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Institutions and Economic Performance
The field of institutional economics has witnessed a surge in interest over recent years and has attracted the attention of a growing number of social scientists. This topical and highly informative collection brings together critical writings on the relationship between institutions and economic performance. The included works encompass seminal cross-country studies of ‘whether institutions matter’, as well as leading examples of within-country studies on the role of specific institutions. This indispensable volume includes an original introduction by the editor which explores the definition and measurement of institutions. The book is essential reading for anyone interested in institutions and economic development.
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Critical Acclaim
Contributors
Contents
More Information
The field of institutional economics has witnessed a surge in interest over recent years and has attracted the attention of a growing number of social scientists. This topical and highly informative collection brings together critical writings on the relationship between institutions and economic performance. The included works encompass seminal cross-country studies of ‘whether institutions matter’, as well as leading examples of within-country studies on the role of specific institutions. This indispensable volume includes an original introduction by the editor which explores the definition and measurement of institutions. The book is essential reading for anyone interested in institutions and economic development.
Critical Acclaim
‘. . . the book is a good example of the writing and reasoning style, sometimes vivid and intriguing, often used by NIE authors. Similarly, the book is a good sample of NIE’s multidisciplinary approach to economics. . . The range of papers presented gives the reader a good picture of the variety of approaches used by NIE scholars, and their ability to integrate sociological and legal consideration within the economic analysis.’
– Martino Bianchi, CEU Political Science Journal
– Martino Bianchi, CEU Political Science Journal
Contributors
20 articles, dating from 1931 to 2008
Contributors include: D. Acemoglu, B. Argarwal, T. Belsey, P.B. Evans, A. Greif, M. Olson, R.A. Posner, D. Rodrik, A. Schleifer
Contributors include: D. Acemoglu, B. Argarwal, T. Belsey, P.B. Evans, A. Greif, M. Olson, R.A. Posner, D. Rodrik, A. Schleifer
Contents
Contents:
Acknowledgements
Introduction Kevin E. Davis
PART I INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS DEFINED
1. John R. Commons (1931), ‘Institutional Economics’
2. Douglass C. North (1994), ‘Economic Performance Through Time’
PART II THE GENERAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
3. Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson (2001), ‘The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation’
4. Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson (2002), ‘Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution’
5. Edward L. Glaeser, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer (2004), ‘Do Institutions Cause Growth?’
6. Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer (2008), ‘The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins’
7. Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor and Jean-Francois Richard (2003), ‘Economic Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect’
8. Samuel Bowles (1998), ‘Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and Other Economic Institutions’
PART III THE ROLES OF SPECIFIC INSTITUTIONS
9. Dani Rodrik (2000), ‘Institutions for High-Quality Growth: What They Are and How to Acquire Them’
10. Peter Evans (1992), ‘The State as Problem and Solution: Predation, Embedded Autonomy, and Structural Change’
11. Mancur Olson (1993), ‘Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development’
12. William J. Baumol (1990), ‘Entrepreneurship: Productive, Unproductive, and Destructive’
13. Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast (1989), ‘Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England’
14. Timothy Besley (1995), ‘Property Rights and Investment Incentives: Theory and Evidence from Ghana’
15. Timothy Besley and Robin Burgess (2000), ‘Land Reform, Poverty Reduction, and Growth: Evidence From India’
16. Abhijit Banerjee and Lakshmi Iyer (2005), ‘History, Institutions, and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India’
17. Bina Agarwal (1994), ‘Gender and Command Over Property: A Critical Gap in Economic Analysis and Policy in South Asia’
18. Avner Greif (1994), ‘Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies’
PART IV EXPLAINING INSTITUTIONAL VARIATION
19. Richard A. Posner (1980), ‘A Theory of Primitive Society, with Special Reference to Law’
20. Vernon W. Ruttan and Yujiro Hayami (1984), ‘Toward a Theory of Induced Institutional Innovation’
Acknowledgements
Introduction Kevin E. Davis
PART I INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS DEFINED
1. John R. Commons (1931), ‘Institutional Economics’
2. Douglass C. North (1994), ‘Economic Performance Through Time’
PART II THE GENERAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
3. Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson (2001), ‘The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation’
4. Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson (2002), ‘Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution’
5. Edward L. Glaeser, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer (2004), ‘Do Institutions Cause Growth?’
6. Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer (2008), ‘The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins’
7. Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor and Jean-Francois Richard (2003), ‘Economic Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect’
8. Samuel Bowles (1998), ‘Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and Other Economic Institutions’
PART III THE ROLES OF SPECIFIC INSTITUTIONS
9. Dani Rodrik (2000), ‘Institutions for High-Quality Growth: What They Are and How to Acquire Them’
10. Peter Evans (1992), ‘The State as Problem and Solution: Predation, Embedded Autonomy, and Structural Change’
11. Mancur Olson (1993), ‘Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development’
12. William J. Baumol (1990), ‘Entrepreneurship: Productive, Unproductive, and Destructive’
13. Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast (1989), ‘Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England’
14. Timothy Besley (1995), ‘Property Rights and Investment Incentives: Theory and Evidence from Ghana’
15. Timothy Besley and Robin Burgess (2000), ‘Land Reform, Poverty Reduction, and Growth: Evidence From India’
16. Abhijit Banerjee and Lakshmi Iyer (2005), ‘History, Institutions, and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India’
17. Bina Agarwal (1994), ‘Gender and Command Over Property: A Critical Gap in Economic Analysis and Policy in South Asia’
18. Avner Greif (1994), ‘Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies’
PART IV EXPLAINING INSTITUTIONAL VARIATION
19. Richard A. Posner (1980), ‘A Theory of Primitive Society, with Special Reference to Law’
20. Vernon W. Ruttan and Yujiro Hayami (1984), ‘Toward a Theory of Induced Institutional Innovation’