Hardback
Fiscal Policy and Environmental Welfare
Modelling Interjurisdictional Competition
9781858987385 Edward Elgar Publishing
In this innovative book the author examines the link between environmental, trade, and industrial policies within an interregional setting. He models how regional governments, using tax rates on real capital and pollutant emissions, determine policies to favour their residents in terms of the provision of public goods and reduction in environmental degradation.
More Information
Contents
More Information
In this innovative book the author examines the link between environmental, trade and industrial policies within an interregional setting. He models how regional governments, using tax rates on real capital and pollutant emissions, determine policies to favour their residents in terms of the provision of public goods and reduction in environmental degradation.
Regions or countries engage in competition for mobile capital in a world where production causes pollution and tax revenues are required to finance public goods. In Fiscal Policy and Environmental Welfare the author considers the efficiency consequences when governments act strategically and seek to manage trade, capital flows and emissions. Using formal models, which extend and modify existing literature, the author demonstrates that interjurisdictional competition typically leads to inefficiencies. He argues that although interjurisdictional competition may lead to the overprovision of public goods and to an inefficiently high environmental quality, often the opposite seems to occur.
This book will be welcomed by environmental economists, and those scholars interested in welfare and fiscal policy.
Regions or countries engage in competition for mobile capital in a world where production causes pollution and tax revenues are required to finance public goods. In Fiscal Policy and Environmental Welfare the author considers the efficiency consequences when governments act strategically and seek to manage trade, capital flows and emissions. Using formal models, which extend and modify existing literature, the author demonstrates that interjurisdictional competition typically leads to inefficiencies. He argues that although interjurisdictional competition may lead to the overprovision of public goods and to an inefficiently high environmental quality, often the opposite seems to occur.
This book will be welcomed by environmental economists, and those scholars interested in welfare and fiscal policy.
Contents
Contents: 1. Introduction 2. Different Forms of Interjurisdictional Competition 3. Strategic Environmental Policy 4. Tax Competition, Provision of Public Goods, and Environmental Policy 5. Conclusion References Index
