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Institutions and Governance in Developing Countries
This comprehensive two-volume collection brings together seminal contributions by leading scholars on institutions and governance in developing countries.
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Critical Acclaim
Contributors
Contents
More Information
This comprehensive two-volume collection brings together seminal contributions by leading scholars on institutions and governance in developing countries. Volume one analyses key theoretical perspectives on institutions and the empirical evidence of the role of institutions in economic development. Volume two further explores the literature, with important contributions in governance, the historical evidence on why institutions matter, formal and informal institutions and the key policy issues that originate from the literature.
Along with a new and original introduction, this essential collection is an indispensable tool for scholars and practitioners alike.
Along with a new and original introduction, this essential collection is an indispensable tool for scholars and practitioners alike.
Critical Acclaim
‘In the last two decades, institutions became forcefully rooted in the mainstream of economic research. Professor Sen’s excellent and timely collection brings together major contributions to this literature (and process). It conveniently allows us to revisit these ideas. This is a must-have volume to any economist interested in institutions and development.’
– Nauro F. Campos, Brunel University, UK
– Nauro F. Campos, Brunel University, UK
Contributors
49 articles, dating from 1986 to 2011
Contributors include: D. Acemoglu, H.J.Chang, P. Evans, A. Grief, M. Grindle, D. North, E. Ostrom, J. Robinson, D. Rodrik, O. Williamson
Contributors include: D. Acemoglu, H.J.Chang, P. Evans, A. Grief, M. Grindle, D. North, E. Ostrom, J. Robinson, D. Rodrik, O. Williamson
Contents
Contents:
Volume I
Acknowledgements
Introduction Kunal Sen
PART I THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON INSTITUTIONS
A. Early Perspectives
1. Douglass C. North (1990), ‘Institutions’
2. Oliver E. Williamson (2000), ‘The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead’
3. Elinor Ostrom (1986), ‘An Agenda for the Study of Institutions’
B. Recent Perspectives
4. Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (2008), ‘Persistence of Power, Elites, and Institutions’
5. Masahiko Aoki (2007), ‘Endogenizing Institutions and Institutional Change’
6. Adam Przeworski (2004), ‘Institutions Matter’
7. Simeon Djankov, Edward Glaeser, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer (2003), ‘The New Comparative Economics’
C. Critiques and Alternatives
8. Ha-Joon Chang (2002), ‘Breaking the Mould: An Institutionalist Political Economy Alternative to the Neo-Liberal Theory of the Market and the State’
9. Geoffrey M. Hodgson (2006), ‘What are Institutions?’
10. Pranab Bardhan (2005), ‘Institutions Matter, But Which Ones?’
PART II Empirical Evidence on the Role of Institutions in Economic Development
11. Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson (2002), ‘Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution’
12. Edward L. Glaser, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer (2004), ‘Do Institutions Cause Growth?’
13. Robert Hall and Charles I. Jones (1999), ‘Why do Some Countries Produce so Much Output Per Worker than Others’
14. Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer (1995), ‘Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures’
15. Dani Rodrik, Arvind Subramanian and Francesco Trebbi (2004), ‘Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic Development’
16. Janine Aron (2000), ‘Growth and Institutions: A Review of the Evidence’
17. Alberto Chong and César Calderón (2000), ‘Institutional Quality and Poverty Measures in a Cross-Section of Countries’
18. Jean-Phillippe Platteau (2009), ‘Institutional Obstacles to African Economic Development: State, Ethnicity, and Custom’
PART III HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES
19. Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James Robinson (2005), ‘The Rise of Europe: Atlantic Trade, Institutional Change, and Economic Growth’
20. Abhijit Banerjee and Lakshmi Iyer (2005), ‘History, Institutions and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India’
21. Edward L. Glaeser and Andrei Shleifer (2002), ‘Legal Origins’
22. Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirgiiç-Kunt and Ross Levine (2003), ‘Law and Finance: Why Does Legal Origin Matter?’
23. Kenneth L. Sokoloff and Stanley L. Engerman (2000), ‘History Lessons: Institutions, Factor Endownments, and Paths of Development in the New World’
Volume II
Acknowledgements
Introduction by editor to appear in volume I
PART I GOVERNANCE
1. Peter Evans (2004), ‘Development as Institutional Change: The Pitfalls of Monocropping and the Potentials of Deliberation’
2. Merilee S. Grindle (2004), ‘Good Enough Governance: Poverty Reduction and Reform in Developing Countries’
3. Daniel Kaufman, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi (2004), ‘Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996, 1998, 2000 and 2002’
4. David Booth (2011), ‘Aid, Institutions and Governance: What Have we Learnt?’
5. Mushtaq H. Khan (2005), ‘Markets, States and Democracy: Patron-client Networks and the Case for Democracy in Developing Countries’
6. Avinash Dixit (2009), ‘Governance Institutions and Economic Activity’
PART II FORMAL INSTITUTIONS
7. Timothy Besley (1995), ‘Property Rights and Investment Incentives: Theory and Evidence from Ghana’
8. Timothy Besley and Robin Burgess (2004), ‘Can Labor Regulation Hinder Economic Performance? Evidence From India’
9. Kunal Sen and Dirk Willem Te Vedle (2009), ‘State Business Relations and Economic Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa’
10. Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez de Silanes and Andrei Shleifer (2002), ‘The Regulation of Entry’
11. Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez de Silanes and Andrei Shleifer (2003), ‘Courts’
PART III INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS
12. Avner Grief (1993), ‘Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders’ Coalition’
13. Simon Johnson, John McMillan and Christopher Woodruff (2002), ‘Courts and Relational Contracts’
14. Liesbet Steer and Kunal Sen (2010), ‘Formal and Informal Institutions in a Transition Economy: The Case of Vietnam’
15. Marcel Fafchamps and Bart Minten (2001), ‘Property Rights in a Flea Market Economy’
PART IV POLICY ISSUES
16. William Easterly (2008), ‘Institutions: Top Down or Bottom Up?’
17. Dani Rodrik (2008), ‘Second-Best Institutions’
18. Raghuram Rajan and Arvind Subramanian (2007), ‘Does Aid Affect Governance?’
19. Nancy Birdsall (2007), ‘Do No Harm: Aid, Weak Institutions and the Missing Middle in Africa’
20. Ha-Joon Chang (2011), ‘Institutions and Economic Development: Theory, Policy and History’
Volume I
Acknowledgements
Introduction Kunal Sen
PART I THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON INSTITUTIONS
A. Early Perspectives
1. Douglass C. North (1990), ‘Institutions’
2. Oliver E. Williamson (2000), ‘The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead’
3. Elinor Ostrom (1986), ‘An Agenda for the Study of Institutions’
B. Recent Perspectives
4. Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (2008), ‘Persistence of Power, Elites, and Institutions’
5. Masahiko Aoki (2007), ‘Endogenizing Institutions and Institutional Change’
6. Adam Przeworski (2004), ‘Institutions Matter’
7. Simeon Djankov, Edward Glaeser, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer (2003), ‘The New Comparative Economics’
C. Critiques and Alternatives
8. Ha-Joon Chang (2002), ‘Breaking the Mould: An Institutionalist Political Economy Alternative to the Neo-Liberal Theory of the Market and the State’
9. Geoffrey M. Hodgson (2006), ‘What are Institutions?’
10. Pranab Bardhan (2005), ‘Institutions Matter, But Which Ones?’
PART II Empirical Evidence on the Role of Institutions in Economic Development
11. Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson (2002), ‘Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution’
12. Edward L. Glaser, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer (2004), ‘Do Institutions Cause Growth?’
13. Robert Hall and Charles I. Jones (1999), ‘Why do Some Countries Produce so Much Output Per Worker than Others’
14. Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer (1995), ‘Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures’
15. Dani Rodrik, Arvind Subramanian and Francesco Trebbi (2004), ‘Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic Development’
16. Janine Aron (2000), ‘Growth and Institutions: A Review of the Evidence’
17. Alberto Chong and César Calderón (2000), ‘Institutional Quality and Poverty Measures in a Cross-Section of Countries’
18. Jean-Phillippe Platteau (2009), ‘Institutional Obstacles to African Economic Development: State, Ethnicity, and Custom’
PART III HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES
19. Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James Robinson (2005), ‘The Rise of Europe: Atlantic Trade, Institutional Change, and Economic Growth’
20. Abhijit Banerjee and Lakshmi Iyer (2005), ‘History, Institutions and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India’
21. Edward L. Glaeser and Andrei Shleifer (2002), ‘Legal Origins’
22. Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirgiiç-Kunt and Ross Levine (2003), ‘Law and Finance: Why Does Legal Origin Matter?’
23. Kenneth L. Sokoloff and Stanley L. Engerman (2000), ‘History Lessons: Institutions, Factor Endownments, and Paths of Development in the New World’
Volume II
Acknowledgements
Introduction by editor to appear in volume I
PART I GOVERNANCE
1. Peter Evans (2004), ‘Development as Institutional Change: The Pitfalls of Monocropping and the Potentials of Deliberation’
2. Merilee S. Grindle (2004), ‘Good Enough Governance: Poverty Reduction and Reform in Developing Countries’
3. Daniel Kaufman, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi (2004), ‘Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996, 1998, 2000 and 2002’
4. David Booth (2011), ‘Aid, Institutions and Governance: What Have we Learnt?’
5. Mushtaq H. Khan (2005), ‘Markets, States and Democracy: Patron-client Networks and the Case for Democracy in Developing Countries’
6. Avinash Dixit (2009), ‘Governance Institutions and Economic Activity’
PART II FORMAL INSTITUTIONS
7. Timothy Besley (1995), ‘Property Rights and Investment Incentives: Theory and Evidence from Ghana’
8. Timothy Besley and Robin Burgess (2004), ‘Can Labor Regulation Hinder Economic Performance? Evidence From India’
9. Kunal Sen and Dirk Willem Te Vedle (2009), ‘State Business Relations and Economic Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa’
10. Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez de Silanes and Andrei Shleifer (2002), ‘The Regulation of Entry’
11. Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez de Silanes and Andrei Shleifer (2003), ‘Courts’
PART III INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS
12. Avner Grief (1993), ‘Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders’ Coalition’
13. Simon Johnson, John McMillan and Christopher Woodruff (2002), ‘Courts and Relational Contracts’
14. Liesbet Steer and Kunal Sen (2010), ‘Formal and Informal Institutions in a Transition Economy: The Case of Vietnam’
15. Marcel Fafchamps and Bart Minten (2001), ‘Property Rights in a Flea Market Economy’
PART IV POLICY ISSUES
16. William Easterly (2008), ‘Institutions: Top Down or Bottom Up?’
17. Dani Rodrik (2008), ‘Second-Best Institutions’
18. Raghuram Rajan and Arvind Subramanian (2007), ‘Does Aid Affect Governance?’
19. Nancy Birdsall (2007), ‘Do No Harm: Aid, Weak Institutions and the Missing Middle in Africa’
20. Ha-Joon Chang (2011), ‘Institutions and Economic Development: Theory, Policy and History’
