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Austrian Law and Economics
The use of economics to study law was pioneered by the Austrian School of Economics. The nineteenth century founders of the school believed that economics could contribute to understanding the spontaneous development of common law as well as the nature of legal rights. For this insightful two-volume collection Mario Rizzo has selected key papers from today’s vibrant Austrian School, focusing on the study of property, market-chosen law, slippery-slope analysis, entrepreneurship, institutions, decentralized social knowledge, and the evolution of legal institutions.
These volumes represent the cutting-edge Austrian contributions to economics and will be an essential reference source for both students and researchers.
These volumes represent the cutting-edge Austrian contributions to economics and will be an essential reference source for both students and researchers.
More Information
Contributors
Contents
More Information
The use of economics to study law was pioneered by the Austrian School of Economics. The nineteenth century founders of the school believed that economics could contribute to understanding the spontaneous development of common law as well as the nature of legal rights. For this insightful two-volume collection Mario Rizzo has selected key papers from today’s vibrant Austrian School, focusing on the study of property, market-chosen law, slippery-slope analysis, entrepreneurship, institutions, decentralized social knowledge, and the evolution of legal institutions.
These volumes represent the cutting-edge Austrian contributions to economics and will be an essential reference source for both students and researchers.
These volumes represent the cutting-edge Austrian contributions to economics and will be an essential reference source for both students and researchers.
Contributors
53 articles, dating from 1969 to 2008
Contributors include: B. Benson, P. Boettke, J. Buchanan, R. Epstein, J. Hasnas, I. Kirzner, P. Leeson, L. Lachmann, C. Menger, L. von Mises, G. Whitman, T. Zywicki
Contributors include: B. Benson, P. Boettke, J. Buchanan, R. Epstein, J. Hasnas, I. Kirzner, P. Leeson, L. Lachmann, C. Menger, L. von Mises, G. Whitman, T. Zywicki
Contents
Contents:
Volume I
Acknowledgements
Introduction Mario J. Rizzo
PART I GENERAL SURVEYS OF AUSTRIAN LAW AND ECONOMICS
1. Gregory Scott Crespi (1998), ‘Exploring the Complicationist Gambit: An Austrian Approach to the Economic Analysis of Law’
2. Linda A. Schwartzstein (1994), ‘An Austrian Economic View of Legal Process’
3. Christopher T. Wonnell (1986), ‘Contract Law and the Austrian School of Economics’
PART II METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
4. Elisabeth Krecké and Carine Krecké (2007), ‘The Anti-Foundational Dilemma: Normative Implications for the Economic Analysis of Law’
5. Elisabeth Krecké (2004), ‘Economic Analysis and Legal Pragmatism’
6. Douglas Glen Whitman (2004), ‘Group Selection and Methodological Individualism: Compatible and Complementary’
7. Mario J. Rizzo (1999), ‘Which Kind of Legal Order? Logical Coherence and Praxeological Coherence’
PART III PROPERTY
8. Ludwig von Mises ([1936] 1981), ‘Ownership’
9. Jörg Guido Hülsmann (2004), ‘The A Priori Foundations of Property Economics’
10. William Barnett II, Walter Block and Gene Callahan (2005), ‘The Paradox of Coase as a Defender of Free Markets’
11. Israel M. Kirzner (1979), ‘Entrepreneurship, Entitlement, and Economic Justice’
PART IV MENGER, HAYEK AND COMMON LAW
12. Carl Menger ([1963] 1985), ‘The “Organic” Origin of Law and the Exact Understanding Thereof’
13. A.I. Ogus (1989), ‘Law and Spontaneous Order: Hayek’s Contribution to Legal Theory’
14. Todd J. Zywicki and Anthony B. Sanders (2008), ‘Posner, Hayek, and the Economic Analysis of Law’
15. John Hasnas (2005), ‘Hayek, the Common Law, and Fluid Drive’
16. Scott A. Beaulier, Peter J. Boettke and Christopher J. Coyne (2005), ‘Knowledge, Economics, and Coordination: Understanding Hayek’s Legal Theory’
PART V EVOLUTION AND LAW
17. Douglas Glen Whitman (1998), ‘Hayek contra Pangloss on Evolutionary Systems’
18. Suri Ratnapala (1993), ‘The Trident Case and the Evolutionary Theory of F.A. Hayek’
19. Suri Ratnapala (2001), ‘Eighteenth-Century Evolutionary Thought and its Relevance in the Age of Legislation’
20. Bruce L. Benson (1989), ‘The Spontaneous Evolution of Commercial Law’
21. John Hasnas (2005), ‘Toward a Theory of Empirical Natural Rights’
22. Todd J. Zywicki (2003), ‘The Rise and Fall of Efficiency in the Common Law: A Supply-Side Analysis’
23. Douglas Glen Whitman (2000), ‘Evolution of the Common Law and the Emergence of Compromise’
Volume II
Acknowledgements
An introduction by the editors to both volumes appears in Volume I
PART I COMMON LAW, BALANCING, AND EFFICIENCY
1. Mario J. Rizzo (1980), ‘Law Amid Flux: The Economics of Negligence and Strict Liability in Tort’
2. Mario J. Rizzo (1980), ‘The Mirage of Efficiency’
3. James M. Buchanan (1969), ‘Private and Social Cost’
4. Peter Lewin (1982), ‘Pollution Externalities: Social Cost and Strict Liability’
5. Roy E. Cordato (1996), ‘Time Passage and the Economics of Coming to the Nuisance: Reassessing the Coasean Perspective’
6. Mario J. Rizzo (1985), ‘Rules Versus Cost-Benefit Analysis in the Common Law’
PART II RULES
7. Richard A. Epstein (2006), ‘Intuition, Custom, and Protocol: How to Make Sound Decisions with Limited Knowledge’
8. Douglas Glen Whitman (2009), ‘The Rules of Abstraction’
9. Todd J. Zywicki (1998), ‘Epstein and Polanyi on Simple Rules, Complex Systems, and Decentralization’
PART III SLIPPERY SLOPE ANALYSIS
10. Mario J. Rizzo and Douglas Glen Whitman (2003), ‘The Camel’s Nose is in the Tent: Rules, Theories, and Slippery Slopes’
11. Douglas Glen Whitman and Mario J. Rizzo (2007), ‘Paternalist Slopes’
PART IV INSTITUTIONS
12. L.M. Lachmann (1971), ‘On Institutions’
13. Karol Boudreaux and Paul Dragos Aligica (2007), ‘The Evolutionary Path’
14. Karol Boudreaux and Paul Dragos Aligica (2007), ‘An Intellectual Toolbox for the Creation of Property Rights’
15. David A. Harper (2003), ‘Institutions I: Rule of Law, Property and Contract’
16. David A. Harper (2003), ‘Institutions II: Money, Political and Legal Decentralisation and Economic Freedom’
17. Peter J. Boettke, Christopher J. Coyne and Peter T. Leeson (2007), ‘Saving Government Failure Theory from Itself: Recasting Political Economy from an Austrian Perspective’
PART V MARKET CHOSEN LAW
18. Edward Stringham (1999), ‘Market Chosen Law’
19. Edward Stringham (2003), ‘The Extralegal Development of Securities Trading in Seventeenth-Century Amsterdam’
20. Edward Stringham (2002), ‘The Emergence of the London Stock Exchange as a Self-Policing Club’
21. Anthony Ogus (1999), ‘Competition Between National Legal Systems: A Contribution of Economic Analysis to Comparative Law’
22. Peter T. Leeson (2007), ‘Trading with Bandits’
23. Peter T. Leeson (2007), ‘An-arrgh-chy: The Law and Economics of Pirate Organization’
PART VI MINIMIZING THE STATE
24. John Hasnas (2003), ‘Reflections on the Minimal State’
25. Peter T. Leeson (2008), ‘Coordination Without Command: Stretching the Scope of Spontaneous Order’
26. Peter T. Leeson (2006), ‘Efficient Anarchy’
27. Peter T. Leeson (2008), ‘How Important is State Enforcement for Trade?’
28. Walter Block and Thomas J. DiLorenzo (2000), ‘Is Voluntary Government Possible? A Critique of Constitutional Economics’
29. Randall G. Holcombe (2004), ‘Government: Unnecessary but Inevitable’
PART VII DISPERSED KNOWLEDGE AND THE LIMITS OF LAW
30. Mario J. Rizzo (2005), ‘The Problem of Moral Dirigisme: A New Argument Against Moralistic Legislation’
Volume I
Acknowledgements
Introduction Mario J. Rizzo
PART I GENERAL SURVEYS OF AUSTRIAN LAW AND ECONOMICS
1. Gregory Scott Crespi (1998), ‘Exploring the Complicationist Gambit: An Austrian Approach to the Economic Analysis of Law’
2. Linda A. Schwartzstein (1994), ‘An Austrian Economic View of Legal Process’
3. Christopher T. Wonnell (1986), ‘Contract Law and the Austrian School of Economics’
PART II METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
4. Elisabeth Krecké and Carine Krecké (2007), ‘The Anti-Foundational Dilemma: Normative Implications for the Economic Analysis of Law’
5. Elisabeth Krecké (2004), ‘Economic Analysis and Legal Pragmatism’
6. Douglas Glen Whitman (2004), ‘Group Selection and Methodological Individualism: Compatible and Complementary’
7. Mario J. Rizzo (1999), ‘Which Kind of Legal Order? Logical Coherence and Praxeological Coherence’
PART III PROPERTY
8. Ludwig von Mises ([1936] 1981), ‘Ownership’
9. Jörg Guido Hülsmann (2004), ‘The A Priori Foundations of Property Economics’
10. William Barnett II, Walter Block and Gene Callahan (2005), ‘The Paradox of Coase as a Defender of Free Markets’
11. Israel M. Kirzner (1979), ‘Entrepreneurship, Entitlement, and Economic Justice’
PART IV MENGER, HAYEK AND COMMON LAW
12. Carl Menger ([1963] 1985), ‘The “Organic” Origin of Law and the Exact Understanding Thereof’
13. A.I. Ogus (1989), ‘Law and Spontaneous Order: Hayek’s Contribution to Legal Theory’
14. Todd J. Zywicki and Anthony B. Sanders (2008), ‘Posner, Hayek, and the Economic Analysis of Law’
15. John Hasnas (2005), ‘Hayek, the Common Law, and Fluid Drive’
16. Scott A. Beaulier, Peter J. Boettke and Christopher J. Coyne (2005), ‘Knowledge, Economics, and Coordination: Understanding Hayek’s Legal Theory’
PART V EVOLUTION AND LAW
17. Douglas Glen Whitman (1998), ‘Hayek contra Pangloss on Evolutionary Systems’
18. Suri Ratnapala (1993), ‘The Trident Case and the Evolutionary Theory of F.A. Hayek’
19. Suri Ratnapala (2001), ‘Eighteenth-Century Evolutionary Thought and its Relevance in the Age of Legislation’
20. Bruce L. Benson (1989), ‘The Spontaneous Evolution of Commercial Law’
21. John Hasnas (2005), ‘Toward a Theory of Empirical Natural Rights’
22. Todd J. Zywicki (2003), ‘The Rise and Fall of Efficiency in the Common Law: A Supply-Side Analysis’
23. Douglas Glen Whitman (2000), ‘Evolution of the Common Law and the Emergence of Compromise’
Volume II
Acknowledgements
An introduction by the editors to both volumes appears in Volume I
PART I COMMON LAW, BALANCING, AND EFFICIENCY
1. Mario J. Rizzo (1980), ‘Law Amid Flux: The Economics of Negligence and Strict Liability in Tort’
2. Mario J. Rizzo (1980), ‘The Mirage of Efficiency’
3. James M. Buchanan (1969), ‘Private and Social Cost’
4. Peter Lewin (1982), ‘Pollution Externalities: Social Cost and Strict Liability’
5. Roy E. Cordato (1996), ‘Time Passage and the Economics of Coming to the Nuisance: Reassessing the Coasean Perspective’
6. Mario J. Rizzo (1985), ‘Rules Versus Cost-Benefit Analysis in the Common Law’
PART II RULES
7. Richard A. Epstein (2006), ‘Intuition, Custom, and Protocol: How to Make Sound Decisions with Limited Knowledge’
8. Douglas Glen Whitman (2009), ‘The Rules of Abstraction’
9. Todd J. Zywicki (1998), ‘Epstein and Polanyi on Simple Rules, Complex Systems, and Decentralization’
PART III SLIPPERY SLOPE ANALYSIS
10. Mario J. Rizzo and Douglas Glen Whitman (2003), ‘The Camel’s Nose is in the Tent: Rules, Theories, and Slippery Slopes’
11. Douglas Glen Whitman and Mario J. Rizzo (2007), ‘Paternalist Slopes’
PART IV INSTITUTIONS
12. L.M. Lachmann (1971), ‘On Institutions’
13. Karol Boudreaux and Paul Dragos Aligica (2007), ‘The Evolutionary Path’
14. Karol Boudreaux and Paul Dragos Aligica (2007), ‘An Intellectual Toolbox for the Creation of Property Rights’
15. David A. Harper (2003), ‘Institutions I: Rule of Law, Property and Contract’
16. David A. Harper (2003), ‘Institutions II: Money, Political and Legal Decentralisation and Economic Freedom’
17. Peter J. Boettke, Christopher J. Coyne and Peter T. Leeson (2007), ‘Saving Government Failure Theory from Itself: Recasting Political Economy from an Austrian Perspective’
PART V MARKET CHOSEN LAW
18. Edward Stringham (1999), ‘Market Chosen Law’
19. Edward Stringham (2003), ‘The Extralegal Development of Securities Trading in Seventeenth-Century Amsterdam’
20. Edward Stringham (2002), ‘The Emergence of the London Stock Exchange as a Self-Policing Club’
21. Anthony Ogus (1999), ‘Competition Between National Legal Systems: A Contribution of Economic Analysis to Comparative Law’
22. Peter T. Leeson (2007), ‘Trading with Bandits’
23. Peter T. Leeson (2007), ‘An-arrgh-chy: The Law and Economics of Pirate Organization’
PART VI MINIMIZING THE STATE
24. John Hasnas (2003), ‘Reflections on the Minimal State’
25. Peter T. Leeson (2008), ‘Coordination Without Command: Stretching the Scope of Spontaneous Order’
26. Peter T. Leeson (2006), ‘Efficient Anarchy’
27. Peter T. Leeson (2008), ‘How Important is State Enforcement for Trade?’
28. Walter Block and Thomas J. DiLorenzo (2000), ‘Is Voluntary Government Possible? A Critique of Constitutional Economics’
29. Randall G. Holcombe (2004), ‘Government: Unnecessary but Inevitable’
PART VII DISPERSED KNOWLEDGE AND THE LIMITS OF LAW
30. Mario J. Rizzo (2005), ‘The Problem of Moral Dirigisme: A New Argument Against Moralistic Legislation’
