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Negotiation, Decision Making and Conflict Management
While negotiation has long been recognised as an activity that affects world peace it has also become a central aspect of professional life. The last two decades have witnessed the emergence of negotiation and conflict resolution as an important area of research and as an area of intense importance in professional areas such as law, government and business.
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Critical Acclaim
Contributors
Contents
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While negotiation has long been recognised as an activity that affects world peace it has also become a central aspect of professional life. The last two decades have witnessed the emergence of negotiation and conflict resolution as an important area of research and as an area of intense importance in professional areas such as law, government and business.
This authoritative and comprehensive collection presents outstanding research on negotiation and conflict resolution that views negotiation as a multi-party decision making process. Negotiation and conflict resolution are conceptualised as a decision making activity, where the individual perceptions of each party and the interactive dynamics of multiple parties are critical elements.
This collection provides an invaluable selection of the most important writing of perhaps the most dominant view of negotiation and conflict resolution, and creates an intellectual history in the process.
This authoritative and comprehensive collection presents outstanding research on negotiation and conflict resolution that views negotiation as a multi-party decision making process. Negotiation and conflict resolution are conceptualised as a decision making activity, where the individual perceptions of each party and the interactive dynamics of multiple parties are critical elements.
This collection provides an invaluable selection of the most important writing of perhaps the most dominant view of negotiation and conflict resolution, and creates an intellectual history in the process.
Critical Acclaim
‘Most aspects of life involve negotiation and most aspects of negotiation are covered by this excellent three-volume work. In bringing together the most important papers in the field, the editor has provided an essential tool for teachers and researchers.’
– Sir George Bain, Queen’s University Belfast, UK
‘This volume provides an excellent collection of path-breaking work in negotiations, decision making, and conflict management research. It is an essential reference for the shelf of any researcher in these fields.’
– Guhan Subramanian, Harvard Law School, US
‘Max Bazerman has assembled an excellent collection of significant publications in this field. These volumes will be an important reference source for any scholar in this field.’
– Roy Lewicki, Fisher College of Business, The Ohio State University, US
– Sir George Bain, Queen’s University Belfast, UK
‘This volume provides an excellent collection of path-breaking work in negotiations, decision making, and conflict management research. It is an essential reference for the shelf of any researcher in these fields.’
– Guhan Subramanian, Harvard Law School, US
‘Max Bazerman has assembled an excellent collection of significant publications in this field. These volumes will be an important reference source for any scholar in this field.’
– Roy Lewicki, Fisher College of Business, The Ohio State University, US
Contributors
87 articles, dating from 1950 to 2002
Contributors include: D. Kahneman, G. Loewenstein, D. Messick, M. Neale, L. Ross, A. Roth, R. Thaler, L. Thompson, A. Tversky
Contributors include: D. Kahneman, G. Loewenstein, D. Messick, M. Neale, L. Ross, A. Roth, R. Thaler, L. Thompson, A. Tversky
Contents
Contents:
Volume I
Acknowledgements
Introduction: A Decision Perspective to Negotiation and Conflict Resolution Max H. Bazerman
PART I REVIEWS
1. Leigh Thompson (1990), ‘Negotiation Behavior and Outcomes: Empirical Evidence and Theoretical Issues’
2. James K. Sebenius (1992), ‘Negotiation Analysis: A Characterization and Review’
3. Lee Ross and Andrew Ward (1995), ‘Psychological Barriers to Dispute Resolution’
4. Robert H. Mnookin and Lee Ross (1995), ‘Introduction’
5. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (1995), ‘Conflict Resolution: A Cognitive Perspective’
6. Colin F. Camerer (1997), ‘Progress in Behavioral Game Theory’
7. Max H. Bazerman, Jared R. Curhan and Don A. Moore (2000), ‘The Death and Rebirth of the Social Psychology of Negotiation’
PART II CLASSICS
8. John F. Nash, Jr. (1950), ‘The Bargaining Problem’
9. James G. March and Herbert A. Simon (1958), ‘Cognitive Limits on Rationality’
10. George A. Akerlof (1970), ‘The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism’
11. Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman (1974), ‘Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases’
12. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (1979), ‘Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk’
13. Howard Raiffa (1982), ‘Some Organizing Questions’ and excerpt from ‘Research Perspectives’
14. Amartya K. Sen (1990), ‘Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory’
PART III INDIVIDUAL BIASES
15. Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman (1986), ‘Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions’
16. William Samuelson and Richard Zeckhauser (1988), ‘Status Quo Bias in Decision Making’
17. Shelley E. Taylor and Jonathon D. Brown (1988), ‘Illusion and Well-Being: A Social Psychological Perspective on Mental Health’
18. George Loewenstein and Richard H. Thaler (1989), ‘Anomalies: Intertemporal Choice’
19. Amos Tversky, Paul Slovic and Daniel Kahneman (1990), ‘The Causes of Preference Reversal’
20. Timothy D. Wilson and Jonathan W. Schooler (1991), ‘Thinking Too Much: Introspection Can Reduce the Quality of Preferences and Decisions’
21. Max H. Bazerman, Don A. Moore, Ann E. Tenbrunsel, Kimberly A. Wade-Benzoni and Sally Blount (1999), ''Explaining How Preferences Change Across Joint Versus Separate Evaluation’
22. Boaz Keysar (1994), ‘The Illusory Transparency of Intention: Linguistic Perspective Taking in Text’
23. Daniel T. Gilbert, Elizabeth C. Pinel, Timothy D. Wilson, Stephen J. Blumberg and Thalia P. Wheatley (1998), ‘Immune Neglect: A Source of Durability Bias in Affective Forecasting’
24. Lorraine Chen Idson, Nira Liberman and E. Tory Higgins (2000), ‘Distinguishing Gains from Nonlosses and Losses from Nongains: A Regulatory Focus Perspective on Hedonic Intensity’
PART IV INTRAPERSONAL CONFLICT
25. Richard H. Thaler and H.M. Shefrin (1981), ‘An Economic Theory of Self-Control’
Thomas C. Schelling (1984), ‘The Intimate Contest for Self-Command’
27. George Loewenstein (1996), ‘Out of Control: Visceral Influences on Behavior’
28. Max H. Bazerman, Ann E. Tenbrunsel and Kimberly Wade-Benzoni (1998), ‘Negotiating with Yourself and Losing: Making Decisions with Competing Internal Preferences’
Name Index
Volume II
Acknowledgements
An introduction by the editor to all three volumes appears in Volume I
PART I COGNITIVE BIASES IN NEGOTIATION AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION
1. Max H. Bazerman, Thomas Magliozzi and Margaret A. Neale (1985), ‘Integrative Bargaining in a Competitive Market’
2. Margaret A. Neale and Max H. Bazerman (1985), ‘The Effects of Framing and Negotiator Overconfidence on Bargaining Behaviors and Outcomes’
3. William F. Samuelson and Max H. Bazerman (1985), ‘The Winner’s Curse in Bilateral Negotiations’
4. Henry S. Farber and Max H. Bazerman (1987), ‘Why is there Disagreement in Bargaining?’
5. Gregory B. Northcraft and Margaret A. Neale (1987), ‘Expert, Amateurs, and Real Estate: An Anchoring-and-Adjustment Perspective on Property Pricing Decisions’
6. Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch and Richard H. Thaler (1990), ‘Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem’
7. Carsten K.W. de Dreu, Peter J.D. Carnevale, Ben J.M. Emans and Evert van de Vliert (1994), ‘Effects of Gain-Loss Frames in Negotiation: Loss Aversion, Mismatching, and Frame Adoption’
8. Ilana Ritov (1996), ‘Anchoring in Simulated Competitive Market Negotiation’
PART II MOTIVATED BIASES IN NEGOTIATION AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION [159 pp]
9. George Loewenstein, Leigh Thompson and Max H. Bazerman (1989), ‘Social Utility and Decision Making in Interpersonal Contexts’
10. Roderick M. Kramer (1994), ‘The Sinister Attribution Error: Paranoid Cognition and Collective Distrust in Organizations’
11. Leigh Thompson (1995), ‘“They Saw a Negotiation”: Partisanship and Involvement’
12. David M. Messick (1995), ‘Equality, Fairness, and Social Conflict’
13. Linda Babcock and George Loewenstein (1997), ‘Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases’
14. Kristina A. Diekmann, Steven M. Samuels, Lee Ross and Max H. Bazerman (1997), ‘Self-Interest and Fairness in Problems of Resource Allocation: Allocators Versus Recipients’
15. Robert J. Robinson, Dacher Keltner, Andrew Ward and Lee Ross (1995), ‘Actual Versus Assumed Differences in Construal: “Naïve Realism” in Intergroup Perception and Conflict’
16. Lee Ross (1995), ‘Reactive Devaluation in Negotiation and Conflict Resolution’
17. Keith G. Allred, John S. Mallozzi, Fusako Matsui and Christopher P. Raia (1997), ‘The Influence of Anger and Compassion on Negotiation Performance’
18. Michael W. Morris, Richard P. Larrick and Steven K. Su (1999), ‘Misperceiving Negotiation Counterparts: When Situationally Determined Bargaining Behaviors Are Attributed to Personality Traits’
PART III FAIRNESS AND JUSTICE
19. David M. Messick and Keith P. Sentis (1979), ‘Fairness and Preference’
20. Werner Güth, Rolf Schmittberger and Bernd Schwarze (1982), ‘An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining’
21. David M. Messick, Suzanne Bloom, Janet P. Boldizar and Charles D. Samuelson (1985), ‘Why We Are Fairer Than Others’
22. Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch and Richard Thaler (1986), ‘Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market’
23. Robert J. Bies (1987), ‘The Predicament of Injustice: The Management of Moral Outrage’
24. Tom R. Tyler (1988), ‘What is Procedural Justice? Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the Fairness of Legal Procedures’
25. Mark Spranca, Elisa Minsk and Jonathan Baron (1991), ‘Omission and Commission in Judgment and Choice’
26. Colin F. Camerer and George Loewenstein (1993), ‘Information, Fairness, and Efficiency in Bargaining’
27. Jonathan Baron and Mark Spranca (1994), ‘Protected Values’
28. Sally Blount (1995), ‘When Social Outcomes Aren’t Fair: The Effect of Causal Attributions on Preferences’
29. Joel Brockner and Batia M. Wiesenfeld (1996), ‘An Integrative Framework for Explaining Reactions to Decisions: Interactive Effects of Outcomes and Procedures’
30. Alan Page Fiske and Philip E. Tetlock (1997), ‘Taboo Trade-offs: Reactions to Transactions That Transgress the Spheres of Justice’
31. Ann E. Tenbrunsel and David M. Messick (1999), ‘Sanctioning Systems, Decision Frames, and Cooperation’
Name Index
Volume III
Acknowledgements
An introduction by the editor to all three volumes appears in Volume I
PART I PRISONER AND SOCIAL DILEMMAS
1. Robyn M. Dawes, Jeanne McTavish and Harriet Shaklee (1977), ‘Behavior, Communication, and Assumptions About Other People’s Behavior in A Commons Dilemma Situation’
2. Robyn M. Dawes (1980), ‘Social Dilemmas’
3. Robert Axelrod (1984), ‘The Success of TIT FOR TAT in Computer Tournaments’
4. Jonathan Bendor, Roderick M. Kramer and Suzanne Stout (1991), ‘When in Doubt . . . Cooperation in a Noisy Prisoner''s Dilemma’
5. David M. Messick and Marilynn B. Brewer (1983), ‘Solving Social Dilemmas: A Review’
6. J. Keith Murnighan, Jae Wook Kim and A. Richard Metzger (1993), ‘The Volunteer Dilemma’
7. Elizabeth A. Mannix (1991), ‘Resource Dilemmas and Discount Rates in Decision Making Groups’
8. Richard P. Larrick and Sally Blount (1997), ‘The Claiming Effect: Why Players Are More Generous in Social Dilemmas Than in Ultimatum Games’
9. Robyn M. Dawes and David M. Messick (2000), ‘Social Dilemmas’
PART II THIRD PARTY INTERVENTION
10. Henry S. Farber (1981), ‘Splitting-the-difference in Interest Arbitration’
11. Max H. Bazerman (1985), ‘Norms of Distributive Justice in Interest Arbitration’
12. Max H. Bazerman and Henry S. Farber (1985), ‘Analyzing the Decision-Making Processes of Third Parties’
13. Margaret A. Neale (1984), ‘The Effects of Negotiation and Arbitration Cost Salience on Bargainer Behavior: The Role of the Arbitrator and Constituency on Negotiator Judgment’
14. William L. Ury, Jeanne M. Brett and Stephen B. Goldberg (1988), ‘Three Approaches to Resolving Disputes: Interests, Rights, and Power’
PART III MULTI-PARTY COMPETITIVE CONTEXTS
15. J. Keith Murnighan (1978), ‘Models of Coalition Behavior: Game Theoretic, Social Psychological, and Political Perspectives’
16. Max H. Bazerman and William F. Samuelson (1983), ‘I Won the Auction But Don''t Want the Prize’
17. John H. Kagel and Dan Levin (1986), ‘The Winner’s Curse and Public Information in Common Value Auctions’
18. Roderick M. Kramer (1991), ‘The More the Merrier? Social Psychological Aspects of Multiparty Negotiations in Organizations’
19. Alvin E. Roth and Xiaolin Xing (1994), ‘Jumping the Gun: Imperfections and Institutions Related to the Timing of Market Transactions’
20. Harris Sondak and Max H. Bazerman (1991), ‘Power Balance and the Rationality of Outcomes in Matching Markets’
21. Ann E. Tenbrunsel, Kimberly A. Wade-Benzoni, Joseph Moag and Max H. Bazerman (1999), ‘The Negotiation Matching Process: Relationships and Partner Selection’
22. Alvin E. Roth (2002), ‘The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics’
PART IV LEARNING AND DEBIASING
23. Robyn M. Dawes (1979), ‘The Robust Beauty of Improper Linear Models in Decision Making’
24. Margaret A. Neale and Gregory B. Northcraft (1990), ‘Experience, Expertise, and Decision Bias in Negotiation: The Role of Strategic Conceptualization’
25. Sheryl B. Ball, Max H. Bazerman and John S. Carroll (1991), ‘An Evaluation of Learning in the Bilateral Winner’s Curse’
26. Daniel Kahneman and Dan Lovallo (1993), ‘Timid Choices and Bold Forecasts: A Cognitive Perspective on Risk Taking’
27. Colin F. Camerer (2000), ‘Prospect Theory in the Wild: Evidence from the Field’
28. Philip E. Tetlock (2000), ‘Cognitive Biases and Organizational Correctives: Do Both Disease and Cure Depend on the Politics of the Beholder?’
29. Leigh Thompson, Dedre Gentner and Jeffrey Loewenstein (2000), ‘Avoiding Missed Opportunities in Managerial Life: Analogical Training More Powerful Than Individual Case Training’
30. Kathleen Valley, Leigh Thompson, Robert Gibbons and Max H. Bazerman (2002), ‘How Communication Improves Efficiency in Bargaining Games’
Name Index
Volume I
Acknowledgements
Introduction: A Decision Perspective to Negotiation and Conflict Resolution Max H. Bazerman
PART I REVIEWS
1. Leigh Thompson (1990), ‘Negotiation Behavior and Outcomes: Empirical Evidence and Theoretical Issues’
2. James K. Sebenius (1992), ‘Negotiation Analysis: A Characterization and Review’
3. Lee Ross and Andrew Ward (1995), ‘Psychological Barriers to Dispute Resolution’
4. Robert H. Mnookin and Lee Ross (1995), ‘Introduction’
5. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (1995), ‘Conflict Resolution: A Cognitive Perspective’
6. Colin F. Camerer (1997), ‘Progress in Behavioral Game Theory’
7. Max H. Bazerman, Jared R. Curhan and Don A. Moore (2000), ‘The Death and Rebirth of the Social Psychology of Negotiation’
PART II CLASSICS
8. John F. Nash, Jr. (1950), ‘The Bargaining Problem’
9. James G. March and Herbert A. Simon (1958), ‘Cognitive Limits on Rationality’
10. George A. Akerlof (1970), ‘The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism’
11. Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman (1974), ‘Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases’
12. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (1979), ‘Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk’
13. Howard Raiffa (1982), ‘Some Organizing Questions’ and excerpt from ‘Research Perspectives’
14. Amartya K. Sen (1990), ‘Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory’
PART III INDIVIDUAL BIASES
15. Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman (1986), ‘Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions’
16. William Samuelson and Richard Zeckhauser (1988), ‘Status Quo Bias in Decision Making’
17. Shelley E. Taylor and Jonathon D. Brown (1988), ‘Illusion and Well-Being: A Social Psychological Perspective on Mental Health’
18. George Loewenstein and Richard H. Thaler (1989), ‘Anomalies: Intertemporal Choice’
19. Amos Tversky, Paul Slovic and Daniel Kahneman (1990), ‘The Causes of Preference Reversal’
20. Timothy D. Wilson and Jonathan W. Schooler (1991), ‘Thinking Too Much: Introspection Can Reduce the Quality of Preferences and Decisions’
21. Max H. Bazerman, Don A. Moore, Ann E. Tenbrunsel, Kimberly A. Wade-Benzoni and Sally Blount (1999), ''Explaining How Preferences Change Across Joint Versus Separate Evaluation’
22. Boaz Keysar (1994), ‘The Illusory Transparency of Intention: Linguistic Perspective Taking in Text’
23. Daniel T. Gilbert, Elizabeth C. Pinel, Timothy D. Wilson, Stephen J. Blumberg and Thalia P. Wheatley (1998), ‘Immune Neglect: A Source of Durability Bias in Affective Forecasting’
24. Lorraine Chen Idson, Nira Liberman and E. Tory Higgins (2000), ‘Distinguishing Gains from Nonlosses and Losses from Nongains: A Regulatory Focus Perspective on Hedonic Intensity’
PART IV INTRAPERSONAL CONFLICT
25. Richard H. Thaler and H.M. Shefrin (1981), ‘An Economic Theory of Self-Control’
Thomas C. Schelling (1984), ‘The Intimate Contest for Self-Command’
27. George Loewenstein (1996), ‘Out of Control: Visceral Influences on Behavior’
28. Max H. Bazerman, Ann E. Tenbrunsel and Kimberly Wade-Benzoni (1998), ‘Negotiating with Yourself and Losing: Making Decisions with Competing Internal Preferences’
Name Index
Volume II
Acknowledgements
An introduction by the editor to all three volumes appears in Volume I
PART I COGNITIVE BIASES IN NEGOTIATION AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION
1. Max H. Bazerman, Thomas Magliozzi and Margaret A. Neale (1985), ‘Integrative Bargaining in a Competitive Market’
2. Margaret A. Neale and Max H. Bazerman (1985), ‘The Effects of Framing and Negotiator Overconfidence on Bargaining Behaviors and Outcomes’
3. William F. Samuelson and Max H. Bazerman (1985), ‘The Winner’s Curse in Bilateral Negotiations’
4. Henry S. Farber and Max H. Bazerman (1987), ‘Why is there Disagreement in Bargaining?’
5. Gregory B. Northcraft and Margaret A. Neale (1987), ‘Expert, Amateurs, and Real Estate: An Anchoring-and-Adjustment Perspective on Property Pricing Decisions’
6. Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch and Richard H. Thaler (1990), ‘Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem’
7. Carsten K.W. de Dreu, Peter J.D. Carnevale, Ben J.M. Emans and Evert van de Vliert (1994), ‘Effects of Gain-Loss Frames in Negotiation: Loss Aversion, Mismatching, and Frame Adoption’
8. Ilana Ritov (1996), ‘Anchoring in Simulated Competitive Market Negotiation’
PART II MOTIVATED BIASES IN NEGOTIATION AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION [159 pp]
9. George Loewenstein, Leigh Thompson and Max H. Bazerman (1989), ‘Social Utility and Decision Making in Interpersonal Contexts’
10. Roderick M. Kramer (1994), ‘The Sinister Attribution Error: Paranoid Cognition and Collective Distrust in Organizations’
11. Leigh Thompson (1995), ‘“They Saw a Negotiation”: Partisanship and Involvement’
12. David M. Messick (1995), ‘Equality, Fairness, and Social Conflict’
13. Linda Babcock and George Loewenstein (1997), ‘Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases’
14. Kristina A. Diekmann, Steven M. Samuels, Lee Ross and Max H. Bazerman (1997), ‘Self-Interest and Fairness in Problems of Resource Allocation: Allocators Versus Recipients’
15. Robert J. Robinson, Dacher Keltner, Andrew Ward and Lee Ross (1995), ‘Actual Versus Assumed Differences in Construal: “Naïve Realism” in Intergroup Perception and Conflict’
16. Lee Ross (1995), ‘Reactive Devaluation in Negotiation and Conflict Resolution’
17. Keith G. Allred, John S. Mallozzi, Fusako Matsui and Christopher P. Raia (1997), ‘The Influence of Anger and Compassion on Negotiation Performance’
18. Michael W. Morris, Richard P. Larrick and Steven K. Su (1999), ‘Misperceiving Negotiation Counterparts: When Situationally Determined Bargaining Behaviors Are Attributed to Personality Traits’
PART III FAIRNESS AND JUSTICE
19. David M. Messick and Keith P. Sentis (1979), ‘Fairness and Preference’
20. Werner Güth, Rolf Schmittberger and Bernd Schwarze (1982), ‘An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining’
21. David M. Messick, Suzanne Bloom, Janet P. Boldizar and Charles D. Samuelson (1985), ‘Why We Are Fairer Than Others’
22. Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch and Richard Thaler (1986), ‘Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market’
23. Robert J. Bies (1987), ‘The Predicament of Injustice: The Management of Moral Outrage’
24. Tom R. Tyler (1988), ‘What is Procedural Justice? Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the Fairness of Legal Procedures’
25. Mark Spranca, Elisa Minsk and Jonathan Baron (1991), ‘Omission and Commission in Judgment and Choice’
26. Colin F. Camerer and George Loewenstein (1993), ‘Information, Fairness, and Efficiency in Bargaining’
27. Jonathan Baron and Mark Spranca (1994), ‘Protected Values’
28. Sally Blount (1995), ‘When Social Outcomes Aren’t Fair: The Effect of Causal Attributions on Preferences’
29. Joel Brockner and Batia M. Wiesenfeld (1996), ‘An Integrative Framework for Explaining Reactions to Decisions: Interactive Effects of Outcomes and Procedures’
30. Alan Page Fiske and Philip E. Tetlock (1997), ‘Taboo Trade-offs: Reactions to Transactions That Transgress the Spheres of Justice’
31. Ann E. Tenbrunsel and David M. Messick (1999), ‘Sanctioning Systems, Decision Frames, and Cooperation’
Name Index
Volume III
Acknowledgements
An introduction by the editor to all three volumes appears in Volume I
PART I PRISONER AND SOCIAL DILEMMAS
1. Robyn M. Dawes, Jeanne McTavish and Harriet Shaklee (1977), ‘Behavior, Communication, and Assumptions About Other People’s Behavior in A Commons Dilemma Situation’
2. Robyn M. Dawes (1980), ‘Social Dilemmas’
3. Robert Axelrod (1984), ‘The Success of TIT FOR TAT in Computer Tournaments’
4. Jonathan Bendor, Roderick M. Kramer and Suzanne Stout (1991), ‘When in Doubt . . . Cooperation in a Noisy Prisoner''s Dilemma’
5. David M. Messick and Marilynn B. Brewer (1983), ‘Solving Social Dilemmas: A Review’
6. J. Keith Murnighan, Jae Wook Kim and A. Richard Metzger (1993), ‘The Volunteer Dilemma’
7. Elizabeth A. Mannix (1991), ‘Resource Dilemmas and Discount Rates in Decision Making Groups’
8. Richard P. Larrick and Sally Blount (1997), ‘The Claiming Effect: Why Players Are More Generous in Social Dilemmas Than in Ultimatum Games’
9. Robyn M. Dawes and David M. Messick (2000), ‘Social Dilemmas’
PART II THIRD PARTY INTERVENTION
10. Henry S. Farber (1981), ‘Splitting-the-difference in Interest Arbitration’
11. Max H. Bazerman (1985), ‘Norms of Distributive Justice in Interest Arbitration’
12. Max H. Bazerman and Henry S. Farber (1985), ‘Analyzing the Decision-Making Processes of Third Parties’
13. Margaret A. Neale (1984), ‘The Effects of Negotiation and Arbitration Cost Salience on Bargainer Behavior: The Role of the Arbitrator and Constituency on Negotiator Judgment’
14. William L. Ury, Jeanne M. Brett and Stephen B. Goldberg (1988), ‘Three Approaches to Resolving Disputes: Interests, Rights, and Power’
PART III MULTI-PARTY COMPETITIVE CONTEXTS
15. J. Keith Murnighan (1978), ‘Models of Coalition Behavior: Game Theoretic, Social Psychological, and Political Perspectives’
16. Max H. Bazerman and William F. Samuelson (1983), ‘I Won the Auction But Don''t Want the Prize’
17. John H. Kagel and Dan Levin (1986), ‘The Winner’s Curse and Public Information in Common Value Auctions’
18. Roderick M. Kramer (1991), ‘The More the Merrier? Social Psychological Aspects of Multiparty Negotiations in Organizations’
19. Alvin E. Roth and Xiaolin Xing (1994), ‘Jumping the Gun: Imperfections and Institutions Related to the Timing of Market Transactions’
20. Harris Sondak and Max H. Bazerman (1991), ‘Power Balance and the Rationality of Outcomes in Matching Markets’
21. Ann E. Tenbrunsel, Kimberly A. Wade-Benzoni, Joseph Moag and Max H. Bazerman (1999), ‘The Negotiation Matching Process: Relationships and Partner Selection’
22. Alvin E. Roth (2002), ‘The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics’
PART IV LEARNING AND DEBIASING
23. Robyn M. Dawes (1979), ‘The Robust Beauty of Improper Linear Models in Decision Making’
24. Margaret A. Neale and Gregory B. Northcraft (1990), ‘Experience, Expertise, and Decision Bias in Negotiation: The Role of Strategic Conceptualization’
25. Sheryl B. Ball, Max H. Bazerman and John S. Carroll (1991), ‘An Evaluation of Learning in the Bilateral Winner’s Curse’
26. Daniel Kahneman and Dan Lovallo (1993), ‘Timid Choices and Bold Forecasts: A Cognitive Perspective on Risk Taking’
27. Colin F. Camerer (2000), ‘Prospect Theory in the Wild: Evidence from the Field’
28. Philip E. Tetlock (2000), ‘Cognitive Biases and Organizational Correctives: Do Both Disease and Cure Depend on the Politics of the Beholder?’
29. Leigh Thompson, Dedre Gentner and Jeffrey Loewenstein (2000), ‘Avoiding Missed Opportunities in Managerial Life: Analogical Training More Powerful Than Individual Case Training’
30. Kathleen Valley, Leigh Thompson, Robert Gibbons and Max H. Bazerman (2002), ‘How Communication Improves Efficiency in Bargaining Games’
Name Index