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Economics of International Trade Law
In this collection, Professor Sykes brings together seminal papers published by leading academics in the highly topical field of economics and international trade law. This authoritative two-volume set covers areas including the basic theory of trade agreements, dispute resolution, safeguard measures, subsidies and countervailing measures and international trade and domestic resolution. This set, together with an original introduction by the editor, will be a valuable research tool for academics and practitioners with an interest in the economics of international trade law.
More Information
Contributors
Contents
More Information
In this collection, Professor Sykes brings together seminal papers published by leading academics in the highly topical field of economics and international trade law. This authoritative two-volume set covers areas including the basic theory of trade agreements, dispute resolution, safeguard measures, subsidies and countervailing measures and international trade and domestic resolution. This set, together with an original introduction by the editor, will be a valuable research tool for academics and practitioners with an interest in the economics of international trade law.
Contributors
47 articles, dating from 1953 to 2011
Contributors include: K. Bagwell, J. Bhagwati, G. Grossman, A. Guzman, H. Horn, H. Johnson, P. Krugman, R. Lawrence, R.Lipsey, G. Maggi
Contributors include: K. Bagwell, J. Bhagwati, G. Grossman, A. Guzman, H. Horn, H. Johnson, P. Krugman, R. Lawrence, R.Lipsey, G. Maggi
Contents
Contents:
Volume I
Acknowledgements
Introduction Alan O. Sykes
PART I BASIC THEORY OF TRADE AGREEMENTS
1. Harry G. Johnson (1953-54), ‘Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation’
2. Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1994), ‘Protection for Sale’
3. Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1995), ‘Trade Wars and Trade Talks’
4. Giovanni Maggi and Andrés Rodríguez-Clare (1998), ‘The Value of Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressures’
5. Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger (1999), ‘An Economic Theory of GATT’
6. Giovanni Maggi (1999), ‘The Role of Multilateral Institutions in International Trade Cooperation’
7. Henrik Horn, Giovanni Maggi and Robert W. Staiger (2010), ‘Trade Agreements as Endogenously Incomplete Contracts’
PART II THE MOST-FAVOURED NATION OBLIGATION AND PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS
8. R.G. Lipsey (1960), ‘The Theory of Customs Unions: A General Survey’
9. Murray Kemp and Henry Wan, Jr. ([1976] 1987), ‘An Elementary Proposition Concerning the Formation of Customs Unions’
10. Henrik Horn and Petros C. Mavroidis (2001), ‘Economic and Legal Aspects of the Most-Favored-Nation Clause’
11. Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger (2004), ‘Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Bilateral Opportunism and the Rules of GATT/WTO’
12. Jagdish Bhagwati (1993), ‘Regionalism and Multilateralism: An Overview’
13. Robert Z. Lawrence (1996), ‘The Impact of Regional Arrangements’ and ‘System Dynamics’
14. Emanuel Ornelas (2005), ‘Rent Destruction and the Political Viability of Free Trade Agreements’
15. Nuno Limão (2007), ‘Are Preferential Trade Agreements with Non-trade Objectives a Stumbling Block for Multilateral Liberalization?’
PART III DISPUTE RESOLUTION
16. Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger (2002), ‘Enforcement’
17. Warren F. Schwartz and Alan O. Sykes (2002), ‘The Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute Resolution in the World Trade Organization’
18. Kym Anderson (2002), ‘Peculiarities of Retaliation in WTO Dispute Settlement’
19. Robert Z. Lawrence (2003), ‘Role of Remedies in the WTO System’
20. Andrew T. Guzman and Beth A. Simmons (2005), ‘Power Plays and Capacity Constraints: The Selection of Defendants in World Trade Organization Disputes’
21. Alberto Martin and Wouter Vergote (2008), ‘On the Role of Retaliation in Trade Agreements’
22. Kyle Bagwell (2009), ‘Remedies in the World Trade Organization: An Economic Perspective’
23. Giovanni Maggi and Robert W. Staiger (2011), ‘The Role of Dispute Settlement Procedures in International Trade Agreements’
Volume II
Acknowledgements
An introduction by the editor to both volumes appears in Volume I
PART I SAFEGUARD MEASURES
1. Gene M. Grossmann (1986), ‘Imports as a Cause of Injury: The Case of the U.S. Steel Industry’
2. Robert S. Pindyck and Julio J. Rotemberg (1987), ‘Are Imports to Blame? Attribution of Injury Under the 1974 Trade Act’
3. Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger (1990), ‘A Theory of Managed Trade’
4. Alan O. Sykes (1991), ‘Protectionism as a “Safeguard”: A Positive Analysis of the GATT “Escape Clause” with Normative Speculations’
5. Douglas A. Irwin (2003), ‘Causing Problems? The WTO Review of Causation and Injury Attribution in US Section 201 Cases’
6. Alan O. Sykes (2003), ‘The Safeguards Mess: A Critique of WTO Jurisprudence’
7. Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger (2005), ‘Enforcement, Private Political Pressure, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization Escape Clause’
8. Mostafa Beshkar (2010), ‘Trade Skirmishes Safeguards: A Theory of the WTO Dispute Settlement Process’
PART II SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING MEASURES
9. Charles J. Goetz, Lloyd Granet and Warren F. Schwartz (1986), ‘The Meaning of “Subsidy” and “Injury” in the Countervailing Duty Law’
10. Paul R. Krugman (1987), ‘Is Free Trade Passé?’
11. Alan O. Sykes (1989), ‘Countervailing Duty Law: An Economic Perspective’
12. Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger (2001), ‘Strategic Trade, Competitive Industries and Agricultural Trade Disputes’
13. Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger (2006), ‘Will International Rules on Subsidies Disrupt the World Trading System?’
14. Alan O. Sykes (2011), ‘The Questionable Case for Subsidies Regulation: A Comparative Perspective’
PART III ANTIDUMPING MEASURES
15. John J. Barceló III (1979), ‘The Antidumping Law: Repeal it or Revise It?’
16. J.M. Finger, H. Keith Hall and Douglas R. Nelson (1982), ‘The Political Economy of Administered Protection’
17. Richard Boltuck (1991), ‘Assessing the Effects on the Domestic Industry of Price Dumping’
18. Thomas J. Prusa (1992), ‘Why Are So Many Antidumping Petitions Withdrawn?’
PART IV INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND DOMESTIC REGULATION
19. Alan O. Sykes (1995), ‘Regulatory Protectionism and the Law of International Trade’
20. Michael Trebilcock and Robert Howse (1998), ‘Trade Liberalization and Regulatory Diversity: Reconciling Competitive Markets with Competitive Politics’
21. Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger (2001), ‘Domestic Policies, National Sovereignty, and International Economic Institutions’
22. Kyle Bagwell, Petros C. Mavroidis and Robert W. Staiger (2002), ‘It’s A Question of Market Access’
PART V DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WTO
23. Kyle Bagwell, Petros C. Mavroidis and Robert W. Staiger (2006), ‘The Case for Tradable Remedies in WTO Dispute Settlement’
24. Chad P. Bown (2009), ‘Developing Countries and WTO Trade Disputes’
Volume I
Acknowledgements
Introduction Alan O. Sykes
PART I BASIC THEORY OF TRADE AGREEMENTS
1. Harry G. Johnson (1953-54), ‘Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation’
2. Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1994), ‘Protection for Sale’
3. Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1995), ‘Trade Wars and Trade Talks’
4. Giovanni Maggi and Andrés Rodríguez-Clare (1998), ‘The Value of Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressures’
5. Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger (1999), ‘An Economic Theory of GATT’
6. Giovanni Maggi (1999), ‘The Role of Multilateral Institutions in International Trade Cooperation’
7. Henrik Horn, Giovanni Maggi and Robert W. Staiger (2010), ‘Trade Agreements as Endogenously Incomplete Contracts’
PART II THE MOST-FAVOURED NATION OBLIGATION AND PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS
8. R.G. Lipsey (1960), ‘The Theory of Customs Unions: A General Survey’
9. Murray Kemp and Henry Wan, Jr. ([1976] 1987), ‘An Elementary Proposition Concerning the Formation of Customs Unions’
10. Henrik Horn and Petros C. Mavroidis (2001), ‘Economic and Legal Aspects of the Most-Favored-Nation Clause’
11. Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger (2004), ‘Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Bilateral Opportunism and the Rules of GATT/WTO’
12. Jagdish Bhagwati (1993), ‘Regionalism and Multilateralism: An Overview’
13. Robert Z. Lawrence (1996), ‘The Impact of Regional Arrangements’ and ‘System Dynamics’
14. Emanuel Ornelas (2005), ‘Rent Destruction and the Political Viability of Free Trade Agreements’
15. Nuno Limão (2007), ‘Are Preferential Trade Agreements with Non-trade Objectives a Stumbling Block for Multilateral Liberalization?’
PART III DISPUTE RESOLUTION
16. Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger (2002), ‘Enforcement’
17. Warren F. Schwartz and Alan O. Sykes (2002), ‘The Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute Resolution in the World Trade Organization’
18. Kym Anderson (2002), ‘Peculiarities of Retaliation in WTO Dispute Settlement’
19. Robert Z. Lawrence (2003), ‘Role of Remedies in the WTO System’
20. Andrew T. Guzman and Beth A. Simmons (2005), ‘Power Plays and Capacity Constraints: The Selection of Defendants in World Trade Organization Disputes’
21. Alberto Martin and Wouter Vergote (2008), ‘On the Role of Retaliation in Trade Agreements’
22. Kyle Bagwell (2009), ‘Remedies in the World Trade Organization: An Economic Perspective’
23. Giovanni Maggi and Robert W. Staiger (2011), ‘The Role of Dispute Settlement Procedures in International Trade Agreements’
Volume II
Acknowledgements
An introduction by the editor to both volumes appears in Volume I
PART I SAFEGUARD MEASURES
1. Gene M. Grossmann (1986), ‘Imports as a Cause of Injury: The Case of the U.S. Steel Industry’
2. Robert S. Pindyck and Julio J. Rotemberg (1987), ‘Are Imports to Blame? Attribution of Injury Under the 1974 Trade Act’
3. Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger (1990), ‘A Theory of Managed Trade’
4. Alan O. Sykes (1991), ‘Protectionism as a “Safeguard”: A Positive Analysis of the GATT “Escape Clause” with Normative Speculations’
5. Douglas A. Irwin (2003), ‘Causing Problems? The WTO Review of Causation and Injury Attribution in US Section 201 Cases’
6. Alan O. Sykes (2003), ‘The Safeguards Mess: A Critique of WTO Jurisprudence’
7. Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger (2005), ‘Enforcement, Private Political Pressure, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization Escape Clause’
8. Mostafa Beshkar (2010), ‘Trade Skirmishes Safeguards: A Theory of the WTO Dispute Settlement Process’
PART II SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING MEASURES
9. Charles J. Goetz, Lloyd Granet and Warren F. Schwartz (1986), ‘The Meaning of “Subsidy” and “Injury” in the Countervailing Duty Law’
10. Paul R. Krugman (1987), ‘Is Free Trade Passé?’
11. Alan O. Sykes (1989), ‘Countervailing Duty Law: An Economic Perspective’
12. Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger (2001), ‘Strategic Trade, Competitive Industries and Agricultural Trade Disputes’
13. Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger (2006), ‘Will International Rules on Subsidies Disrupt the World Trading System?’
14. Alan O. Sykes (2011), ‘The Questionable Case for Subsidies Regulation: A Comparative Perspective’
PART III ANTIDUMPING MEASURES
15. John J. Barceló III (1979), ‘The Antidumping Law: Repeal it or Revise It?’
16. J.M. Finger, H. Keith Hall and Douglas R. Nelson (1982), ‘The Political Economy of Administered Protection’
17. Richard Boltuck (1991), ‘Assessing the Effects on the Domestic Industry of Price Dumping’
18. Thomas J. Prusa (1992), ‘Why Are So Many Antidumping Petitions Withdrawn?’
PART IV INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND DOMESTIC REGULATION
19. Alan O. Sykes (1995), ‘Regulatory Protectionism and the Law of International Trade’
20. Michael Trebilcock and Robert Howse (1998), ‘Trade Liberalization and Regulatory Diversity: Reconciling Competitive Markets with Competitive Politics’
21. Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger (2001), ‘Domestic Policies, National Sovereignty, and International Economic Institutions’
22. Kyle Bagwell, Petros C. Mavroidis and Robert W. Staiger (2002), ‘It’s A Question of Market Access’
PART V DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WTO
23. Kyle Bagwell, Petros C. Mavroidis and Robert W. Staiger (2006), ‘The Case for Tradable Remedies in WTO Dispute Settlement’
24. Chad P. Bown (2009), ‘Developing Countries and WTO Trade Disputes’
