Hardback
Handbook on Experimental Economics and the Environment
Laboratory and field experiments have grown significantly in prominence over the past decade. The experimental method provides randomization in key variables therefore permitting a deeper understanding of important economic phenomena. This path-breaking volume provides a valuable collection of experimental work within the area of environmental and resource economics and showcases how laboratory and field experiments can be used for both positive and normative purposes.
More Information
Critical Acclaim
Contributors
Contents
More Information
Laboratory and field experiments have grown significantly in prominence over the past decade. The experimental method provides randomization in key variables therefore permitting a deeper understanding of important economic phenomena. This path-breaking volume provides a valuable collection of experimental work within the area of environmental and resource economics and showcases how laboratory and field experiments can be used for both positive and normative purposes.
The Handbook provides a timely reminder to social scientists, policymakers, international bodies, and practitioners that appropriate decision-making relies on immediate and sharp feedback, both of which are key features of proper experimentation. This book includes a collection of research that makes use of the experimental method to explore key issues within environmental and resource economics that will prove invaluable for both students and academics working in these areas.
The Handbook provides a timely reminder to social scientists, policymakers, international bodies, and practitioners that appropriate decision-making relies on immediate and sharp feedback, both of which are key features of proper experimentation. This book includes a collection of research that makes use of the experimental method to explore key issues within environmental and resource economics that will prove invaluable for both students and academics working in these areas.
Critical Acclaim
‘Until not much more than 20 years ago, economists frequently lamented the fact that they were limited in their empirical analyses to statistical assessments of market behavior, because controlled economic experiments were (thought to be) infeasible, unethical, or both. Much has changed in the intervening years! In this new volume, John List, Michael Price, and their co-authors provide a diverse set of applications of experimental approaches to the environmental economics realm. This is among the most promising of new areas of research in the economics of the environment, and this book provides a superb point of entry for experts and novices alike.’
– Robert Stavins, Harvard University, US
‘This volume is likely to have great value for experienced economic experimentalists looking to keep abreast of new developments in the field across a range of environmental issues. Experienced researchers can make use of the individual chapters most relevant to their own work, and will find the theoretical and technical detail offered to be highly useful.’
– Louise Blackmore, Australian Journal of Agricultural & Resource Economics
– Robert Stavins, Harvard University, US
‘This volume is likely to have great value for experienced economic experimentalists looking to keep abreast of new developments in the field across a range of environmental issues. Experienced researchers can make use of the individual chapters most relevant to their own work, and will find the theoretical and technical detail offered to be highly useful.’
– Louise Blackmore, Australian Journal of Agricultural & Resource Economics
Contributors
Contributors: R.P. Berrens, F. Bousquet, J.-C. Cardenas, R. Croson, A. Farrell, L. Gangadharan, G. Giordana, J.K. Horowitz, M. Janssen, J.L. Knetsch, S. Kroll, J.A. List, M.C. Lopez, C.F. Mason, K.E. McConnell, M. McKee, K. Moeltner, J.J. Murphy, W.S. Neilson, C.F. Parmeter, J.C. Pope, M.K. Price, K. Silz Carson, J.M. Spraggon, J.T.R. Stoop, J.K. Stranlund, D.P. van Soest, M.A. Velez, C.A. Vossler, J. Vyrastekova, M. Willinger, D. Zetland
Contents
Contents:
Introduction
John A. List and Michael K. Price
PART I: ECONOMETRIC APPROACHES FOR EXPERIMENTAL DATA
1. Quasi-Experiments and Hedonic Property Value Methods
Christopher F. Parmeter and Jaren C. Pope
2. Institutional Heterogeneity in Social Dilemma Games: A Bayesian Examination
Klaus Moeltner, James J. Murphy, John K. Stranlund and Maria Alejandra Velez
3. Analyzing Repeated-Game Economics Experiments: Robust Standard Errors for Panel Data with Serial Correlation
Christian A. Vossler
PART II: NON-MARKET VALUATION
4. Behavioral Foundations of Environmental Economics and Valuation
John K. Horowitz, Kenneth E. McConnell and James J. Murphy
5. Values of Gains and Losses: Reference States and Choice of Measure
Jack L. Knetsch
6. Value and Outcome Uncertainty as Explanations for the WTA vs WTP Disparity
William S. Neilson, Michael McKee and Robert P. Berrens
PART III: EMISSIONS TRADING AND AMBIENT TAXES
7. Regulatory Instruments for Monitoring Ambient Pollution
Gaston Giordana and Marc Willinger
8. Investment Decisions and Emissions Reductions: Results from Experiments in Emissions Trading
Lata Gangadharan, Rachel Croson and Alex Farrell
9. Imperfect Enforcement of Emissions Trading and Industry Welfare: A Laboratory Investigation
John K. Stranlund, James J. Murphy and John M. Spraggon
PART IV: COMMON POOL RESOURCE GAMES
10. A Tale of Two Carrots: The Effectiveness of Multiple Reward Stages in a Common Pool Resource Game
Jan T.R. Stoop, Daan P. van Soest and Jana Vyrastekova
11. Dynamics of Rules and Resources: Three New Field Experiments on Water, Forests, and Fisheries
Juan-Camilo Cardenas, Marco Janssen and Francois Bousquet
12. Does Government Regulation Complement Existing Community Efforts to Support Cooperation? Evidence from Field Experiments in Columbia
Maria Claudia Lopez, James J. Murphy, John M. Spraggon and John K. Stranlund
13. Fixed Instruments to Cope with Stock Externalities: An Experimental Evaluation
Gaston Giordana and Marc Willinger
PART V: VOTING AND PUBLIC GOODS
14. Water Managers are Selfish Like Us
David Zetland
15. Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Providing Environmental Public Goods
Katherine Silz Carson
16. The Prisoner’s Dilemma as Intergroup Game: An Experimental Investigation
Stephan Kroll, John A. List and Charles F. Mason
Index
Introduction
John A. List and Michael K. Price
PART I: ECONOMETRIC APPROACHES FOR EXPERIMENTAL DATA
1. Quasi-Experiments and Hedonic Property Value Methods
Christopher F. Parmeter and Jaren C. Pope
2. Institutional Heterogeneity in Social Dilemma Games: A Bayesian Examination
Klaus Moeltner, James J. Murphy, John K. Stranlund and Maria Alejandra Velez
3. Analyzing Repeated-Game Economics Experiments: Robust Standard Errors for Panel Data with Serial Correlation
Christian A. Vossler
PART II: NON-MARKET VALUATION
4. Behavioral Foundations of Environmental Economics and Valuation
John K. Horowitz, Kenneth E. McConnell and James J. Murphy
5. Values of Gains and Losses: Reference States and Choice of Measure
Jack L. Knetsch
6. Value and Outcome Uncertainty as Explanations for the WTA vs WTP Disparity
William S. Neilson, Michael McKee and Robert P. Berrens
PART III: EMISSIONS TRADING AND AMBIENT TAXES
7. Regulatory Instruments for Monitoring Ambient Pollution
Gaston Giordana and Marc Willinger
8. Investment Decisions and Emissions Reductions: Results from Experiments in Emissions Trading
Lata Gangadharan, Rachel Croson and Alex Farrell
9. Imperfect Enforcement of Emissions Trading and Industry Welfare: A Laboratory Investigation
John K. Stranlund, James J. Murphy and John M. Spraggon
PART IV: COMMON POOL RESOURCE GAMES
10. A Tale of Two Carrots: The Effectiveness of Multiple Reward Stages in a Common Pool Resource Game
Jan T.R. Stoop, Daan P. van Soest and Jana Vyrastekova
11. Dynamics of Rules and Resources: Three New Field Experiments on Water, Forests, and Fisheries
Juan-Camilo Cardenas, Marco Janssen and Francois Bousquet
12. Does Government Regulation Complement Existing Community Efforts to Support Cooperation? Evidence from Field Experiments in Columbia
Maria Claudia Lopez, James J. Murphy, John M. Spraggon and John K. Stranlund
13. Fixed Instruments to Cope with Stock Externalities: An Experimental Evaluation
Gaston Giordana and Marc Willinger
PART V: VOTING AND PUBLIC GOODS
14. Water Managers are Selfish Like Us
David Zetland
15. Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Providing Environmental Public Goods
Katherine Silz Carson
16. The Prisoner’s Dilemma as Intergroup Game: An Experimental Investigation
Stephan Kroll, John A. List and Charles F. Mason
Index