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Governance: An International Perspective
This insightful collection presents key papers by leading financial economists on the subject of corporate governance across the world.
More Information
Critical Acclaim
Contributors
Contents
More Information
This insightful collection presents key papers by leading financial economists on the subject of corporate governance across the world.
The volumes bring together articles that describe, analyse and empirically explore the range of mechanisms that influence company managers and decision makers to maximise the value of a company to its owners. The selection includes studies based on companies throughout the world, allowing comparisons of corporate governance systems between countries.
This authoritative two-volume set will be of interest to managers of multinational corporations and financial institutions as well as policymakers and scholars with an interest in cross-border corporate governance.
The volumes bring together articles that describe, analyse and empirically explore the range of mechanisms that influence company managers and decision makers to maximise the value of a company to its owners. The selection includes studies based on companies throughout the world, allowing comparisons of corporate governance systems between countries.
This authoritative two-volume set will be of interest to managers of multinational corporations and financial institutions as well as policymakers and scholars with an interest in cross-border corporate governance.
Critical Acclaim
‘. . . the papers contained in the two volumes can help accounting researchers to identify the key issues of interest in mainstream research in corporate governance.’
– Juan Manuel García Lara, European Accounting Review
‘. . . essential reference books for anybody wishing to have a good knowledge of this research field. Excellent reading for researchers.’
– Gestion 2000
‘. . . for those deeply interested in corporate governance, [this book] is likely to be considered something close to a necessity. . . few collections can match it in ambition and reach, both in its international concern and coverage of the spectrum of governance issues.’
– Manifest-i
‘This important collection allows topical issues of corporate governance to be seen in an international perspective, offsetting the ethnocentric Anglo-Saxon orientation of the everyday debate.’
– John Kay, London School of Economics and Political Science, UK
‘Denis and McConnell have compiled a collection of excellent papers on all the main issues relating to corporate governance. Executive compensation, board composition, shareholder dispersion and control, take-overs, financial structure, privatization, and comparisons of governance systems are all well covered. Researchers and teachers of corporate governance will find in this two-volume collection of papers a convenient, well-organized and very valuable source of information about the current debate.’
– Martin Ricketts, University of Buckingham, UK
– Juan Manuel García Lara, European Accounting Review
‘. . . essential reference books for anybody wishing to have a good knowledge of this research field. Excellent reading for researchers.’
– Gestion 2000
‘. . . for those deeply interested in corporate governance, [this book] is likely to be considered something close to a necessity. . . few collections can match it in ambition and reach, both in its international concern and coverage of the spectrum of governance issues.’
– Manifest-i
‘This important collection allows topical issues of corporate governance to be seen in an international perspective, offsetting the ethnocentric Anglo-Saxon orientation of the everyday debate.’
– John Kay, London School of Economics and Political Science, UK
‘Denis and McConnell have compiled a collection of excellent papers on all the main issues relating to corporate governance. Executive compensation, board composition, shareholder dispersion and control, take-overs, financial structure, privatization, and comparisons of governance systems are all well covered. Researchers and teachers of corporate governance will find in this two-volume collection of papers a convenient, well-organized and very valuable source of information about the current debate.’
– Martin Ricketts, University of Buckingham, UK
Contributors
36 articles, dating from 1989 to 2003
Contributors include: J. Brickley, M. Jensen, R. La Porta, V. Maksimovic, W. Megginson, K. Murphy, R. Rajan, H. Servaes, A. Shleifer, M. Weisbach
Contributors include: J. Brickley, M. Jensen, R. La Porta, V. Maksimovic, W. Megginson, K. Murphy, R. Rajan, H. Servaes, A. Shleifer, M. Weisbach
Contents
Contents:
Volume I
Acknowledgements
Introduction Diane Denis and John McConnell
PART I OVERVIEW
1. Diane K. Denis and John J. McConnell (2003), ‘International Corporate Governance’
PART II BOARDS OF DIRECTORS
2. Benjamin E. Hermalin and Michael S. Weisbach (2003), ‘Boards of Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature’
3. Steven N. Kaplan and Bernadette A. Minton (1994), ‘Appointments of Outsiders to Japanese Boards: Determinants and Implications for Managers’
4. Jay Dahya, John J. McConnell and Nickolas G. Travlos (2002), ‘The Cadbury Committee, Corporate Performance, and Top Management Turnover’
5. James A. Brickley, Jeffrey L. Coles and Gregg Jarrell (1997), ‘Leadership Structure: Separating the CEO and Chairman of the Board’
6. David Yermack (1996), ‘Higher Market Valuation of Companies with a Small Board of Directors’
7. Theodore Eisenberg, Stefan Sundgren and Martin T. Wells (1998), ‘Larger Board Size and Decreasing Firm Value in Small Firms’
8. David J. Denis and Diane K. Denis (1995), ‘Performance Changes Following Top Management Dismissals’
PART III EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
9. Michael C. Jensen and Kevin J. Murphy (1990), ‘Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives’
10. Martin J. Conyon and Kevin J. Murphy (2000), ‘The Prince and the Pauper? CEO Pay in the United States and United Kingdom’
11. Steven N. Kaplan (1994), ‘Top Executive Rewards and Firm Performance: A Comparison of Japan and the United States’
PART IV OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL
12. John J. McConnell and Henri Servaes (1990), ‘Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate Value’
13. Clifford G. Holderness (2003), ‘A Survey of Blockholders and Corporate Control’
14. Mara Faccio and Larry H.P. Lang (2002), ‘The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corporations’
15. Jun-Koo Kang and Anil Shivdasani (1995), ‘Firm Performance, Corporate Governance, and Top Executive Turnover in Japan’
16. Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov, Joseph P.H. Fan and Larry H.P. Lang (2002), ‘Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings’
17. Randall Morck and Masao Nakamura (1999), ‘Banks and Corporate Control in Japan’
18. Tarun Khanna and Krishna Palepu (2000), ‘Is Group Affiliation Profitable in Emerging Markets? An Analysis of Diversified Indian Business Groups’
19. Karl Lins and Henri Servaes (1999), ‘International Evidence on the Value of Corporate Diversification’
Name Index
Volume II
Acknowledgements
An introduction by the editors to both volumes appears in Volume I
PART I OWNERSHIP CHANGE VIA PRIVATIZATION
1. William L. Megginson and Jeffry M. Netter (2001), ‘From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization’
2. Kathryn L. Dewenter and Paul H. Malatesta (2001), ‘State-Owned and Privately Owned Firms: An Empirical Analysis of Profitability, Leverage, and Labor Intensity’
3. Archana Hingorani, Kenneth Lehn and Anil K. Makhija (1997), ‘Investor Behavior in Mass Privatization: The Case of the Czech Voucher Scheme’
PART II THE EXTERNAL CONTROL MARKET
4. Gregor Andrade, Mark Mitchell and Erik Stafford (2001), ‘New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers’
5. Julian R. Franks and Robert S. Harris (1989), ‘Shareholder Wealth Effects of Corporate Takeovers: The U.K. Experience 1955–1985’
6. Cheol S. Eun, Richard Kolodny and Carl Scheraga (1996), ‘Cross-Border Acquisitions and Shareholder Wealth: Tests of the Synergy and Internalization Hypotheses’
7. Anil Shivdasani (1993), ‘Board Composition, Ownership Structure, and Hostile Takeovers’
8. Kee-Hong Bae, Jun-Koo Kang and Jin-Mo Kim (2002), ‘Tunneling or Value Added? Evidence from Mergers by Korean Business Groups’
PART III LEGAL SYSTEMS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
9. Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny (1998), ‘Law and Finance’
10. Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny (2002), ‘Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation’
11. Tatiana Nenova (2003), ‘The Value of Corporate Voting Rights and Control: A Cross-Country Analysis’
12. Paolo F. Volpin (2002), ‘Governance with Poor Investor Protection: Evidence from Top Executive Turnover in Italy’
13. Todd Mitton (2002), ‘A Cross-Firm Analysis of the Impact of Corporate Governance on the East Asian Financial Crisis’
PART IV FINANCIAL MARKETS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
14. Raghuram G. Rajan and Luigi Zingales (1998), ‘Financial Dependence and Growth’
15. Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Vojislav Maksimovic (1998), ‘Law, Finance, and Firm Growth’
16. William A. Reese Jr. and Michael S. Weisbach (2002), ‘Protection of Minority Shareholder Interests, Cross-Listings in the United States, and Subsequent Equity Offerings’
17. Thorsten Beck and Ross Levine (2002), ‘Industry Growth and Capital Allocation: Does Having a Market- or Bank-Based System Matter?’
Name Index
Volume I
Acknowledgements
Introduction Diane Denis and John McConnell
PART I OVERVIEW
1. Diane K. Denis and John J. McConnell (2003), ‘International Corporate Governance’
PART II BOARDS OF DIRECTORS
2. Benjamin E. Hermalin and Michael S. Weisbach (2003), ‘Boards of Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature’
3. Steven N. Kaplan and Bernadette A. Minton (1994), ‘Appointments of Outsiders to Japanese Boards: Determinants and Implications for Managers’
4. Jay Dahya, John J. McConnell and Nickolas G. Travlos (2002), ‘The Cadbury Committee, Corporate Performance, and Top Management Turnover’
5. James A. Brickley, Jeffrey L. Coles and Gregg Jarrell (1997), ‘Leadership Structure: Separating the CEO and Chairman of the Board’
6. David Yermack (1996), ‘Higher Market Valuation of Companies with a Small Board of Directors’
7. Theodore Eisenberg, Stefan Sundgren and Martin T. Wells (1998), ‘Larger Board Size and Decreasing Firm Value in Small Firms’
8. David J. Denis and Diane K. Denis (1995), ‘Performance Changes Following Top Management Dismissals’
PART III EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
9. Michael C. Jensen and Kevin J. Murphy (1990), ‘Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives’
10. Martin J. Conyon and Kevin J. Murphy (2000), ‘The Prince and the Pauper? CEO Pay in the United States and United Kingdom’
11. Steven N. Kaplan (1994), ‘Top Executive Rewards and Firm Performance: A Comparison of Japan and the United States’
PART IV OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL
12. John J. McConnell and Henri Servaes (1990), ‘Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate Value’
13. Clifford G. Holderness (2003), ‘A Survey of Blockholders and Corporate Control’
14. Mara Faccio and Larry H.P. Lang (2002), ‘The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corporations’
15. Jun-Koo Kang and Anil Shivdasani (1995), ‘Firm Performance, Corporate Governance, and Top Executive Turnover in Japan’
16. Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov, Joseph P.H. Fan and Larry H.P. Lang (2002), ‘Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings’
17. Randall Morck and Masao Nakamura (1999), ‘Banks and Corporate Control in Japan’
18. Tarun Khanna and Krishna Palepu (2000), ‘Is Group Affiliation Profitable in Emerging Markets? An Analysis of Diversified Indian Business Groups’
19. Karl Lins and Henri Servaes (1999), ‘International Evidence on the Value of Corporate Diversification’
Name Index
Volume II
Acknowledgements
An introduction by the editors to both volumes appears in Volume I
PART I OWNERSHIP CHANGE VIA PRIVATIZATION
1. William L. Megginson and Jeffry M. Netter (2001), ‘From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization’
2. Kathryn L. Dewenter and Paul H. Malatesta (2001), ‘State-Owned and Privately Owned Firms: An Empirical Analysis of Profitability, Leverage, and Labor Intensity’
3. Archana Hingorani, Kenneth Lehn and Anil K. Makhija (1997), ‘Investor Behavior in Mass Privatization: The Case of the Czech Voucher Scheme’
PART II THE EXTERNAL CONTROL MARKET
4. Gregor Andrade, Mark Mitchell and Erik Stafford (2001), ‘New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers’
5. Julian R. Franks and Robert S. Harris (1989), ‘Shareholder Wealth Effects of Corporate Takeovers: The U.K. Experience 1955–1985’
6. Cheol S. Eun, Richard Kolodny and Carl Scheraga (1996), ‘Cross-Border Acquisitions and Shareholder Wealth: Tests of the Synergy and Internalization Hypotheses’
7. Anil Shivdasani (1993), ‘Board Composition, Ownership Structure, and Hostile Takeovers’
8. Kee-Hong Bae, Jun-Koo Kang and Jin-Mo Kim (2002), ‘Tunneling or Value Added? Evidence from Mergers by Korean Business Groups’
PART III LEGAL SYSTEMS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
9. Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny (1998), ‘Law and Finance’
10. Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny (2002), ‘Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation’
11. Tatiana Nenova (2003), ‘The Value of Corporate Voting Rights and Control: A Cross-Country Analysis’
12. Paolo F. Volpin (2002), ‘Governance with Poor Investor Protection: Evidence from Top Executive Turnover in Italy’
13. Todd Mitton (2002), ‘A Cross-Firm Analysis of the Impact of Corporate Governance on the East Asian Financial Crisis’
PART IV FINANCIAL MARKETS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
14. Raghuram G. Rajan and Luigi Zingales (1998), ‘Financial Dependence and Growth’
15. Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Vojislav Maksimovic (1998), ‘Law, Finance, and Firm Growth’
16. William A. Reese Jr. and Michael S. Weisbach (2002), ‘Protection of Minority Shareholder Interests, Cross-Listings in the United States, and Subsequent Equity Offerings’
17. Thorsten Beck and Ross Levine (2002), ‘Industry Growth and Capital Allocation: Does Having a Market- or Bank-Based System Matter?’
Name Index
