A.O. Krueger, M. Olson, H. Rosenthal, G.J. Stigler, R.D. Tollison, G. Tullock, B.R. Weingast
Contents
PROVISIONAL CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
VOLUME I: HOMO ECONOMICUS IN THE POLITICAL MARKET-PLACE
PART I: EARLY BEGINNINGS
H. Hotelling (1929), ‘Stability in Competition’
A. Smithies (1941), ‘Optimum Location in Spatial Competition’
D. Black (1948), ‘On the Rationale of Group Decision-making’
G. Tullock (1959), ‘Problems of Majority Voting’
J. M. Buchanan (1959), ‘Positive Economics, Welfare Economics and Political Economy’
A. Downs (1957), ‘A Comment on Economic Theories of Government Behavior’
PART II: THE VOTE MOTIVE
C. R. Plott (1967), ‘A Notion of Equilibrium and its Possibility Under Majority Rule’
M. J. Hinich and P. C. Ordeshook (1969), ‘Abstentions and Equilibrium in the Electoral Process’
M. J. Hinich and P. C. Ordeshook (1970), ‘Plurality Maximixation vs. Vote Maximization: A Spatial Analysis with Variable Participation’
T. Romer and H. Rosenthal (1978), ‘Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas and the Status Quo’
T. Romer and H. Rosenthal (1979), The Elusive Median Voter’
C. K. Rowley (1984), ‘The Relevance of the Median Voter Theorem’
R. G. Holcombe (1980), ‘An Empirical Test of the Median Voter Model’
W. H. Riker and P. C. Ordeshook (1968), ‘A Theory of the Calculus of Voting’
G. J. Stigler (1971), ‘Economic Competition and Political Competition’
Y. Barzel and E. Silberberg (1973), ‘Is the Act of Voting Rational?’
S. Peltzman (1990), ‘How Efficient is the Voting Market?’
PART III: INTEREST GROUPS
M. Olson (1982), ‘The Logic’
M. Olson (1984), ‘Interview: Why Nations Rise and Fall’
M. Olson (1984), ‘Collective Action’
G. J. Stigler (1974), ‘Free Riders and Collective Action: An Appendix to Theories of Economic Regulation’
D. Austin-Smith (1981), ‘Voluntary Pressure Groups’
G. S. Becker (1983), ‘A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence’
W. C. Mitchell and M. C. Munger (1991), ‘Economic Models of Interest Groups: An Introductory Survey’
VOLUME II: THE CHARACTERISTICS OF POLITICAL EQUILIBRIUM
PART I: THE RENT-SEEKING INSIGHT
G. Tullock (1967), ‘The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies and Theft’
A. O. Kruger (1974), ‘The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society’
R. A. Posner (1975), ‘The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation’
G. Tullock (1975), ‘The Transitional Gains Trap’
R. D. Tollison (1982), ‘Rent-seeking: A Survey’
F. S. McChesney (1987), ‘Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation’
PART II: THE LEGISLATURE
G. J. Stigler (1971), ‘The Theory of Economic Regulation’
S. Peltzman (1976), ‘Toward a More General Theory of Regulation’
G. Becker (1976), ‘Comment’
S. Peltzman (1985), ‘An Economic Interpretation of the History of Congressional Voting in the Twentieth Century’
S. Peltzman (1984), ‘Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting’
J. B. Kau and P. H. Rubin (1979), ‘Self-interest, Ideology and Logrolling in congressional Voting’
J. P. Kalt and M. A. Zupan (1984), ‘Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics’
D. Nelson and E. Silberberg (1987), ‘Ideology and Legislator Shirking’
G. J. Stigler (1976), ‘The Sizes of Legislatures’
R. D. Tollison (1988), ‘Public Choice and Legislation’
M. A. Crew and C. K. Rowley (1988), ‘Toward a Public Choice Theory of Monopoly Regulation’
PART III: THE DETERMINANTS OF LEGISLATIVE EQUILIBRIUM
G. Tullock (1981), ‘Why so Much Stability’
K. A. Shepsle and B. R. Weingast (1981), ‘Structure-induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice’
T. M. Moe (1987), ‘An Assessment of the Positive Theory of “Congressional Dominance”’
K. A. Shepsle;e and B. R. Weingast (1987), ‘The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power’
B. R. Weingast and W. J. Marshall (1988), ‘The Industrial Organization of Congress; or Why Legislature Like Firms, are Not Organized as Markets’
VOLUME III: THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY
PART I: THE EXECUTIVE
W. M. Crain and R. D. Tollison (1979), ‘The Executive Branch in the Interest-group Theory of Government’
B. R. Weingast (1981), ‘Regulation, Reregulations, and Deregulation: The Political Foundations of Agency Clientele Relationships’
J. R. Carter and D. Schap (1987), ‘Executive Veto Legislative Override, and Structure-induced Equilibrium’
T. M. Moe (1990), ‘Political Institutions: The Neglected Side if the Story’
PART II: THE JUDICIARY
W. E. Landes and R. A. Posner (1975), ‘The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-group Perspective’
J. M. Buchanan (1975), ‘Comment’
M. S. Kimenyi, W. F. Shugart and R. D. Tollison (1985), ‘What do Judges Maximize?’
C. K. Rowley (1989), ‘The common Law in Public Choice Perspective: A Theoretical and Institutional Critique’
R. Gely and P. T. Spiller (1990), ‘A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court Statutory Decisions with Applications to the State Farm and Grove City Cases’
PART III: THE BUREAUCRACY
W. A. Niskanen (1975), ‘Bureaucrats and Politicians’
J. Margolis (1975), ‘Comment’
A. Breton and R. Wintrobe (1975), ‘The Equilibrium Size of a Budget-maximizing Bureau: A Note on Niskanen’s Theory of Bureaucracy’
B. R. Weingast and M. J. Moran (1983), ‘Bureacratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission’
J. Tirole (1986), ‘Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations’
J. Ferejohn and C. Shipan (1990), ‘Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy’
PART IV: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY
J. M. Buchanan and G. Tullock (1962), ‘The Calculus of Consent: A Generalized Economic Theory’
J. M. Buchanan (1987), ‘The Constitution of Economic Policy’
J. M. Buchanan (1990). ‘The Domain of Constitutional Economics’
R. E. Wagner (1988), ‘The Calculus of Consent: A Wicksellian Retrospective’
W. C. Mitchell (1989), ‘The Calculus of Consent: Enduring Contributions to Public Choice and Political Science’
C. K. Rowley (1990), ‘The Reason of Rules: Constitutional Contract versus Political Market Conflict’
D. C. Mueller (1991), ‘Constitutional Rights’
PART V: PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE
D. C. Mueller (1976), ‘Public Choice: A Survey’
J. M. Buchanan (1983), ‘The Public Choice Perspective’
D. Wittman (1989), ‘Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results’
C. K. Rowley and M. A. Vachris (1993), ‘Snake Oil Economics versus Public Choice’
C. K. Rowley (1991), ‘A Changing of the Guard’
INTRODUCTION
VOLUME I: HOMO ECONOMICUS IN THE POLITICAL MARKET-PLACE
PART I: EARLY BEGINNINGS
H. Hotelling (1929), ‘Stability in Competition’
A. Smithies (1941), ‘Optimum Location in Spatial Competition’
D. Black (1948), ‘On the Rationale of Group Decision-making’
G. Tullock (1959), ‘Problems of Majority Voting’
J. M. Buchanan (1959), ‘Positive Economics, Welfare Economics and Political Economy’
A. Downs (1957), ‘A Comment on Economic Theories of Government Behavior’
PART II: THE VOTE MOTIVE
C. R. Plott (1967), ‘A Notion of Equilibrium and its Possibility Under Majority Rule’
M. J. Hinich and P. C. Ordeshook (1969), ‘Abstentions and Equilibrium in the Electoral Process’
M. J. Hinich and P. C. Ordeshook (1970), ‘Plurality Maximixation vs. Vote Maximization: A Spatial Analysis with Variable Participation’
T. Romer and H. Rosenthal (1978), ‘Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas and the Status Quo’
T. Romer and H. Rosenthal (1979), The Elusive Median Voter’
C. K. Rowley (1984), ‘The Relevance of the Median Voter Theorem’
R. G. Holcombe (1980), ‘An Empirical Test of the Median Voter Model’
W. H. Riker and P. C. Ordeshook (1968), ‘A Theory of the Calculus of Voting’
G. J. Stigler (1971), ‘Economic Competition and Political Competition’
Y. Barzel and E. Silberberg (1973), ‘Is the Act of Voting Rational?’
S. Peltzman (1990), ‘How Efficient is the Voting Market?’
PART III: INTEREST GROUPS
M. Olson (1982), ‘The Logic’
M. Olson (1984), ‘Interview: Why Nations Rise and Fall’
M. Olson (1984), ‘Collective Action’
G. J. Stigler (1974), ‘Free Riders and Collective Action: An Appendix to Theories of Economic Regulation’
D. Austin-Smith (1981), ‘Voluntary Pressure Groups’
G. S. Becker (1983), ‘A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence’
W. C. Mitchell and M. C. Munger (1991), ‘Economic Models of Interest Groups: An Introductory Survey’
VOLUME II: THE CHARACTERISTICS OF POLITICAL EQUILIBRIUM
PART I: THE RENT-SEEKING INSIGHT
G. Tullock (1967), ‘The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies and Theft’
A. O. Kruger (1974), ‘The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society’
R. A. Posner (1975), ‘The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation’
G. Tullock (1975), ‘The Transitional Gains Trap’
R. D. Tollison (1982), ‘Rent-seeking: A Survey’
F. S. McChesney (1987), ‘Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation’
PART II: THE LEGISLATURE
G. J. Stigler (1971), ‘The Theory of Economic Regulation’
S. Peltzman (1976), ‘Toward a More General Theory of Regulation’
G. Becker (1976), ‘Comment’
S. Peltzman (1985), ‘An Economic Interpretation of the History of Congressional Voting in the Twentieth Century’
S. Peltzman (1984), ‘Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting’
J. B. Kau and P. H. Rubin (1979), ‘Self-interest, Ideology and Logrolling in congressional Voting’
J. P. Kalt and M. A. Zupan (1984), ‘Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics’
D. Nelson and E. Silberberg (1987), ‘Ideology and Legislator Shirking’
G. J. Stigler (1976), ‘The Sizes of Legislatures’
R. D. Tollison (1988), ‘Public Choice and Legislation’
M. A. Crew and C. K. Rowley (1988), ‘Toward a Public Choice Theory of Monopoly Regulation’
PART III: THE DETERMINANTS OF LEGISLATIVE EQUILIBRIUM
G. Tullock (1981), ‘Why so Much Stability’
K. A. Shepsle and B. R. Weingast (1981), ‘Structure-induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice’
T. M. Moe (1987), ‘An Assessment of the Positive Theory of “Congressional Dominance”’
K. A. Shepsle;e and B. R. Weingast (1987), ‘The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power’
B. R. Weingast and W. J. Marshall (1988), ‘The Industrial Organization of Congress; or Why Legislature Like Firms, are Not Organized as Markets’
VOLUME III: THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY
PART I: THE EXECUTIVE
W. M. Crain and R. D. Tollison (1979), ‘The Executive Branch in the Interest-group Theory of Government’
B. R. Weingast (1981), ‘Regulation, Reregulations, and Deregulation: The Political Foundations of Agency Clientele Relationships’
J. R. Carter and D. Schap (1987), ‘Executive Veto Legislative Override, and Structure-induced Equilibrium’
T. M. Moe (1990), ‘Political Institutions: The Neglected Side if the Story’
PART II: THE JUDICIARY
W. E. Landes and R. A. Posner (1975), ‘The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-group Perspective’
J. M. Buchanan (1975), ‘Comment’
M. S. Kimenyi, W. F. Shugart and R. D. Tollison (1985), ‘What do Judges Maximize?’
C. K. Rowley (1989), ‘The common Law in Public Choice Perspective: A Theoretical and Institutional Critique’
R. Gely and P. T. Spiller (1990), ‘A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court Statutory Decisions with Applications to the State Farm and Grove City Cases’
PART III: THE BUREAUCRACY
W. A. Niskanen (1975), ‘Bureaucrats and Politicians’
J. Margolis (1975), ‘Comment’
A. Breton and R. Wintrobe (1975), ‘The Equilibrium Size of a Budget-maximizing Bureau: A Note on Niskanen’s Theory of Bureaucracy’
B. R. Weingast and M. J. Moran (1983), ‘Bureacratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission’
J. Tirole (1986), ‘Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations’
J. Ferejohn and C. Shipan (1990), ‘Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy’
PART IV: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY
J. M. Buchanan and G. Tullock (1962), ‘The Calculus of Consent: A Generalized Economic Theory’
J. M. Buchanan (1987), ‘The Constitution of Economic Policy’
J. M. Buchanan (1990). ‘The Domain of Constitutional Economics’
R. E. Wagner (1988), ‘The Calculus of Consent: A Wicksellian Retrospective’
W. C. Mitchell (1989), ‘The Calculus of Consent: Enduring Contributions to Public Choice and Political Science’
C. K. Rowley (1990), ‘The Reason of Rules: Constitutional Contract versus Political Market Conflict’
D. C. Mueller (1991), ‘Constitutional Rights’
PART V: PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE
D. C. Mueller (1976), ‘Public Choice: A Survey’
J. M. Buchanan (1983), ‘The Public Choice Perspective’
D. Wittman (1989), ‘Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results’
C. K. Rowley and M. A. Vachris (1993), ‘Snake Oil Economics versus Public Choice’
C. K. Rowley (1991), ‘A Changing of the Guard’