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Economics of Constitutional Law
In this thought-provoking collection, Professor Epstein brings together the leading articles which explore the economic approach to the two major issues of constitutionalism. The first volume deals with structural protections that are afforded by the separation of powers, the use of checks and balances, and the institutions of federalism. The second volume deals with the protection of individual rights in connection with property, speech, religion, due process and equality. Both volumes focus on the extent to which assumptions about self-interest and human nature influence the choice of social institutions. They offer extensive comparisons between the classical liberal and social democratic views of constitutional law. Professor Epstein’s lengthy and careful introduction seeks to weave together the diverse approaches to constitutional law exhibited in these volumes.
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Critical Acclaim
Contributors
Contents
More Information
In this thought-provoking collection, Professor Epstein brings together the leading articles which explore the economic approach to the two major issues of constitutionalism. The first volume deals with structural protections that are afforded by the separation of powers, the use of checks and balances, and the institutions of federalism. The second volume deals with the protection of individual rights in connection with property, speech, religion, due process and equality. Both volumes focus on the extent to which assumptions about self-interest and human nature influence the choice of social institutions. They offer extensive comparisons between the classical liberal and social democratic views of constitutional law.
Professor Epstein’s lengthy and careful introduction seeks to weave together the diverse approaches to constitutional law exhibited in these volumes.
Professor Epstein’s lengthy and careful introduction seeks to weave together the diverse approaches to constitutional law exhibited in these volumes.
Critical Acclaim
‘Richard Epstein has compiled a brilliant collection of essays that explore the insights of economic theory on such diverse constitutional issues as separation of powers, federalism, takings, free speech, freedom of religion, and due process of law. These essays illuminate and challenge fundamental questions about the meaning and application of our constitution.’
– Geoffrey Stone, University of Chicago Law School, US
– Geoffrey Stone, University of Chicago Law School, US
Contributors
29 articles, dating from 1787 to 2006
Contributors include: R.H. Coase, R. Cooter, H. Hovenkamp, F.S. McChesney, M.W. McConnell, T.W. Merrill, M. Radin, C.R. Sunstein, B. Weingast
Contributors include: R.H. Coase, R. Cooter, H. Hovenkamp, F.S. McChesney, M.W. McConnell, T.W. Merrill, M. Radin, C.R. Sunstein, B. Weingast
Contents
Contents:
Volume I: The Structural Constitution
Acknowledgements
Introduction The Law and Economics of Constitutionalism Richard A. Epstein
PART I: SELF-INTEREST AND CONSTITUTIONS
1. James Madison ([1787] 1961), ‘The Federalist. No X. (The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection Continued)’
2. Cass R. Sunstein (1985), ‘Interest Groups in American Public Law’
3. Robert Cooter (2002), ‘Constitutional Consequentialism: Bargain Democracy versus Median Democracy’
PART II THE STRUCTURAL CONSTITUTION
A Separation of Powers
4. Saul Levmore (1992), ‘Bicameralism: When are Two Decisions Better than One?’
5. Susan Rose-Ackerman (1992), ‘Judicial Review and the Power of the Purse’
6. Eric R. Claeys (2004), ‘Progressive Political Theory and Separation of Powers on the Burger and Rehnquist Courts’
7. Jide Nzelibe (2006), ‘A Positive Theory of the War-Powers Constitution’
B Federalism
8. Barry R. Weingast (1995), ‘The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development’
9. Richard A. Epstein (1987), ‘The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power’
10. Michael W. McConnell (1988), ‘Contract Rights and Property Rights: A Case Study in the Relationship Between Individual Liberties and Constitutional Structure’
11. J. Robert S. Prichard with Jamie Benedickson (1983), ‘Securing the Canadian Economic Union: Federalism and Internal Barriers to Trade’
12. Jonathan H. Adler (2001), ‘The Ducks Stop Here? The Environmental Challenge to Federalism’
13. Jack L. Goldsmith and Alan O. Sykes (2001), ‘The Internet and the Dormant Commerce Clause’
C Unconstitutional Conditions
14. Richard A. Epstein (1988), ‘Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent’
Name Index
Volume II: Individual Rights
Acknowledgements
An introduction by the editor to both volumes appears in Volume I
PART I PROPERTY AND CONTRACT
1. Richard A. Epstein (1986), ‘An Outline of Takings’
2. Margaret Jane Radin (1988), ‘The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings’
3. Daniel A. Farber (1992), ‘Economic Analysis and Just Compensation’
4. William A. Fischel (1991), ‘Exploring the Kozinski Paradox: Why is More Efficient Regulation a Taking of Property?’
5. Thomas W. Merrill (1986), ‘The Economics of Public Use’
6. Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky (2006), ‘The Uselessness of Public Use’
7. William A. Fischel (1987), ‘The Economics of Land Use Exactions: A Property Rights Analysis’
8. Daniel R. Fischel and Alan O. Sykes (1999), ‘Governmental Liability for Breach of Contract’
9. Richard A. Epstein (1987), ‘The Public Trust Doctrine’
PART II FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND RELIGION
10. R.H. Coase (1977), ‘Advertising and Free Speech’
11. Fred S. McChesney (1988), ‘A Positive Regulatory Theory of the First Amendment’
12. Michael W. McConnell and Richard A. Posner (1989), ‘An Economic Approach to Issues of Religious Freedom’
13. Daniel A. Farber (1991), ‘Free Speech without Romance: Public Choice and the First Amendment’
PART III DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION
14. Cass R. Sunstein (1984), ‘Naked Preferences and the Constitution’
15. Herbert Hovenkamp (1988), ‘The Political Economy of Substantive Due Process’
Name Index
Volume I: The Structural Constitution
Acknowledgements
Introduction The Law and Economics of Constitutionalism Richard A. Epstein
PART I: SELF-INTEREST AND CONSTITUTIONS
1. James Madison ([1787] 1961), ‘The Federalist. No X. (The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection Continued)’
2. Cass R. Sunstein (1985), ‘Interest Groups in American Public Law’
3. Robert Cooter (2002), ‘Constitutional Consequentialism: Bargain Democracy versus Median Democracy’
PART II THE STRUCTURAL CONSTITUTION
A Separation of Powers
4. Saul Levmore (1992), ‘Bicameralism: When are Two Decisions Better than One?’
5. Susan Rose-Ackerman (1992), ‘Judicial Review and the Power of the Purse’
6. Eric R. Claeys (2004), ‘Progressive Political Theory and Separation of Powers on the Burger and Rehnquist Courts’
7. Jide Nzelibe (2006), ‘A Positive Theory of the War-Powers Constitution’
B Federalism
8. Barry R. Weingast (1995), ‘The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development’
9. Richard A. Epstein (1987), ‘The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power’
10. Michael W. McConnell (1988), ‘Contract Rights and Property Rights: A Case Study in the Relationship Between Individual Liberties and Constitutional Structure’
11. J. Robert S. Prichard with Jamie Benedickson (1983), ‘Securing the Canadian Economic Union: Federalism and Internal Barriers to Trade’
12. Jonathan H. Adler (2001), ‘The Ducks Stop Here? The Environmental Challenge to Federalism’
13. Jack L. Goldsmith and Alan O. Sykes (2001), ‘The Internet and the Dormant Commerce Clause’
C Unconstitutional Conditions
14. Richard A. Epstein (1988), ‘Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent’
Name Index
Volume II: Individual Rights
Acknowledgements
An introduction by the editor to both volumes appears in Volume I
PART I PROPERTY AND CONTRACT
1. Richard A. Epstein (1986), ‘An Outline of Takings’
2. Margaret Jane Radin (1988), ‘The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings’
3. Daniel A. Farber (1992), ‘Economic Analysis and Just Compensation’
4. William A. Fischel (1991), ‘Exploring the Kozinski Paradox: Why is More Efficient Regulation a Taking of Property?’
5. Thomas W. Merrill (1986), ‘The Economics of Public Use’
6. Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky (2006), ‘The Uselessness of Public Use’
7. William A. Fischel (1987), ‘The Economics of Land Use Exactions: A Property Rights Analysis’
8. Daniel R. Fischel and Alan O. Sykes (1999), ‘Governmental Liability for Breach of Contract’
9. Richard A. Epstein (1987), ‘The Public Trust Doctrine’
PART II FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND RELIGION
10. R.H. Coase (1977), ‘Advertising and Free Speech’
11. Fred S. McChesney (1988), ‘A Positive Regulatory Theory of the First Amendment’
12. Michael W. McConnell and Richard A. Posner (1989), ‘An Economic Approach to Issues of Religious Freedom’
13. Daniel A. Farber (1991), ‘Free Speech without Romance: Public Choice and the First Amendment’
PART III DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION
14. Cass R. Sunstein (1984), ‘Naked Preferences and the Constitution’
15. Herbert Hovenkamp (1988), ‘The Political Economy of Substantive Due Process’
Name Index
