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Franchise Contracting and Organization
Much has been written about franchising in economics over the last two decades: researchers have gained important insights, especially into how and why it works and into the reasons behind the various forms of vertical restraints usually embedded in these contracts. This authoritative volume presents the key papers that have introduced the theoretical frameworks and the empirical facts that have spurred the interest of scholars in franchising as an organizational form. By combining all these contributions in a single volume, this collection not only highlights the main questions that have been addressed in the literature on franchising, but also illustrates the important role that incentive issues have played in it. As a result, this compilation should be of special interest to economists and management scholars with an interest in franchising but also to those interested in general issues concerning the organization of the firm.
More Information
Critical Acclaim
Contributors
Contents
More Information
Much has been written about franchising in economics over the last two decades: researchers have gained important insights, especially into how and why it works and into the reasons behind the various forms of vertical restraints usually embedded in these contracts. This authoritative volume presents the key papers that have introduced the theoretical frameworks and the empirical facts that have spurred the interest of scholars in franchising as an organizational form. By combining all these contributions in a single volume, this collection not only highlights the main questions that have been addressed in the literature on franchising, but also illustrates the important role that incentive issues have played in it. As a result, this compilation should be of special interest to economists and management scholars with an interest in franchising but also to those interested in general issues concerning the organization of the firm.
Critical Acclaim
‘An excellent collection of the best recent research examining franchise contracting and related organizational issues from both theoretical and empirical perspectives.’
– Paul L. Joskow, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, US
– Paul L. Joskow, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, US
Contributors
26 articles, dating from 1967 to 2005
Contributors include: J.A. Brickley, R.E. Caves, D.W. Carlton, P.J. Kaufmann, B. Klein, G.F. Mathewson, P.H. Rubin, A. Shepard, M.E. Slade, R.A. Winter
Contributors include: J.A. Brickley, R.E. Caves, D.W. Carlton, P.J. Kaufmann, B. Klein, G.F. Mathewson, P.H. Rubin, A. Shepard, M.E. Slade, R.A. Winter
Contents
Contents:
Acknowledgements
Introduction Francine Lafontaine
PART I AGENCY THEORY AND FRANCHISING
1. Richard E. Caves and William F. Murphy II (1976), ‘Franchising: Firms, Markets, and Intangible Assets’
2. Paul H. Rubin (1978), ‘The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise Contract’
3. G. Frank Mathewson and Ralph A. Winter (1985), ‘The Economics of Franchise Contracts’
4. James A. Brickley and Frederick H. Dark (1987), ‘The Choice of Organizational Form: The Case of Franchising’
5. Francine Lafontaine (1992), ‘Agency Theory and Franchising: Some Empirical Results’
6. Andrea Shepard (1993), ‘Contractual Form, Retail Price, and Asset Characteristics in Gasoline Retailing’
7. Sugato Bhattacharyya and Francine Lafontaine (1995), ‘Double-sided Moral Hazard and the Nature of Share Contracts’
8. Nancy A. Lutz (1995), ‘Ownership Rights and Incentives in Franchising’
9. Francine Lafontaine and Sugato Bhattacharyya (1995), ‘The Role of Risk in Franchising’
10. Asher A. Blass and Dennis W. Carlton (2001), ‘The Choice of Organizational Form in Gasoline Retailing and the Cost of Laws that Limit that Choice’
11. Francine Lafontaine and Kathryn L. Shaw (2005), ‘Targeting Managerial Control: Evidence from Franchising’
PART II SELF-ENFORCEMENT AND FRANCHISING
12. Benjamin Klein (1980), ‘Transaction Cost Determinants of “Unfair” Contractual Arrangements’
13. James A. Brickley, Frederick H. Dark and Michael S. Weisbach (1991), ‘The Economic Effects of Franchise Termination Laws’
14. Patrick J. Kaufmann and Francine Lafontaine (1994), ‘Costs of Control: The Source of Economic Rents for McDonald’s Franchisees’
15. Benjamin Klein (1995) ‘The Economics of Franchise Contracts’
PART III MULTI-TASKING AND COMPLEMENTARITIES
16. Margaret E. Slade (1996), ‘Multitask Agency and Contract Choice: An Empirical Exploration’
17. Francine Lafontaine and Margaret E. Slade (1996), ‘Retail Contracting and Costly Monitoring: Theory and Evidence’
18. Jeffrey L. Bradach (1997), ‘Using the Plural Form in the Management of Restaurant Chains’
19. James A. Brickley (1999), ‘Incentive Conflicts and Contractual Restraints: Evidence from Franchising’
20. Francine Lafontaine and Emmanuel Raynaud (2002), ‘Residual Claims and Self-enforcement as Incentive Mechanisms in Franchise Contracts: Substitutes or Complements?’
PART IV FRANCHISING AND OUTLET-LEVEL OUTCOMES
21. John P. Shelton (1967), ‘Allocative Efficiency vs. “X-Efficiency”: Comment’
22. John M. Barron and John R. Umbeck (1984), ‘The Effects of Different Contractual Arrangements: The Case of Retail Gasoline Markets’
23. Richard L. Smith II (1982), ‘Franchise Regulation: An Economic Analysis of State Restrictions on Automobile Distribution’
24. Alan B. Krueger (1991), ‘Ownership, Agency, and Wages: An Examination of Franchising in the Fast Food Industry’
25. Margaret E. Slade (1998), ‘Beer and the Tie: Did Divestiture of Brewer-owned Public Houses Lead to Higher Beer Prices?’
26. Steven C. Michael (2000), ‘The Effect of Organizational Form on Quality: The Case of Franchising’
Name Index
Acknowledgements
Introduction Francine Lafontaine
PART I AGENCY THEORY AND FRANCHISING
1. Richard E. Caves and William F. Murphy II (1976), ‘Franchising: Firms, Markets, and Intangible Assets’
2. Paul H. Rubin (1978), ‘The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise Contract’
3. G. Frank Mathewson and Ralph A. Winter (1985), ‘The Economics of Franchise Contracts’
4. James A. Brickley and Frederick H. Dark (1987), ‘The Choice of Organizational Form: The Case of Franchising’
5. Francine Lafontaine (1992), ‘Agency Theory and Franchising: Some Empirical Results’
6. Andrea Shepard (1993), ‘Contractual Form, Retail Price, and Asset Characteristics in Gasoline Retailing’
7. Sugato Bhattacharyya and Francine Lafontaine (1995), ‘Double-sided Moral Hazard and the Nature of Share Contracts’
8. Nancy A. Lutz (1995), ‘Ownership Rights and Incentives in Franchising’
9. Francine Lafontaine and Sugato Bhattacharyya (1995), ‘The Role of Risk in Franchising’
10. Asher A. Blass and Dennis W. Carlton (2001), ‘The Choice of Organizational Form in Gasoline Retailing and the Cost of Laws that Limit that Choice’
11. Francine Lafontaine and Kathryn L. Shaw (2005), ‘Targeting Managerial Control: Evidence from Franchising’
PART II SELF-ENFORCEMENT AND FRANCHISING
12. Benjamin Klein (1980), ‘Transaction Cost Determinants of “Unfair” Contractual Arrangements’
13. James A. Brickley, Frederick H. Dark and Michael S. Weisbach (1991), ‘The Economic Effects of Franchise Termination Laws’
14. Patrick J. Kaufmann and Francine Lafontaine (1994), ‘Costs of Control: The Source of Economic Rents for McDonald’s Franchisees’
15. Benjamin Klein (1995) ‘The Economics of Franchise Contracts’
PART III MULTI-TASKING AND COMPLEMENTARITIES
16. Margaret E. Slade (1996), ‘Multitask Agency and Contract Choice: An Empirical Exploration’
17. Francine Lafontaine and Margaret E. Slade (1996), ‘Retail Contracting and Costly Monitoring: Theory and Evidence’
18. Jeffrey L. Bradach (1997), ‘Using the Plural Form in the Management of Restaurant Chains’
19. James A. Brickley (1999), ‘Incentive Conflicts and Contractual Restraints: Evidence from Franchising’
20. Francine Lafontaine and Emmanuel Raynaud (2002), ‘Residual Claims and Self-enforcement as Incentive Mechanisms in Franchise Contracts: Substitutes or Complements?’
PART IV FRANCHISING AND OUTLET-LEVEL OUTCOMES
21. John P. Shelton (1967), ‘Allocative Efficiency vs. “X-Efficiency”: Comment’
22. John M. Barron and John R. Umbeck (1984), ‘The Effects of Different Contractual Arrangements: The Case of Retail Gasoline Markets’
23. Richard L. Smith II (1982), ‘Franchise Regulation: An Economic Analysis of State Restrictions on Automobile Distribution’
24. Alan B. Krueger (1991), ‘Ownership, Agency, and Wages: An Examination of Franchising in the Fast Food Industry’
25. Margaret E. Slade (1998), ‘Beer and the Tie: Did Divestiture of Brewer-owned Public Houses Lead to Higher Beer Prices?’
26. Steven C. Michael (2000), ‘The Effect of Organizational Form on Quality: The Case of Franchising’
Name Index
