Paperback
Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume I
Theory
9781785363344 Edward Elgar Publishing
The first volume of this wide-ranging Handbook contains original contributions by world-class specialists. It provides up-to-date surveys of the main game-theoretic tools commonly used to model industrial organization topics. The Handbook covers numerous subjects in detail including, among others, the tools of lattice programming, supermodular and aggregative games, monopolistic competition, horizontal and vertically differentiated good models, dynamic and Stackelberg games, entry games, evolutionary games with adaptive players, asymmetric information, moral hazard, learning and information sharing models.
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Critical Acclaim
Contributors
Contents
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Industrial organization studies how markets allocate resources, specifically when there are few agents or when there are frictions that render the price-taking paradigm unsuitable. Game theory explores situations in which agents interact strategically and provides a useful foundation for studying many traditional industrial organization topics.
The first volume of this wide-ranging Handbook contains original contributions by world-class specialists. It provides up-to-date surveys of the main tools of game theory that are used to model industrial organization topics. The Handbook covers numerous subjects in detail including, among others, the tools of lattice programming, supermodular and aggregative games, monopolistic competition, horizontal and vertically differentiated good models, dynamic and Stackelberg games, entry games, evolutionary games with adaptive players, asymmetric information, moral hazard, and learning and information sharing models.
Technical yet accessible, this comprehensive resource will be required reading for both established researchers as well as graduate or advanced undergraduate students in industrial economics and game theory.
The first volume of this wide-ranging Handbook contains original contributions by world-class specialists. It provides up-to-date surveys of the main tools of game theory that are used to model industrial organization topics. The Handbook covers numerous subjects in detail including, among others, the tools of lattice programming, supermodular and aggregative games, monopolistic competition, horizontal and vertically differentiated good models, dynamic and Stackelberg games, entry games, evolutionary games with adaptive players, asymmetric information, moral hazard, and learning and information sharing models.
Technical yet accessible, this comprehensive resource will be required reading for both established researchers as well as graduate or advanced undergraduate students in industrial economics and game theory.
Critical Acclaim
‘The publication of this Handbook, bringing together game theory and industrial organization, is an occasion worth celebrating. . . . I am truly delighted that there is now a Handbook devoted to this transformative partnership.’
– From the foreword by Eric Maskin
‘Game theoretic methods are central in the study of oligopoly markets. The surveys in this Handbook provide a broad introduction to the relevant game theory topics and their applications in oligopoly theory. There is an emphasis on recent developments, such as lattice theory and supermodular games. The Handbook will be a valuable resource for researchers and students.’
– Robert Porter, Northwestern University, US
‘With these two volumes, Professors Corchon and Marini have provided an invaluable public good to our profession. They have gathered leading scholars to present a broad and deep overview of the definitive impact that game theory had, and continues to have, on the field of industrial organization over recent years. Any serious researcher wanting to take stock of advances in the field should certainly consider studying the material covered in these volumes, from the more fundamental issues in Volume 1 to the more applied topics presented in Volume 2.’
– David Martimort, Paris School of Economics, France
– From the foreword by Eric Maskin
‘Game theoretic methods are central in the study of oligopoly markets. The surveys in this Handbook provide a broad introduction to the relevant game theory topics and their applications in oligopoly theory. There is an emphasis on recent developments, such as lattice theory and supermodular games. The Handbook will be a valuable resource for researchers and students.’
– Robert Porter, Northwestern University, US
‘With these two volumes, Professors Corchon and Marini have provided an invaluable public good to our profession. They have gathered leading scholars to present a broad and deep overview of the definitive impact that game theory had, and continues to have, on the field of industrial organization over recent years. Any serious researcher wanting to take stock of advances in the field should certainly consider studying the material covered in these volumes, from the more fundamental issues in Volume 1 to the more applied topics presented in Volume 2.’
– David Martimort, Paris School of Economics, France
Contributors
Contributors: R. Amir, A. Attar, G.I. Bischi, F. Bloch, L.C. Corchón, S. Currarini, C. d’Aspremont, F. Feri, J.J. Gabszewicz, M.K. Jensen, L.A. Julien, F. Lamantia, I. Macho-Stadler, M. Marini, E. Maskin, D. Pérez‐Castrillo, C. Pimienta, M. Polo, D. Radi, R.A. Ritz, K. Ritzberger, O. Tarola, J.-F. Thisse, A. Urbano, P. Ushchev, X. Vives, J. Zhao
Contents
Contents:
Foreword by Eric Maskin
1. Introduction
Luis C. Corchón and Marco A. Marini
PART I BASIC GAMES IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
2. Strategic complementarities in oligopoly
Xavier Vives
3. On the Cournot and Bertrand oligopolies and the theory of supermodular games
Rabah Amir
4. Aggregative games
Martin Kaae Jensen
5. Monopolistic competition without apology
Jacques-François Thisse and Philip Ushchev
6. Oligopoly and product differentiation
Jean J. Gabszewicz and Ornella Tarola
7. Oligopolistic competition and welfare
Robert A. Ritz
PART II DYNAMIC GAMES IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
8. Dynamic games
Klaus Ritzberger
9. Strategic refinements
Carlos Pimienta
10. Stackelberg games
Ludovic A. Julien
11. Entry games and free entry equilibria
Michele Polo
12. Evolutionary oligopoly games with heterogeneous adaptive players
Gian Italo Bischi, Fabio Lamantia and Davide Radi
PART III GAMES OF COLLUSION IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
13. Coalitions and networks in oligopolies
Francis Bloch
14. TU oligopoly games and industrial cooperation
Jingang Zhao
PART IV INFORMATION GAMES
15. Trading under asymmetric information: positive and normative implications
Andrea Attar and Claude d’Aspremont
16. Moral hazard: Base models and two extensions
Inés Macho-Stadler and David Pérez‐Castrillo
17. Learning in markets
Amparo Urbano
18. Information sharing in oligopoly
Sergio Currarini and Francesco Feri
Index
Foreword by Eric Maskin
1. Introduction
Luis C. Corchón and Marco A. Marini
PART I BASIC GAMES IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
2. Strategic complementarities in oligopoly
Xavier Vives
3. On the Cournot and Bertrand oligopolies and the theory of supermodular games
Rabah Amir
4. Aggregative games
Martin Kaae Jensen
5. Monopolistic competition without apology
Jacques-François Thisse and Philip Ushchev
6. Oligopoly and product differentiation
Jean J. Gabszewicz and Ornella Tarola
7. Oligopolistic competition and welfare
Robert A. Ritz
PART II DYNAMIC GAMES IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
8. Dynamic games
Klaus Ritzberger
9. Strategic refinements
Carlos Pimienta
10. Stackelberg games
Ludovic A. Julien
11. Entry games and free entry equilibria
Michele Polo
12. Evolutionary oligopoly games with heterogeneous adaptive players
Gian Italo Bischi, Fabio Lamantia and Davide Radi
PART III GAMES OF COLLUSION IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
13. Coalitions and networks in oligopolies
Francis Bloch
14. TU oligopoly games and industrial cooperation
Jingang Zhao
PART IV INFORMATION GAMES
15. Trading under asymmetric information: positive and normative implications
Andrea Attar and Claude d’Aspremont
16. Moral hazard: Base models and two extensions
Inés Macho-Stadler and David Pérez‐Castrillo
17. Learning in markets
Amparo Urbano
18. Information sharing in oligopoly
Sergio Currarini and Francesco Feri
Index
